

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 26

JANUARY 1948

No. 2

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

By J. Robert Oppenheimer

One day in a clearing in the forest, Confucius came upon a woman in deep mourning, wracked by sorrow. He learned that her son had just been eaten by a tiger; and he attempted to console her, to make clear how unavailing her tears would be, to restore her composure. But when he left, he had barely reentered the forest, when the renewed sounds of weeping recalled him. "That is not all," the woman said. "You see, my husband was eaten here a year ago by this same tiger." Again Confucius attempted to console her and again he left only to hear renewed weeping. "Is that not all?" "Oh, no," she said. "The year before that my father too was eaten by the tiger." Confucius thought for a moment, and then said: "This would not seem to be a very salutary neighborhood. Why don't you leave it?" The woman wrung her hands. "I know," she said, "I know; but, you see, the government is so excellent."

THIS wry tale comes to mind often when one observes the efforts which the Government of the United States is making to turn the development of atomic energy to good ends, and the frustrations and sorrows of the negotiations within the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to which these efforts toward international control have now been reduced.

In these notes I should like to write briefly of some of the sources of United States policy, and of the formulation of that policy in the context of the contemporary world. Against the background of present prospects, which manifestly make success in any short term seem rather unlikely, to write of these matters today must of necessity be difficult. We are beyond advocacy, and not yet far enough for history. Yet the effort may not be without some slight usefulness in helping us to achieve an appreciation of what was sound, what was timely and what was lasting in the policy adopted by the United States, and even more than that, in helping us to see why this policy has not been successful. To answer simply that we have failed because of non-coöperation on the part of the Soviet Government is certainly to give a most essential part of a true answer. Yet we must ask ourselves why in a matter so overwhelmingly important to our in-

terest we have not been successful; and we must be prepared to try to understand what lessons this has for our future conduct.

Clearly, such understanding must depend in the first instance on insight into the nature and sources of Soviet policy, and indeed into our own political processes. Such an analysis, which in any final sense may transcend the collective wisdom of our time, is of course wholly beyond the scope of this paper. These notes are concerned solely with questions of our intent with regard to atomic control, questions which, though necessarily over-abstract, are yet a part of history.

II

The development of atomic energy had none of the other-worldliness normally characteristic of new developments in science. It was marked from the very first by an extreme self-consciousness on the part of all participants, which has given it an often heroic, though not infrequently rather comic, aspect. Thus when the phenomenon of fission was discovered by Hahn, after less than a decade of intensive exploration of nuclear structure and nuclear transmutations, we were all very quick to hail it, not as a beautiful discovery, but as a likely source of a great technological development. Long before it was known that conditions could be realized for maintaining a fission chain reaction, long before the difficulties in that enterprise were appreciated or methods for their solution sketched out, the phenomenon of fission was greeted as a possible source of atomic explosives, and their development was urged upon many governments. Thus, it happened that when, in the United States, the Manhattan District was approaching the completion of its task, and atomic weapons were in fact almost ready for use, there was a fairly well-informed group of people who in a sort of fraternal privacy had discussed what these developments might mean — what problems they would raise, and along what lines the solution might be sought. After the use of the weapons at the end of the war, much of this thinking became public; it achieved a sort of synoptic codification because of the joint requirements of easy comprehension and military security.

Yet it should be not without usefulness now to recall how the problem appeared to us in the summer of 1945, when it became fully apparent that atomic weapons and the large-scale release of atomic energy were not only realizable, but were about to be

realized. Even at that time a good deal of thought had gone into what subsequently came to be known as the peaceful use of atomic energy. On the technical side this preoccupation was natural enough, since many interesting avenues of exploration had been sealed off by the overriding requirements of the military program, and we were naturally curious to sketch out what might lie along these avenues against that time when there should be leisure for their pursuit.

But beyond that there was a political consideration. It was clear to us that the forms and methods by which mankind might in the future hope to protect itself against the dangers of unlimited atomic warfare would be decisively influenced just by the answer to the question "Is there any good in the atom?" From the first, it has been clear that the answer to this question would have a certain subtlety. The answer would be "yes," and emphatically "yes," but it would be a "yes" unconvincing, conditional and temporizing compared to the categorical affirmative of the atomic bomb itself. In particular, the advantages which could come from the exploitation of atomic energy do not appear to be of such a character that they are likely to contribute in a *very short term* to the economic or technical well-being of mankind. They are among the long-range goods. Thus they could not be expected to recommend themselves as urgent to the peoples of countries devastated by war, suffering from hunger, poverty, homelessness and the awful confusion of a shattered civilization. The importance of these limitations was perhaps not adequately recognized as a deterrent to the sort of interest in the development of atomic energy on the part of other peoples and other governments which might have played so great a part in assuring their support for our hopes. Only among the professional scientists, for whom the interest in the *development* of atomic energy is rather immediate, could we have expected to find, and did we in fact find, an enlightened enthusiasm for coöperation in this development.

Only two classes of peaceful applications of atomic energy were then apparent. To the best of my knowledge, only two are apparent today. One is the development of a new source of power; the other is a family of new instruments of research, investigation, technology and therapy.

Of the former, it was clear two years ago, and it is clear today, that although the generation of useful power from atomic sources

would assuredly be a soluble problem and would under favorable circumstances make decisive progress within a decade, the question of the usefulness of this power, the scale on which it could be made available, and the costs and general economic values, would take a long time to answer. As we all know, the answers depend on the raw material situation — essentially, that is, on the availability and cost of natural uranium and thorium — and on the extent to which one could in practice manage to consume the abundant isotope of uranium and thorium as nuclear fuels. Thus, no honest evaluation of the prospects of power in 1945 could fail to recognize the necessity of intensive development and exploration. Equally, no honest evaluation could give assurances as to the ultimate outcome beyond those general assurances which the history of our technology justifies. Certainly no evaluation at that time, nor for that matter today, could justify regarding atomic power as an immediate economic aid to a devastated and fuel-hungry world, nor give its development the urgency which the control of atomic armaments would be sure to have once the nature and ferocity of the weapons had been made clear to all.

With regard to the use of tracer materials, of radioactive species, and of radiations for science, the practical arts, for technology and medicine, we were in a better position to judge what might come. The use of tracer materials was not new. The last decade — the 1930's — had seen increasingly varied and effective applications of them. The use of radiation for the study of the properties of matter, for diagnosis and for therapy was likewise not new. Several decades of hopeful and bitter experiences gave us some notion of the power and limitations of these tools. What was held in store by the development of atomic reactors and of new methods for the handling of radioactive materials and the separation of isotopes, was a much greater variety and a vastly greater quantity of tracer materials, and a far higher intensity of radiation than had been available in the past. That this would be a stimulus to physical and biological study was clear; that its value would in the first instance depend on the skilful development of chemical, physical and biological techniques, and that this development even under the best circumstances would be a gradual and continuing one, we knew as well.

Thus, our picture of the peaceful uses of atomic energy was neither trivial nor heroic: on the one hand, many years, perhaps many decades, of development — largely engineering develop-

ment — with the purpose of providing new sources of power; on the other hand, a new arsenal of instruments for the exploration of the physical and biological world, and in time, for their further control, to be added to the always growing arsenal of what scientists and engineers have had available.

Three other matters were clear at that time. On the one hand, the development of atomic power could not be separated from technological development essential for and largely sufficient for the manufacture of atomic weapons. On the other hand, neither the development of power nor the effective and widespread use of the new tools of research and technology could prosper fully without a very considerable openness and candor with regard to the technical realities — an openness and candor difficult to reconcile with the traditional requirements of military security about the development of weapons of war. To these general considerations we should add again: although the peaceful use of atomic energy might well challenge the interests of technical people, and appear as an inspiration to statesmen concerned with the welfare of mankind, it could not make a direct appeal to the weary, hungry, almost desperate peoples of a war-ravaged world. Such an appeal, if made, could hardly be made in honesty.

III

Important though these views as to the peaceful future of atomic energy may have been, they were overshadowed then as they have been overshadowed since by a preoccupation of quite another sort. In an over-simplified statement, this is the preoccupation for the “control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to prevent its use for destructive purposes.” Two sorts of considerations bear on this problem, one deriving from the nature of atomic armament, and the other from the political climate of the postwar world. The former set of arguments has perhaps been given more relative weight in public discussions. Surely it is in the latter that the essential wellsprings of policy should have lain.

Even the weapons tested in New Mexico and used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki served to demonstrate that with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare. It was quite clear that with nations committed to atomic armament, weapons even more terrifying, and perhaps vastly more terrifying, than those already delivered would be developed; and it was clear even from a casual estimate

of costs that nations so committed to atomic armament could accumulate these weapons in truly terrifying numbers.

As the war ended, adequate defenses against the delivery of atomic weapons almost certainly did not exist. There would be variations, as military developments progressed, in the advantages of offense and defense. If effective antiaircraft interception is developed before new types of aircraft or rockets, there may even be periods during which the delivery of atomic weapons is seriously handicapped. But it was clear then that for the most part the development of these weapons had given to strategic bombardment — that form of warfare which peculiarly characterized the last war, and contributed so much to the desolation of Europe and Asia — a new and important and *qualitative* increase in ferocity. It was not necessary to envisage novel and ingenious methods of delivery, such as the suitcase and the tramp steamer, to make this point clear to us. To this must be added a preoccupation not unnatural for us in the United States. It seemed unreasonable to suppose that any future major conflict would leave this country as relatively unharmed as had the last two wars and as totally unscathed by strategic bombardment. These points have been so commonly made, and with such fervor, that they have perhaps obscured to some extent the true nature of the issues involved in the international control of atomic energy.

In this last war, the fabric of civilized life has been worn so thin in Europe that there is the gravest danger that it will not hold. Twice in a generation, the efforts and the moral energies of a large part of mankind have been devoted to the fighting of wars. If the atomic bomb was to have meaning in the contemporary world, it would have to be in showing that not modern man, not navies, not ground forces, but war itself was obsolete. The question of the future of atomic energy thus appeared in one main constructive context: "What can be done with this development to make it an instrument for the preservation of peace and for bringing about those altered relations between the sovereign nations on the basis of which there is some reason to hope that peace can be preserved?"

Although this may have been the question in principle, a far more concrete and immediate problem faced the world. It is true that there may be a certain myopia in too great a preoccupation with relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is true that other sources of conflict, other possibilities of war,

and other problems which must be solved if the world is to achieve peace can well be discerned and could well be decisive. But although the coöperation — on a scale, with an intimacy and effectiveness heretofore unknown — between the Soviet Union and the United States may not be sufficient for the establishment of peace, it clearly was necessary. Thus, the question naturally presented itself whether the coöperative control and development of atomic energy might not play a unique and decisive part in the program of establishing such coöperation. Clearly, quite widely divergent views might be held as to the readiness of the Soviet Union to embark on such coöperation — varying from the belief that it would be forthcoming if the United States indicated the desire for it to the conviction that it was not in our power to bring it about. The prevalent view, and, I believe, that on which our subsequent policy was based, was that such coöperation would represent a reversal of past Soviet policy, and to some extent a repudiation of elements of Soviet political theory, very much more incisive in fact than the corresponding attitudes on our part. The prevalent view, that is, saw in the problems of atomic energy, not an opportunity to allow the leaders of the Soviet state to carry out a policy of international coöperation, of openness, candor and renunciation of violence to which they were already committed; rather, it saw an opportunity to cause a decisive change in the whole trend of Soviet policy, without which the prospects of an assured peace were indeed rather gloomy, and which might well be, if accomplished, the turning point in the pattern of international relations.

Why did the field of atomic energy appear hopeful for this endeavor? It appeared hopeful only in part because of the terrifying nature of atomic warfare, which to all peoples and some governments would provide a strong incentive to adapt themselves to a changing technology. As such, atomic weapons were only a sort of consummation of the total character of warfare as waged in this last world war, a sort of final argument, if one were needed, a straw to break the camel's back. But there were other points far more specific. The control of atomic weapons always appeared possible only on the basis of an intensive and working collaboration between peoples of many nationalities, on the creation (at least in this area) of supra-national patterns of communication, of work and of development. The development of atomic energy lay in an area peculiarly suited to such internationalization, and in

fact requiring it for the most effective exploitation, almost on technical grounds alone. The development of atomic energy lay in a field international by tradition and untouched by preëxisting national patterns of control. Thus the problem as it appeared in the summer of 1945 was to use our understanding of atomic energy, and the developments that we had carried out, with their implied hope and implied threat, to see whether in this area international barriers might not be broken down and patterns of candor and coöperation established which would make the peace of the world.

It was impossible even at that time not to raise two questions of some gravity. One was whether Soviet policy had not already congealed into almost total non-coöperation. The difficulties during the war years, both in coöperation on technical problems which had some analogy to atomic energy, and in the more general matters of the coördination of strategy, could certainly be read as a bad augury for a coöperative future. A second and related question was whether the development of atomic weapons by Great Britain, Canada and the United States, and the announcement of this completed development at the end of the war, might not itself appear to cast a doubt upon our willingness to coöperate in the future with allies with whom we had not in this field been willing to coöperate during the war.

In any case, these doubts pointed rather strongly to the need for discussions between the heads of state and their immediate advisors, in an attempt to re-open the issue of far-reaching coöperation. The later relegation of problems of atomic energy to discussions within the United Nations, where matters of the highest policy could only be touched upon with difficulty and clumsily, would appear to have prejudiced the chances of any genuine meeting of minds.

In the field of atomic energy our own security demanded a quite new approach to international problems. The security of all peoples would be jeopardized by a failure to establish new systems of openness and coöperation between the nations; and many favorable circumstances made concrete coöperative action appear attractive and feasible. Thus atomic energy had a special rôle in international affairs. Yet it should be stressed again that no prospect of intimate collaboration in this field appeared likely of success unless coupled with a comparable coöperation in other fields. It should be stressed again that if atomic energy appeared

of some importance as an international issue, it was precisely because it was not entirely separable from other issues, precisely because what was done in that field might be prototypical of what could be done in others, and precisely because we appeared to have in this a certain freedom of manoeuvre — which our technical developments appeared to have given us — to ask for a consideration on the highest possible plane of the means by which the nations of the world could learn so to alter their relations that future wars would no longer be likely.

IV

The views which have just been outlined no doubt reflect only roughly those current in the closing months of the war, among the people to whom familiarity or responsibility had made the nature of atomic energy apparent. That considerations such as these should have found expression in the policy of the people and the Government of the United States is itself somewhat surprising. One must bear in mind that the field of atomic energy was quite unfamiliar to the people of this country, that the whole spirit and temper of a development of this kind would require explaining and reexplaining. One must bear in mind that for reasons of security much that was relevant to an understanding of the problem could not be revealed and cannot be revealed today. One must bear in mind that with the end of the war there was a widespread nostalgia among all our people that the efforts and tensions of the war years be relaxed and that we return to a more familiar and less arduous life. That under these circumstances the United States should have developed, and in large part committed itself to, a policy of genuine internationalization of atomic energy, and that it should have fortified this policy with concrete, if sketchy, proposals as to how the internationalization was to be accomplished, and indeed that it should have taken the initiative in putting these views before the governments of the other Powers — this should not be too lightly dismissed as a remarkable achievement in the democratic formulation of public policy. Nevertheless, this has cost something.

Perhaps most of all what it has cost is that in our preoccupation with determining and clarifying our own policy, we have given far too little thought to attempting to influence that of the Soviet Union on the only plane where such an influence could be effective. We have allowed our own internal preoccupations to make us

content to put forward our views in the world forum of the United Nations, without pursuing early enough, on a high enough plane, or with a fixed enough resolution, the objective of making the heads of the Soviet state in part, at least, party to our effort. Our internal effort has cost delay, it has cost confusion, it has cost the injection of some irrelevant and some inconsistent elements in our policy with regard to atomic energy. Above all, it has cost a sort of schizophrenic separation of our dealings in this field from our dealings in all others. In fact, in order to keep pace with political developments all over the world, we have found ourselves negating in many concrete political contexts the possibility of that confidence and that coöperation which we were asking for in the field of atomic energy. It is surely idle to speculate, as it may well be meaningless to ask, whether, if this country had had its own thoughts in better order in June 1945, and had been prepared to act upon them, its policies would have met with greater success. Only an historian to whom the intimacies of Soviet thinking and Soviet decision are freely available would be able to begin to answer such a question. But the evidence, as the actual course of events has unfolded it, necessarily gives little support to the view that by prompter, clearer and more magnanimous action we might have achieved our purposes.

The history of the development of United States atomic energy policy from the first pronouncements of President Truman and Secretary Stimson on August 6, 1945, to the most recent detailed working papers of the United States representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, is of public record, and has in large part been summarized by the State Department's report "International Control of Atomic Energy."¹ Two aspects of this development need to be specially mentioned. One has to do with what may be called the aim of United States policy — the sketch of our picture of the world as we would like to see it in so far as atomic energy was concerned. Here, the principles of internationalization, openness, candor and the complete absence of secrecy, and the emphasis on coöperative, constructive development, the absence of international rivalry, the absence of legal right for national governments to intervene — these are the pillars on which our policy was built. It is quite clear that in this field we would like to see patterns established which, if they were more

¹ "International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy." Washington: Department of State Publication 2702, 1947.

generally extended, would constitute some of the most vital elements of a new international law: patterns not unrelated to the ideals which more generally and eloquently are expressed by the advocates of world government. It has naturally taken some time for it to be clear that more modest attempts at control were likely to aggravate rather than alleviate the international rivalries and suspicions which it is our purpose to abolish.

This solution which the United States has proposed and advocated is a radical solution, and clearly calls for a spirit of mutual confidence and trust in order to give it any elements of substance. Only in the field of sanctions — of the enforcement of undertakings with regard to atomic energy — has the policy of the United States necessarily been somewhat conservative. Here in an effort to fit this problem of enforcement into the preëxisting structure of the United Nations it has had to rely on the prospects of collective security to protect complying states against the deliberate efforts of another state to evade controls, and to arm atomically.

The second aspect of our policy which needs to be mentioned is that while these proposals were being developed, and their soundness explored and understood, the very bases for international coöperation between the United States and the Soviet Union were being eradicated by a revelation of their deep conflicts of interest, the deep and apparently mutual repugnance of their ways of life, and the apparent conviction on the part of the Soviet Union of the inevitability of conflict — and not in ideas alone, but in force. For these reasons, the United States has coupled its far-reaching proposals for the future of atomic energy with rather guarded reference to the safeguards required, lest in our transition to the happy state of international control we find ourselves at a marked relative disadvantage.

Many factors have contributed to this background of caution. There appears to be little doubt that at the present time our unique possession of the facilities and weapons of atomic energy constitute military advantages which we only reluctantly would lay down. There appears to be little doubt that we yearn for the notion of a trusteeship, more or less as it was formulated by President Truman in his Navy Day address of late 1945: we would desire, that is, a situation in which our pacific intent was recognized and in which the nations of the world would gladly see us the sole possessors of atomic weapons. As a corollary, we are reluctant to see any of the knowledge on which our present mastery of atomic

energy rests, revealed to potential enemies. Natural and inevitable as these desires are, they nevertheless stand in bleak contradiction to our central proposals for the renunciation of sovereignty, secrecy and rivalry in the field of atomic energy. Here again, it is no doubt idle to ask how this country would have responded had the Soviet Union approached the problem of atomic energy control in a true spirit of coöperation. Such a situation presupposes those profound changes in all of Soviet policy, which in their reactions upon us would have altered the nature of our political purposes, and opened new avenues for establishing international control, unfettered by the conditions which in the present state of the world we no doubt shall insist upon. Nor should it be forgotten that were there more reality to the plans for the internationalization of atomic energy, we ourselves, and the governments of other countries as well, would have found many difficulties in reconciling particular national security, custom and advantage with an over-all international plan for insuring the security of the world's peoples. That these problems have not arisen in any serious form reflects the lack of reality of all discussions to date.

Yet despite these limitations the work of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission has established one point: through many months of discussion, under circumstances of often dispiriting frustration, and by delegates not initially committed to it, the basic idea of security through international coöperative development has proven its extraordinary and profound vitality.

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The view sketched above of the international aspects of the problems of atomic energy is thus a history of high, if not provably unreasonable hope, and of failure. Questions will naturally arise as to whether limited but nevertheless worthy objectives cannot be achieved in this field. Thus, there is the question of whether agreements to outlaw atomic weapons more like the conventional agreements, supplemented by a more modest apparatus for inspection, may not give us some degree of security. Possibly when the lines of political hostility were not as sharply drawn as they are now between the Soviet Union and the United States, we might have tried to find an affirmative answer to this question. Were we not dealing with a rival whose normal practices, even in matters having nothing to do with atomic energy, involve secrecy

and police control which is the very opposite of the openness that we have advocated — and under suitable assurances offered to adopt — we might believe that less radical steps of internationalization could be adequate. The history of past efforts to outlaw weapons, to reduce armaments or to maintain peace by such methods gives little encouragement for hopefulness regarding these approaches.

Nor does it seem reasonable to hope, with the world as it now is, and with our policies in fields other than atomic energy as clearly predicated as they now are on conflict (which is not the same as war) with the Soviet Union, that intermediate solutions involving, perhaps, a formal renunciation of atomic armament, and some concession with regard to access to atomic facilities on the part of international inspectors, will appeal to us as useful. They will hardly do so either in the achievement of present security or the later realization of coöperative relations. Indeed, it has come to be the official position of the Government of the United States that palliative solutions along these lines would almost certainly give rise to intensified suspicions and intensified rivalries, whereas they manifestly would lose for us whatever national advantages — and they cannot *a priori* be dismissed as inconsiderable — our prior development and extensive familiarity with atomic energy now give us.

Clearly we may not lightly dismiss consideration of whether there are other approaches to the problem of the international control of atomic energy which have a better chance of contributing to our security. In fact, recent literature is replete with suggestions along these lines. No one aware of the gravity of the situation can fail to advocate what appears to be a hopeful avenue of approach; and no one has a right to dismiss these proposals without the most careful consideration.

It is my own view that none of these proposals has any elements of hopefulness in the short term. In fact, it appears most doubtful if there are now any courses open to the United States which can give to our people the sort of security they have known in the past. The argument that such a course *must* exist seems to be specious; and in the last analysis most current proposals rest on this argument.

This does not mean that on a lower plane, and with much more limited objectives, problems of policy with regard to atomic energy will not arise, even in the international field. Clearly, ar-

rangements that could be established between the Government of the United States and other governments, for the purpose of profitably exploiting atomic energy or of strengthening our relative position in this field, have some sort of bearing on security, and have an important, if not transparent, bearing on the probabilities for the maintenance of peace. But such arrangements, difficult though they may be to determine, and significant though they may be for our future welfare, cannot pretend, and do not pretend, to offer us real security, nor are they direct steps toward the perfection of those coöperative arrangements to which we rightly look as the best insurance of peace. They belong in the same class, in our present situation, as the proper, imaginative and wise conduct of our domestic atomic-energy program. They are part of the necessary conditions for the long-range maintenance of peace; but no one would for a moment suppose them to be sufficient.

Thus, if we try to examine what part atomic energy may play in international relations in the near future, we can hardly believe that it alone can reverse the trend to rivalry and conflict which exists in the present-day world. My own view is that only a profound change in the whole orientation of Soviet policy, and a corresponding reorientation of our own, even in matters far from atomic energy, would give substance to the initial high hopes. The aim of those who would work for the establishment of peace, and who would wish to see atomic energy play whatever useful part it can in bringing this to pass, must be to maintain what was sound in the early hopes, and by all means in their power to look to their eventual realization.

It is necessarily denied to us in these days to see at what time, to what immediate ends, in what context, and in what manner of world, we may return again to the great issues touched on by the international control of atomic energy. Yet even in the history of recent failure, we may recognize elements that bear more generally on the health of our civilization. We may discern the essential harmony, in a world where science has extended and deepened our understanding of the common sources of power for evil and power for good, of restraining the one and of fostering the other. This is seed we take with us, travelling to a land we cannot see, to plant in new soil.

THE MYTH OF SECURITY

By Hanson W. Baldwin

THERE is a basic paradox in coupling the word "defense" with modern military means and methods. The atomic bomb, the long-range plane, the giant missile have demolished so many "security" concepts that defense, measured by any military yardstick, has become chiefly a reflex of retaliation. In a search for defense, men have broken the boundaries of space and solved many of the mysteries of nature. But, ironically, they have made themselves less secure than before. The rise of nation-states, the growth of populations, the industrial revolution and a new technological revolution have made war "total." "Defense" is completely incompatible with the realities of modern warfare, and if it dominates the military thinking of a nation it is a term synonymous with defeat. No theory of limited liability, of defensive strategy or tactics, can win the war of tomorrow.

Man's attempts to limit the destructiveness and outlaw some of the horror of war are not likely to succeed unless power is linked to reality. The great general problem of the twentieth century, as of all past centuries, is to harness justice with power, idealism with realism. Moral factors — the ebb and flow of intangible forces, the surge of national wills, the things of the spirit, man's consciousness of right and wrong — are realities and cannot be omitted from any reckoning of power which pretends to be trustworthy. But the fact remains that though moral scruples, embodied in such international laws as the divided peoples of the earth have come to accept, may serve as deterrents to aggressor nations, the fear of a swift counter-punch — retaliation in kind — is in the present state of affairs the weightiest argument against aggression. The American military problem is how to land that counter-punch. That is the problem of "defense," and it obviously has many aspects.

But before the strategic problem confronting the United States can even be posed, Americans must examine and dismiss some of the errors and half-truths that color our military thinking. There can be no understanding of the military problem unless we rid our minds of some of the shibboleths that cluster around it. The following pages are an attempt to clear away certain of the fallacies which encumber discussions of military problems in the

United States, and to suggest some of the lessons which may justifiably be drawn from recent military history. Though so restricted an analysis will not provide answers to the American strategical problem, it may help make the nature of that problem clear.¹

The first fallacy:

As a people we are prone to wishful thinking, and lack the long view of history. The fallacy that underlies so much of our optimism, and hence of our moods of disillusion, is the assumption that we can get peace overnight and cheaply — by declaring ourselves in favor of it. But unfortunately there is no evidence in history (or in the behavior of men today) for the belief that the millennium is just around the corner. Permanent peace — a world without war — has been the goal of generations; it is “a consummation devoutly to be wished.” But there seems no likelihood that war will be abolished in our generation, or, indeed, for many generations to come. Peace is a process of education, and man learns slowly. Each succeeding generation, it seems, must relearn some of the bitter lessons of the past. There *is* progress. The United Nations — weak though it may be — is stronger than was the League of Nations. There is no reason for absolute despair. The scope of modern war and the horror of its instruments of devastation are, in themselves, a check upon its inception. Yet no nation is ready to build its policy upon that foundation alone.

The second fallacy:

The assertion that “We were unprepared” has been applied, with almost monotonous repetition, to the state of American armed forces before World War I, before World War II, in fact before all our wars. But the statement is sophistry. For what were we unprepared? Preparedness is relative, not absolute; there are degrees of preparedness. Before the Second World War this nation had a navy equal to any and the best long-range bomber in the world; the National Guard had been federalized, conscription had started, and the factories of the country already had commenced the manufacture of war orders. Nevertheless, we were, of course, “unprepared” for the war that developed. We shall always be similarly unprepared; for there is no such thing as absolute preparedness and it is futile to strive for it. Germany, for

¹ This article is adapted from the introductory chapter of the author's book, entitled “The Price of Power,” scheduled for publication in the spring by Harper and Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations.

instance, was prepared for the Polish campaign, but not for the war she got. Not even totalitarian states — much less democracies — can indulge in the luxury of absolute preparedness in time of peace. Complete preparedness is a will o' the wisp; it has led any country which attempted to achieve it to destruction.

The third fallacy:

The beguiling belief that "A strong army and navy will prevent war" is the twin of the "unpreparedness" argument. The assertion that armaments mean security is denied by all history. There is no such thing as security from war. The greatest armaments — those of Sparta, Persia, Macedonia, Rome, Carthage, France, Germany, Japan, Russia — have never brought either inviolability against attack or certainty of victory. The greater the armaments, the greater the temptation to embark upon an imperialistic war and to strive for "absolute" preparedness — which is likely to mean casting the rest of the world in the rôle of potential enemies. Merely because there is no safety in flabby weakness does not make it necessary to fly to the opposite extreme and seek safety in excessive armaments. Excessive military weakness can invite attack; excessive military strength can precipitate war. There is a happy mean in armaments as in politics.

The fourth fallacy:

This, the fallacy that "Disarmament means insecurity,"² is the corollary of the foregoing. It stems from a distorted view of the history of the 1920's, a view always popular to chauvinistic opinion which has found wide acceptance during the present post-war crisis. In this view, the gallant and idealistic United States was the dupe of clever international politicians, and was hornswoggled out of its rightful power at the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921. The Washington Conference, in fact, halted a rapidly growing naval race between the United States and Britain, and formalized for the United States a position of naval parity with Britain — an inestimable gain, for it provided a foundation for the subsequent naval partnership between the two countries. The Washington Conference did, however, give Japan virtual strategic hegemony over the western Pacific, though our

² The popular word "disarmament" is of course loosely and incorrectly applied. Real disarmament never has been considered seriously at any of the so-called "disarmament" conferences and never has been practised by any major nation, except when imposed by victor upon vanquished. Disarmament belongs to the millennium; but limitation of armaments is a practical possibility of today.

error in this regard was more political than military. It was compounded by our failure to enter the League of Nations, which so disastrously cramped the effectiveness of that organization and nullified the political, psychological and military results achieved by the armaments limitations conferences.

The limitation of armaments does not, of course, mean insecurity — unless a Great Power indulges in disarmament unilaterally, which we have never done. Limitation of armaments will not end war, for armaments are not the primary cause of war, but rather surface evidence of a deeper infection in the body politic, international or national. But excessive armaments, particularly races in armaments, do add to the multiple frictions which bring on war, and though arms limitation will not abolish war, it does tend to limit its frequency and scope — which is no minor goal.

The fifth fallacy:

This is the fallacy that “The United States will be the first area to be attacked in any future war.” This glib assertion — which is another half-truth — has had popular acceptance now for a quarter of a century, though it has not yet been proved valid. Postwar military prophets after World War I warned that the next war would bring the weight of enemy attack first upon American soil. They were wrong. Unless United States diplomacy becomes utterly bankrupt they may well be entirely wrong again, for the basis of our whole past strategy has been, of course, to fight our wars overseas. And the object of our diplomacy (as applied to strategy) has been to ensure that there would be bases overseas for the United States, whence our military power could be applied to the enemy, and to gain allies so that we would not fight the war alone. The technological revolution in weapons and the great range of the plane and the missile which will make transoceanic attack feasible enhance the possibility that a future world war will begin with an attack upon American cities. But though our cities *may* be among the first places to be attacked in any future war, no potential enemy could possibly afford to neglect the danger spots nearer his own borders from which we might launch attacks against him. So long as the United States possesses allies and bases overseas, the objective of any enemy must be neutralization or conquest of those positions. A concurrent attack upon the continental United States would be, of course, possible, but our own advantage would be considerable so long as we possessed positions overseas and the enemy did not.

The sixth fallacy:

This is the fallacy that "Invasion of the United States is now possible." Neither now nor in the foreseeable future is the large-scale, physical invasion of the continental United States by troops probable. Today it is virtually impossible. Invading forces can come to the United States only by sea or air, and distance and geography — though foreshortened in the air age — still have strategical and, above all, logistical meaning. Only at the Bering Strait, where Alaska abuts closely to the land-mass of Eurasia, are the distances separating us from potential enemies small enough to permit the large-scale transport of armies by air. And even in Alaska and the contiguous coast of Asia, communications are so difficult and climate so severe that large-scale airborne operations would be exceedingly hazardous. So long as we "control" the sea and the air no large-scale, physical invasion, like the Normandy invasion or the other amphibious and airborne operations made famous during the last war, are possible. Small-scale airborne operations — involving the transportation of regiments or even a division of men — might be accomplished, though without air superiority they would be very difficult.

The history of airborne operations attests to their complexity, and the ocean distances that still separate us from potential enemies make any large-scale invasion through the air impossible in the immediate future, whether or not the enemy enjoys air superiority. In the more distant future they will be exceedingly difficult, though not impossible. The danger of invasion of our shores by large bodies of armed men is not a major problem of this nation. Yet such are the range, flexibility and speed of modern weapons that invasion by troops may not be necessary to future conquest. In the century of the atomic bomb, supersonic missiles, long-range jet planes and high-speed submarines, the strategic problem for the United States is not defense against invasion, but protection against assault.

III

Set in this frame and stripped of some trappings of myth and half-truth, the dimensions of the United States strategic problem in the atomic age come into clearer perspective. Yet that problem cannot be stated even in general terms until we have first considered some of the broad lessons taught us — with blood and mourning, tears and sweat and misery — in World War II.

The war did not develop new principles. For the principles of war — that is, the broad “rules” of the art of fighting — are immutable; “their interpretation and application will vary greatly, but their substance is the same.”³ Hannibal annihilated the legions of Rome in the “perfect” battle at Cannae in 216 B.C. Eisenhower, using precisely the same tactic of the “double envelopment,” crushed the last cohesive German armies of the west in the Battle of the Ruhr in 1945. Many air enthusiasts, bred on the doctrines of Douhet, Mitchell and Seversky, have claimed that “strategic bombardment” or air attack upon cities, civilian populations and factories introduces a new principle of war in that it focuses military effort upon the civilian rather than the military populations of the warring nations. But pressure behind the military lines has been an old tactic of warfare since the days when Attila the Hun and Jenghiz Khan ravaged, burned and looted Europe. The naval blockade is an indirect form of such pressure; the siege and sack of walled cities in the Middle Ages, Sherman’s march through Georgia and Sheridan’s devastation of the Shenandoah Valley are all examples of precisely the same tactic that the air age has adopted — the application of military power to civilian and behind-the-line installations. The instruments have changed and the plane and the atomic bomb have extended the potential area of devastation of the scourged and ravaged earth to the infinite; but the principle of ruthlessness is still the same.

Despite the universality of military principles, it is well to recall that war still is and always has been an art, not a science. It includes, adumbrates and transcends all sciences. Yet military operations are not scientific. They cannot be marshalled in the exact phalanx of equations, particularly in this era of total war, when they include not merely the clash of armed men but the activity of the entire population of the belligerents. The inexact and the intangible are as much a part of modern war as the finite. It is necessary to emphasize this at a time of technological revolution in warfare, lest we tend to think of future war solely in impersonal, “push-button” terms. Science and the armed forces must, of course, be closely harnessed, but war remains an unscientific occupation. Like genius, it represents an infinite capacity for taking pains; yet the art of taking pains can lead to its own confusion. The Germanic cult of precision and the propensity of

³ Wallace Goforth, in an address to l’Institut Militaire de Quebec, June 1947.

the Prussians for trying to give detailed, practical application to vast and cloudy generalities (*viz.*, some of the mumbo-jumbo produced in the name of geopolitics) have not been without influence in the United States.

With such reservations, we may list a few of the major strategic lessons of World War II.

First, victory in modern war is no longer won by the big battalions but by the big factories. This has been increasingly true since the industrial revolution; Forrest's "To git thar fust with the most" now must be amended "To git thar fust with the most fire power." The Russian front in the last war would seem to refute this lesson, and it is true that massed manpower still can be a factor of military strength. But the Russians used masses of men not through choice but because of necessity. Men in great numbers substituted for machines and fire power, in which the Russians were relatively weak. Even so, the masses of men used on the Russian front were probably less dense in proportion to the extent of that front than the numbers used in the west, and the Russian quantitative superiority in manpower could never have overcome the armaments without the powerful intervention — primarily with fire power — of the western allies. The mass army (with manpower as the yardstick of strength) has declined steadily in importance, and the technological revolution in weapons of the last few years has accelerated the trend.

Our victory in World War II was primarily and fundamentally an industrial victory, a victory in which the factories of America supplied not only our own armies but the forces of our Allies. The United States was, irrefutably, the "arsenal of democracy;" the statistics of our industrial effort are gargantuan, unprecedented. It used to be said, for instance, that a nation must fight a war with the navy it possessed at the outbreak, so complex and so difficult is the construction of men-of-war. Yet we produced during World War II fleets that completely dwarfed our prewar navy; the naval and mercantile ships that went down our ways easily exceeded the combined tonnage of all the fleets of the world. Our factories produced by far the greatest air force in history and gave us an army more thoroughly equipped than any that had ever gone forth to battle. And we shipped to our allies, over thousands of miles of sea, the equivalent in dollar value of enough military equipment to outfit completely 2,000 infantry divisions — more divisions, by far, than there were in all the world. In

short, the big factories of America won the Second World War.

Incidental to the growing importance of industrial strength which made massed machines rather than massed manpower the determinant of victory, was the decline in importance of generalship (though not of leadership). Generals and admirals (though particularly generals) became — at least in the highest ranks — general managers rather than tacticians and strategists. Particularly in the early days of the war, before the industrial output of war matériel had risen to such unprecedented peaks, there was still a premium on skill in manoeuvre and on a nice sense of terrain and timing. Rommel, who did much with little, exemplified this “dying” art of generalship perhaps better than any other individual of World War II. But for the most part, the higher ranking generals had to be a combination of politician, personnel director, inventory clerk and general manager. Once the big factories of America had outstripped the factories of the Axis, the Allies could scarcely have lost the war no matter what mistakes in generalship were made. After 1943, there was no single American general or admiral of whom it might be said — as it was said of Jellico at Jutland — that he could “lose the war in an afternoon.” Industrial strength is a major factor in military power and a major measure of national power in the modern world.

Second, the continental United States is not only arsenal and supply base, but is now the main *operating* base for our armed forces. This development will be speeded as the range of weapons increases. During the war our entire global strategy was directed from Washington; headquarters was not on horseback, as in Napoleon’s or Lee’s day, or in the field at all. Our B-29 Super-Fortresses were directed strategically and sometimes even tactically from Washington. The Navy’s floating-base system, which uses supply ships, floating machine shops, barracks ships, etc., to support the combatant ships, was prepared and provisioned and supplied in the continental United States. More and more as the war progressed, not only supplies but operations tended to stem outward from the United States to the foci of fighting. As trans-oceanic, trans-polar, and ultimately around-the-world ranges are achieved, the continental United States will become more and more completely the main operating base of our armed forces as well as their manufacturing and supply base.

Third, the offense has so far outstripped the defense that our strategic concepts have been altered fundamentally. This superi-

ority of offense over defense, which reversed the trend of World War I, when the machine gun and the trench-system locked the fighting fronts in bloody stalemate, became apparent almost as soon as World War II commenced. The basic theory of Blitzkrieg is movement. The Germans maintained their mobility (which neither Allies nor Germans had been able to do a quarter century before) by coupling fire power to the plane-tank spearhead. As the war developed, and the bomber came into its frightful heritage, the offense gained even greater ascendancy. By skillful choice of terrain, prodigious feats of fortification, and very careful use of manoeuvre and counterattack, a nation fighting a defensive war might hope — for a time — to ward off its enemy's ground attacks, but there was little hope of averting bombing assaults. At one time during the war the ascendancy of the offensive seemed to be checked by the development of the anti-tank gun, radar and other equipment, but it became more and more pronounced in the closing years with the introduction of the robot V-1 "flying bomb," the supersonic V-2, the submarine with *schmorchel* and high underwater speed, and the atomic bomb.

These last weapons heralded the technological revolution through which we are passing, and foreshadow the nature of the next war. The evolution thus scarcely begun has developed with considerable rapidity. Weapons will, in the next three decades, approach the ultimate in range, power and speed. Clearly forecast on the world's proving grounds and in its laboratories are supersonic transoceanic missiles; high-speed submersibles with rocket-firing facilities (the first true submersibles in history, able to cross the oceans under water); biological poisons; radioactive dusts; gases far more toxic than the German Tabun wartime series (which outmoded all previously known war gases); and more atomic bombs. These and other frightful agents of destruction have conferred upon the offense a great and growing lead over the defense. The coming long-range missiles have in particular altered all American strategical concepts.

The United States is now more vulnerable to assault than ever before. For the first time in history we have "live" frontiers — frontiers of the air through which missiles may move across the Pole or across the seas at supersonic speeds, frontiers of the under-seas, whence modern and unseen leviathans may launch devastating attack upon our coasts. These live frontiers, and the increasing lead of the offense, seem to make the problem of

American defense hopeless of solution, if the word "defense" is used in its old, narrow sense. The best and only defense against atomic bombs, long-range, globe-girdling planes, intercontinental missiles and induced plagues would appear to be a strong offense — the threat of worse blows against the enemy homeland than any the enemy can deliver against us. This means reorientation of our traditional American military policy to an offensive concept and the maintenance of a completely equipped mobile force ready for instant action.

Fourth, modern war is "total" far beyond the imagination of even those who coined the phrase. The totality of effort of the United States and of all other major nations that participated in the Second World War far exceeded national efforts in any preceding wars. The trend has been inevitable since the advent of the industrial revolution. The growing importance of the factories put a wartime premium upon the man behind the lines. Then the plane made possible the *attaque brusquée* upon homes, factories and civilian morale, and made the civilian a part of the war machine. Missiles and atomic bombs accelerate these trends. In the next war, labor as well as fighting power will probably be drafted; every phase of national effort that does not contribute to victory will probably be eliminated. Total war means total effort, and the preparations for it must be as far-reaching as the execution of the blueprint. Consequently, the effects of total war transcend the period of hostilities; they wrench and distort and twist the body politic and the body economic not only after a war (as we are now seeing) but they necessitate peacetime measures of preparation which also affect the entire state.

These "lessons," tentative and subject to perennial reëxamination though they may be, delimit and define the nature of the modern American strategical problem. The frame of experience in which the American strategic problem in the atomic age is set compels us to confront the greatest and most puzzling paradox in our military or political history. It can be best stated in the form of three statements and ancillary questions:

1. We have seen that the continental United States is now not only the manufacturing arsenal and supply base of any American military effort, but is also the main operating base of our armed forces. Because of this triple importance — especially because of the value of mass industry to war effort — it is more important than ever before in history to protect the continental United

States against assault. Yet we have also seen that, because of the technological revolution and the ascendancy of the offensive, the United States is now more vulnerable than ever before in history. How, then, do we "defend" the continental United States?

2. Offense today is by far the best defense. But how can we develop in peacetime, in a peace-loving, non-imperialist democracy, an offensive force of suitable type, ready for instant action?

3. The atomic bomb and the age of total war make mandatory an increase in military efficiency. This logically means a redirection of all phases of national life toward military strength and the extension of the influence of the military into all phases of life. Yet, how can we thus increase military efficiency without weakening our democracy? How can we prepare for total war without becoming a "garrison state" and destroying the very qualities and virtues and principles we originally aimed to save?

This is the paradox, this is the problem we must now set out to solve.

1848: THE YEAR OF REVOLUTION

By Arnold Whitridge

ON February 22, 1848, Richard Rush, the American Minister to the Court of the Tuileries, noted in his diary that he had just returned from a *soirée* at the Rochefoucaulds'. The party was not large but very agreeable. There was some talk about a political "banquet" that had been organized to further the cause of electoral reform. The company present were not enthusiastic about these banquets, but there was nothing to be worried about. After all, only the middle class attended the banquets, and the proposed reforms would merely enfranchise another section of this middle class. Why should anyone be uneasy? If King Louis Philippe were known to be suffering from a cold there might be some cause for anxiety, but every diplomat in Paris knew that as long as the King was well there could be no serious disturbance. His health was the key to the political stability of Europe.

Forty-eight hours later the King and Queen had fled, the Tuileries had been completely gutted, the whole seemingly solid structure of government had crumbled to pieces, and such families as the Rochefoucaulds were probably wondering whether once again the mob would be lusting for their blood. Within a week Mr. Rush, acting on his own initiative — there was no transatlantic cable yet — had recognized the new Republic. Lord Normanby, the British Ambassador, thought that Mr. Rush had acted too hastily, but President Polk subsequently commended him for being the first ambassador to welcome France into the family of republics. What could be more gratifying than the knowledge that Europe at last was following in the footsteps of the United States! Public opinion in America was convinced that Europe too was now to enjoy the blessings of liberty and justice. Resolutions were offered in the Senate and in the House tendering the congratulations of the Senate and the House to the French people. Among those who voted in favor of the resolutions were Jefferson Davis in the Senate, and Abraham Lincoln in the House. A monster meeting held in City Hall Park on April 3 to rejoice over the freedom of France was described by Bayard Taylor as "one of the most sublime meetings I ever beheld." Cheers were given for Pope Pius IX, for Lamar-

tine, for the Swiss and for Poland. "At seven o'clock the City Hall was illuminated on all sides except the north with 1,500 sperm candles — one to each pane of glass — and produced a most magnificent appearance."

Meanwhile, some of the wreckage of the Revolution had drifted over to England. The first to arrive was Guizot, Louis Philippe's prime minister. He was a man whose personal integrity nobody had ever questioned, but his indifference to the thoughts and aspirations of the working man, his placid assumption that political intelligence was only to be found among people of substantial wealth, had made him one of the most hated men in France. Guizot honestly believed that a constitutional monarchy in which the voters were limited to the aristocracy and the upper bourgeoisie represented the summit of enlightenment. Let the people sit back and enjoy their blessings. The government was maintaining order at home and peace abroad. The country was on the right track; the rich were growing richer, and eventually prosperity would seep down to the lowest stratum of society. Guizot had found "a little house close to London, at Brompton, which is almost in the country." There he had settled down, imperturbable as ever, to write a constitutional history of England.

Within a few weeks Louis Philippe and his family were installed in a Surrey villa, while a certain Herr and Frau von Meyer, better known as Prince and Princess Metternich, were occupying rooms in a Hanover Square hotel. Nearby, staying with the Palmerstons, was the Prince of Prussia, a fugitive for the moment who had had to be smuggled out of the country. Twenty-three years later, Bismarck crowned him Emperor of Germany. The French royal princes and princesses had also fled the storm and found refuge in England. The last to arrive were the Prince de Joinville and the Duc d'Aumale, forced to abandon Algeria in the very hour of victory. History is full of dramatic reversals of fortune, but seldom have they been as abrupt as those of 1848.

The fall of Louis Philippe is all the more remarkable because in many ways he was a shrewd man, not a hero or a coward, but a good bourgeois who had apparently profited by the mistakes of his predecessors. During the last two years of his life — he died in 1850 — Louis Philippe was to spend much of his time explaining why during the critical days of February 1848 he had not acted

more heroically. The explanation was really quite simple. He could not bring himself to shed blood. What he did not explain, probably because he did not understand it himself, was that the very circumstances which made him politically merciful made him also politically unprincipled. At the end of his life his shrewdness gave way to obstinacy, but at no time in his 77 years was his conduct ever dictated by passionate conviction. His policy on all occasions, as a republican historian described it, was *toute provisoire*. His last two years were not unhappy. He lived quietly and unostentatiously, surrounded by his children and grandchildren. British visitors were impressed by his philosophic indifference to misfortune. As he stood up to carve the roast beef for dinner — he never surrendered that prerogative of the head of the family to anyone else — it must have been hard to realize that this big bourgeois *père de famille*, whom Daumier found so supremely ridiculous, had been a general before the world had ever heard of Napoleon. He had been a member of the Jacobin Club, he had shot rapids on the Ohio river, he had been a Swiss schoolmaster, a Twickenham taxpayer, and a king of the French people — not king of France. The distinction was an important one to the French mind. The title, “king of the French,” transferred the emphasis from the old territorial principle to the human element, thus paying a subtle tribute to the sovereignty of the people. On August 26, 1850, this “painful life voyage,” as Carlyle called it, was brought to an end by an attack of pleurisy. If he had set his sights a little higher he might have died in the Tuileries, but the code he lived by — *chacun pour soi, chacun chez soi* — represented everything that liberal Europe hated. Liberal Europe was bent on revolution, and Louis Philippe personified those characteristics of a conservative society — family solidarity, acquisitiveness and material prosperity — that every revolution is bound to destroy.

II

All over the Continent men were struggling to be free, but there was no agreement as to what freedom meant. In 1848 it was more than ever a chameleon word changing its color to suit the demands of those that used it. In France “freedom” meant universal suffrage, which in turn implied a republic that guaranteed a living wage to all workers. To the Prussian bourgeois, as Karl Marx said, this boasted freedom meant nothing more

than establishing exactly the sort of government that the French had just upset. In Bavaria it meant getting rid of a Scotch dancer who called herself Lola Montez and with whom King Ludwig was hopelessly infatuated. Royal mistresses do not necessarily make for revolution, but Lola's demand for the removal of the University from Munich was more than even the good-natured Bavarians could tolerate. When finally Ludwig and Donna Maria de Dolores de los Montes were driven into exile, the church, the army and the nobility of Bavaria settled back to enjoy their freedom.

A Hungarian patriot like Kossuth felt there could be no genuine freedom in Europe until Hungary and Austria were recognized as separate entities, whereas Palacký, the intellectual pioneer of Czech rebirth, was convinced that only within a strong Austrian empire could the Slavs ever be free. If the Austrian Empire did not exist, it would be necessary to create it. An Italian in Milan thought he would enjoy perfect freedom as soon as the hated Austrians had been driven back across the mountains. An Italian in Rome was not disturbed by the presence of an Austrian garrison in Lombardy. For him freedom was a matter of hustling the new Pope, Pius IX, who believed in trusting the people as far as possible, into one concession after another until the temporal power of the papacy had been completely whittled away. An Italian in Palermo harbored no grievance against Austria or against the Papacy. The arch-enemy of the Sicilians was the Neapolitan Government, and more particularly King Ferdinand II who earned the name of "Bomba" for having ordered the bombardment of Messina, in those days an act of unheard-of cruelty.

Early in 1848 it looked as if the storm of revolution would engulf all Europe. From Sicily to the Baltic, rulers were tumbling over themselves in their hurry to grant the reforms demanded by their peoples. In every state existing ministers were jettisoned and more liberal ministers appointed. Except in Russia and in England, the two empires that flanked the Continent, it looked as if the peoples of Europe had got the bit in their teeth and were running away with their rulers. In Italy it was said to be raining constitutions. The spark kindled by Sicily spread through the peninsula at such a pace that within the course of 35 days four states—Naples, Tuscany, Piedmont and Rome—had all agreed to give the people the precious scrap of paper they were clamoring

for. "Everything is demanded of us," wrote the distracted Duke Ernest of Saxe-Coburg, "even the establishment of perfect health and the gift of long life!" Young Benjamin Disraeli made a speech in the House of Commons about the "modern, new-fangled, sentimental principle of nationality" that was threatening one nation after another with civil war. There was a disturbing element of truth in what he said. Within the Austrian Empire, Poles and Hungarians, Croats and Italians, were striving to assert their right to a separate nationhood.

The word "self-determination" had not yet been coined, but the idea was already familiar, and men were beginning to wonder as they have been wondering ever since how far down the scale the principle of self-determination applies. If Hungary was to be allowed to break away from Austria, why should not Ireland break away from England, and supposing Hungary and Ireland were allowed to go in peace how could they in turn resist the demands for independence of their minorities — the Croats within Hungary, and the Ulstermen within Ireland? The Croat Diet refused to accept its abolition by Hungary and retorted by proclaiming the independence of Croatia from Budapest, just as 70 years later Ulster refused to accept the domination of Dublin. Russia's answer to insurgent minorities was a definite, uncompromising "no." There could be no permanent peace in the world unless great nations were kept intact. So it was that when America came to be threatened with disunion, Russia was the only Great Power in Europe that would have no truck with the Confederacy. Not that the Russian Government was inspired by any hatred of slavery or any admiration for the American Constitution, but the revolt of a province, secession — call it what you will — was a principle to be crushed whenever it raised its head.

Lord Palmerston's answer to the cry of nationalism followed the traditional pattern of British foreign policy. His method was always to compromise, to grant popular demands while they were moderate so as not to be compelled to grant much more extreme demands later. Like the soft answer that turns away wrath, a constitution would turn away revolution. Palmerston's policy was supported by the people of England because at a time when England was becoming the workshop of the world, and when her merchants were to be found in every country in Europe, it was natural that she should dread any policy that interfered

with trade abroad. It was for this reason that Palmerston, when he saw Metternich doing everything in his power, as he believed, to make revolution inevitable, set out to check him and to encourage those reforms in which he saw the only guarantee of a peaceful, prosperous Europe. Palmerston's highest ambition for Italy was that each one of the separate states should have two houses of Parliament and a free press. What he did not understand was that a proud people could never be permanently satisfied with merely administrative, or even political, reforms, that the very presence of Austrian garrisons in Italy prevented the growth of the liberal institutions he advocated. Mazzini's mystical faith in the regenerating power of nationality meant little more to him than it did to Metternich.

III

But there were other questions besides nationality that were troubling men's minds in this year of revolution. It was in 1848 that Karl Marx published his Communist Manifesto exhorting the workers of the world to unite. He told them that they had no country, that they were being exploited, that with the disappearance of classes within the nation the state of enmity between nations would come to an end, that they had a world to win and nothing to lose but their chains. It was in 1848 that Bakunin, the aristocratic Russian revolutionary, prophesied a Russian as well as an Austrian revolution and launched his project of a great Slav federation stretching from the Urals to the Adriatic. 1848 drove the Pope from the Vatican, and brought Garibaldi hurrying back from South America to fight for a free Italy — free not only from the foreigner but from the rule of priests. The shortlived Roman Republic set men wondering whether Catholicism would be swamped by nationalism, or whether the Holy See could denationalize itself and emerge, as it finally did, shorn of its temporal power but exercising a greater spiritual authority than ever before. It was in 1848 that France tried to solve the problem of unemployment by establishing national workshops, and that a seedy-looking adventurer with nothing to recommend him but the magic of the name Napoleon was elected President of France. During the years of revolution, 1848 and 1849, half a million emigrants from Europe poured into the United States. These newcomers were not political refugees but, for the most part, Irishmen driven from their country by hunger. In a country

like Ireland, where over half the population lived off potatoes, the failure of the potato crop was a catastrophe to which emigration or death seemed to be the only answers. Disraeli was hardly exaggerating when he said that "the mysterious but universal sickness of a single root changed the history of the world." In 1848 a Swiss emigrant discovered gold in California; an American army fought its way into Mexico City, thereby concluding a war that added a million square miles to the national territory. President Polk in his farewell address contrasted the anarchy in Europe with "the sublime moral spectacle presented to the world by our beloved country."

In England the Chartists presented a petition to the House of Commons demanding certain reforms which were regarded by the Government as preposterous, but all of which with the exception of annual parliaments have long since been adopted. The British Government, warned by events in France, had made extensive preparations, and the demonstration from which the Paris radicals expected great things turned out to be a fiasco. "Every gentleman in London," wrote Greville in his diary, "is become a constable . . . it is either very sublime or very ridiculous." That determined apostle of progress, Lord Macaulay, contrasted the stability of England with the chaotic confusion of the rest of Europe, but even in England men wondered whether the monarchy would be able to ride out the storm. Though the Channel might be a barrier to an invading army it was no barrier to revolutionary doctrines. Radical members of the House of Commons were already protesting that "the Russells, Greys and other scions of great families monopolized every place to the exclusion of men of practical experience who would do the business of the country much better." Matthew Arnold thought that the hour of the hereditary peerage and immense properties had struck. Emerson gave it another five years.

In Austria the days of the Hapsburg empire seemed to be numbered, but the young Prince Francis Joseph who came to the throne in 1848 was still ruling the empire when he died in 1916. While the various races of the Austrian empire almost split apart, the separate states of Germany nearly came together. If King Frederick William IV of Prussia had not decided that he would rather be king by the grace of God than Emperor by the grace of democracy, the Germany invented by Bismarck might never have been born.

In 1848 there was still no such thing as Germany. The great shapeless area stretching across the middle of Europe included four kingdoms and innumerable duchies, grand duchies, and even republics. There was a German language spoken by 25,000,000 Germans; there was a German art and a German culture, but there was no such thing as a German flag or a German state. In the eyes of the law the three most brilliant men in Germany, Schopenhauer a citizen of Hamburg, Wagner a Saxon, and Heine a Jew from the Rhineland, had no more in common than an Englishman and a Turk. On May 18, a number of distinguished men gathered together in the old church of St. Paul in Frankfort to rectify this situation by binding the various German states into a nation. Never had any people elected such dignified representatives. There was only one laboring man among them, a Polish peasant from Silesia. All the rest were well educated men, most of them products of university education. There were 49 university professors, 57 professors and other teachers from higher schools, 157 judges, 118 civil servants, 66 lawyers, and a liberal sprinkling of Catholic priests, Protestant pastors, mayors, doctors, diplomats and librarians — all in all an imposing gathering, though perhaps too academic for the rough and tumble business of making a nation. "Too much of a university and not enough of a political stock exchange" was the terse comment of one German historian. Nevertheless for a moment it looked as if the long-standing disputes between the rulers themselves, and between the rulers and their peoples, would be melted away by the eloquence of these learned men. The spring of 1848 was indeed the *Völkersonnengott*, the people's springtime. The wise men at Frankfort would give the patient, hard-working Germans everything they wanted — their princes and their freedom, the little states and the great Fatherland, a benevolent Germany and elected representatives, a strong army and peace between nations, German unity without sacrificing German neighborliness, a democratic state with a crowned emperor at the head of it.

Why did these dreams never come true? Partly because the King of Prussia never overcame his terror of democracy. To him it was always a Jacobin thing born of the French Revolution. Partly, too, because the German people were, as indeed they still are, politically inept. They had been excluded from all participation in government for so long that political liberty

seemed to them a matter of philosophic speculation in which only the highly educated could indulge. Germany had its brilliant men in 1848, men of brains, generosity and eloquence, but unfortunately they were not statesmen. In Austria the counter-revolution produced a statesman in Prince Schwarzenberg who resuscitated the empire with amazing efficiency, but it was only for a moment, only for his lifetime. In Germany, Bismarck was still too young to play anything but a minor rôle. The 23-year-old Pomeranian squire watched the birth pangs of German democracy with undisguised contempt. Years later, he phrased that contempt in memorable words: "Not by speeches and resolutions of majorities are the great questions of the time decided — that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849 — but by blood and iron." The popular movement to unite Germany ended in the conviction that nothing could be accomplished by persuasion, that the give and take of democracy was a synonym for chattering inefficiency. That was the real tragedy of the revolution. Nothing remained but the idea of force, and this idea has remained at the helm of German history ever since. Many of the Forty-eighters, disillusioned with politics, withdrew into their laboratories, and served Germany by applying science to practical needs. Others, and among them men like Carl Schurz and Franz Sigel whom Germany could least afford to spare, emigrated to America and were lost to the Fatherland forever.

IV

In France the abdication of Louis Philippe had left the road open for Louis Napoleon. Before the old King had smuggled himself out of the country the Prince was on his way to Paris, to the Assembly, to the Presidency and to the Empire. His arrival marked the beginning of a propaganda campaign that has served as a model for all the dictatorships of the twentieth century. Every trick of the trade was used — persuasion and intimidations, the simultaneous appeal to the noblest sentiments and the basest instincts, and a blaring publicity that kept the people whipped up to such a frenzy of excitement that the shrewdest peasant and the most cautious bourgeois were finally convinced that Napoleon was the only guarantee of security for the family or of safety for the state. Starting with no other assets than his name, no money and no influential friends, and not even possessed of that eloquence which counts for so much in French

political life, he built up a machine that crushed every attempt at opposition. The Napoleonic legend was given a slight twist to the left. As long as the mood of the Provisional Government was so definitely republican the regret for the past glories of the Empire had to be played down. Louis Napoleon cleverly emphasized the duties inherent in his name rather than the rights.

The success of the campaign amazed everyone. In the June elections to the Assembly 200,000 people voted for him. They had neither seen him nor heard him, but he was the symbol of what they thought they wanted. In one Department whole villages with the mayor at their head marched to the voting booth to the sound of the drum, shouting *Vive l'Empereur!* and *A bas la République!* Would he be allowed to take his seat, or would the Assembly invoke the law under which all Bonapartes were banished from France? Rather than cause a situation the Prince refused the honor that had been accorded him. The Government apparently resented his election. All right, he would remain in exile until he could return to France as an ordinary private citizen devoted to the welfare of his country. Reëlected in September by five constituencies, this time he took his seat, and read out a brief address affirming his devotion "to the defense of order and the strengthening of the Republic."

By the time the Presidential election was held, on December 10, it was obvious that France had succumbed once more to the magic of the Napoleonic name. Out of the 7,500,000 votes cast Louis Napoleon received 5,500,000. Lamartine — poet, orator, and leader in the Provisional Government — found himself much to his surprise at the bottom of the poll with a mere 17,000. What was to be the effect on France of the election of another Bonaparte? How far would his election satisfy them? It was the first time that the people had chosen their ruler. George Sand confessed that the prospect of universal suffrage bewildered her. She spoke of it in a letter to Mazzini much as we today might speak of the atomic bomb. It was a new force let loose in the world. Man had created something he was powerless to control. For one thing the election of Louis Napoleon represented the victory of equality over liberty. The instinct of liberty, which had been the driving force behind the Paris bourgeoisie as long as the vision of a republic beckoned to them, was suddenly thwarted. The instinct of equality with its implication of social revolution, which would affect not only the well-to-do but the

mass of people as well, swept everything before it. To the peasants and the working men of France democracy meant the abolition of privilege, and that was what Napoleonic rule promised. The fact that universal suffrage had inadvertently designated a candidate for the Empire instead of merely electing a President was not realized until 1851.

The history of France during the 10 months that elapsed between the fall of Louis Philippe and the election of Louis Napoleon can be interpreted in many ways. To the cynic it will appear that France had made a political somersault. By December 31, 1848, the situation was not so very different from what it had been on January 1. Louis Napoleon's first set of ministers were surprisingly like the ministers of Louis Philippe. No one of them had played any part in the setting up of the Provisional Government or in the founding of the Republic. The budget was no smaller, the army certainly no less powerful. There were more deputies in the Chamber and they were more noisy, but they exercised no more influence in the country than the Chamber of 1847. Louis Philippe, his children and grandchildren, had been bundled out of the Tuileries. Louis Napoleon had moved into the Elysée Palace. It was 33 years since his uncle had abdicated in this same palace in favor of the young King of Rome. Madame de Pompadour, Murat, Napoleon after the return from Elba, the Duke of Wellington, and the Tsar Alexander, had all lived there. Now it was to be his home, the official residence of the President of the Republic. As his eye wandered over those rooms so full of Napoleonic memories he must have contemplated his own achievement with a good deal of satisfaction. The campaign that had swept him into the Presidency had been no less skilfully planned, no less brilliantly executed, than the campaigns of Jena or Austerlitz. It still remained to be seen whether Frenchmen could take up any intermediate position between political torpor and revolutionary violence. In February, Baudelaire had welcomed the Revolution as offering him a chance to shoot his stepfather. The cynic might well wonder whether the mood he represented could ever be affected by a change in the political régime.

v

And yet there is another, less cynical and perhaps more plausible, interpretation of these crowded months. The Revolu-

tion of 1848 can not be dismissed as a mere flash in the pan. It produced solid results though these results were not immediately apparent. After 1848, in spite of their defeat on the barricades, the workers had acquired a new status in the community. Never again could a politician suggest that the men in the factories and the workshops should accept their lot with humble resignation. Heaven knows the Revolution of 1848 did not put an end to political corruption, but at least it did put an end to the idea that any administration could perpetuate itself by working exclusively through the meaner and more selfish impulses of mankind. Guizot had thought it absurd to maintain that all men should be allowed to exercise political rights. He believed that two or three hundred thousand big landowners and prosperous business men adequately represented the whole of France. That belief, honestly and tenaciously held, coupled with an indifference to social reform, precipitated a revolution. By a strange quirk of fortune the Republic that was born out of that revolution was destroyed by too blind a faith in the virtue of universal suffrage. The optimists of 1848, untouched by any hint of skepticism, never dreamed of the dangers latent in an enormous ignorant electorate. They believed that liberty and social justice could be conjured into being by winged words, by their idealization of France and French popular instincts. Later on they blundered into the opposite mistake. They persuaded themselves that dictatorships, because they sometimes abolish specific evils, can therefore create lasting good in their place.

The Frenchman's fear of a strong executive, against which de Gaulle is now battling, dates from 1848. The revolution did not succeed, any more than any subsequent revolution has succeeded, in reconciling liberty with order; but it did sound the death knell of the night-watchman theory of government, the notion that if a political régime maintained order it had done everything that could be expected of it. Those who believed that the fall of Louis Philippe marked the beginning of a new era were not entirely mistaken. The Revolution of 1848 was the first social revolution of the modern age. Never again could a government stand idly by while men worked 11 to 13 hours a day, and received for their toil often not more than five or six hundred francs a year. By the end of the year the forces of reaction were back in the saddle, but the working man had acquired an importance in the eyes of the politician that he has never since lost.

AN AMERICAN ENGINEER LOOKS AT BRITISH COAL

By Robert P. Koenig

WITH every passing month it becomes increasingly clear that the rehabilitation of the British coal industry is a prerequisite not only of Britain's own industrial recovery but to a large extent of that of all western Europe. The majority of observers find it increasingly difficult to understand why this rehabilitation fails to materialize. The necessity for drastic reorganization has long been recognized, the technical problems analyzed and cures recommended over and over again. Why, if the course is charted, and agreement reached by everyone in authority to embark on it, does production fail significantly to increase? Many foreign observers attribute it to the Labor Government's nationalization program, others to the dislocations of six years of war. Comparatively few realize that the present situation has been at least 25 years in the making. It is the product both of avoidable stupidity and unavoidable bad luck; the problem it presents is social and psychological as well as technical, the result of general economic and social conditions which have influenced not only mining but other basic industries, and not in Britain alone but in all the "older" European countries. The state of affairs has been so long in evolving that no amount of hard work, efficiency, goodwill or determination, from any source, governmental or private, can remedy it overnight, however great the need.

Let us look at this crisis in the making. The First and not the Second World War marked the beginning of the decline of British coal mining; it was in 1919, not 1947, that remedies should first have been applied. In the 50 years before World War I, the industry expanded phenomenally in response to an ever-increasing demand from a rapidly industrializing world. It increased its work force four times, its production three times and exports almost six times.¹ In 1913 it was the largest British industry, next to agriculture. In that year it produced 287,000,000 tons, of which 94,000,000 were exported — a level which has not been reached since. This output required a work force of 1,107,000 and thus showed a productivity of only 259 tons per man year

¹ Cf. Harold Wilson, "New Deal For Coal." London, Contact, 1945.

(1.03 metric tons per man shift). But workers were cheap and plentiful, so that, as in so many basic industries in the Old World, low individual output caused no concern either on grounds of total output or of costs.

The coal industry met the nation's needs during World War I, but the Armistice was barely signed before the situation began rapidly to deteriorate. The usual reaction from abnormal war-time efforts, a work force diluted with drafts of unskilled workers, a continued history of bad industrial relations, topped off by the government's unwisely sudden relinquishment of its wartime control of the industry, led to a serious fall in output. Simultaneously, demand began to decline. An internal trade depression caused an almost immediate reduction in the domestic market. A brief period of war-inflated continental demand in 1919 and another short period of prosperity due to temporary overseas conditions in 1923-24 helped to postpone the decline in exports. But while British coal operators and dividend holders rejoiced in this shallow-rooted demand, continental mines were recovering and expanding their prewar output. By 1925 exports fell to 50,100,000 tons; and a continual improvement in mining techniques overseas foretold a further decline in export demand even without the effects of possible world depression.

In the long run, it was unfortunate for British mining that the general high level of unemployment throughout heavy industry in the inter-war period insured the continued presence of a large reserve of unemployed for the coal industry in spite of relatively low wages and bad conditions. Encouraged by this reserve, the coal operators' first thought in a crisis was to cut wages, which represented 70 percent of pit-head prices. In an industry where about a thousand concerns were engaged in keen competition, it was perhaps natural that this method of cutting costs came readily to mind. But it had two disastrous effects. Its immediate effect was to worsen immeasurably the relations of labor and employers in an industry where they were notoriously bad. But far more important, wage reduction was taken as an alternative to a program of modernizing and mechanizing the mines which increasingly adverse mining conditions required. Faced with a problem of rising costs and mounting competition for continental markets, the mine owners with few exceptions relied upon a cheap labor supply rather than higher efficiency. This decision is probably the most significant in the history of the

British coal-mining industry. This policy determined the program of the industry throughout the inter-war period, and has to a certain extent lingered on right up to the present.

The coal seams most readily mined had been thoroughly exploited as early as 1913. More than a third of the mines had been laid out in the seventies and the eighties for quick profit rather than long-term investment. By the twenties the industry was showing the effect of this. Deeper, narrower and less accessible seams had to be mined, but little or no action was taken to improve mining techniques. Efficiency plummeted, and costs began to soar. Modernization could have brought health to the industry, but the coal operators could not get over the feeling that dividends to their shareholders had first claim on current earnings. In the brief period of prosperity in the early twenties they paid out dividends instead of reading the writing on the wall and plowing back their profits — the last of any size they were to make. When the depression hit it was, in a sense, already too late for the necessary reforms. Unemployment was so extensive, excess capacity so large and investment risk so great that the immediate crisis had to be ameliorated before long-term measures could be taken. In the absence of any program for increasing efficiency, the formula of reducing costs and meeting continental competition by wage reductions was a failure. The effects of this formula antagonized labor and still further retarded the development of greater efficiency in the industry. At the same time it wrecked the financial structure of the industry and that, in turn, forced the mine owners to continue their already disastrous policy.

II

The history of labor relations is too well known to need detailed repetition here. But it has had such an effect on the current attitude of the coal miners that some mention seems necessary. By 1925, wages had already been reduced to half their war-time level. In that year, the owners adopted a new wage cut which led to the coal strike of 1926. The accompanying nine-day general strike, the first and only one in England, is so well known that it is occasionally forgotten that the coal strike which caused it continued for six months. The strike ended finally in a crushing defeat for the miners and this, in an industry continually weakened by foreign competition and world depression, made the next ten years a period of bitter memories for the mining vil-

lages. Average adult earnings seldom exceeded \$9 per week. Even as late as 1938, weekly earnings had increased only to \$11, and in a list of nearly 100 industries, coal mining was eighty-first in average adult male earnings. Unemployment averaged 25 per cent. Although no large strikes took place, persistent minor warfare continued so that in almost every year stoppages in the mines accounted for more than 40 percent of the working days lost through strikes in the whole country. More than 50 percent of those engaged in industrial disputes in Great Britain were miners. These facts, together with an accident and a disease rate that compared unfavorably with those in other industries made miners vow that their children should not enter the mines if there was any alternative. In consequence, the recruitment rate by 1938 was already far below that needed to maintain the working force, foreshadowing the labor shortage of the war and postwar years.

By 1930 the general state of the industry was so low the government had to come to its aid. It perhaps speaks well for the hearts of the coal operators that their ideas of what to do at that juncture were not concerned with rationalization and concentration, but with spreading the available business, however thinly, among all. It does not speak well for their heads. The Coal Mines Act of 1930 set up machinery for regulating prices and (by the establishment of quotas) production to a degree unprecedented in British industry. The coal operators, who had already attempted voluntary cartel arrangements, welcomed this section of the act joyfully. The Act was still in effect at the beginning of the war and its application had, by that time, succeeded in raising prices and wages somewhat. There was a second section of the Act, which established a Coal Mines Reorganization Committee, supposed to promote amalgamations and the concentration of production in the most efficient units. However, the Committee's powers were weak. It was hampered both by the private ownership of mineral rights (whose boundaries often bore little relation to the ownership of the mines themselves) and by the forcibly expressed dislike of the operators for anything resembling compulsory consolidation. By 1939, only 90 voluntary amalgamation schemes had gone through. In 1938 a somewhat stronger act was passed, which included a provision for the nationalization of the coal seams (though not the coal mines), but the war interrupted its application.

With demand continually falling (especially for export coal, due

partly to abnormal subsidized competition from Germany and Poland), with so much excess capacity, and with the immediate demands of the stockholders still, as ever, first in their minds, it was scarcely to be expected that the coal owners would open new mines. However, since overseas competition had somehow to be met, and wage costs cut, and since wage rates had really reached rock bottom, the operators did, during the thirties, at last begin a program of mechanization. Between 1929 and 1938, the proportion of coal cut by machinery increased from 28 percent to 59 percent, and the proportion mechanically conveyed from 17 percent to 54 percent, resulting in an increase of 6 percent in output per man shift. Unfortunately, machines for power loading, originally developed in the United States, were generally not adaptable for British mining conditions and the construction of a suitable machine was neglected.

British miners did not welcome this program. Unfortunately, it was carried out in a period of unemployment, so that it seemed one more threat in a world full of threats, just as the new wage rates, which accompanied it, often seemed one more danger to wages already unbearably low. Nor were industrial relations such as to enable drastic technical changes to be made easily. Above all, the miners and their leaders shared with so many owners the resistance to, and fear of, radical change; it seems sometimes as if the chief characteristic of both owners and men was inertia.

In contrast with the 287,000,000-ton production of the halcyon year of 1913, Great Britain, in 1939, produced 231,000,000 tons of coal, of which 46,000,000 were exported. It did this with a work force of 766,000, an output per man year of 301.6 tons (rearmament demands insured full time working) and an output per man shift of 1.17 metric tons. During the last couple of years, domestic demand had increased somewhat because of rearmament, while exports were being protected from further decline through trade treaties. But the crisis already threatened. The average age of pits became older and older, their seams more difficult to work. The relative inefficiency of British mines could be seen from the high cost of coal, in spite of low mining wages. If, for any reason, wages were raised costs would skyrocket. And now, for the first time, it began to look as though a labor shortage might compel higher wages, for in 1938 the rate of recruitment of boys and youths had fallen to between 15,000 and 20,000 a year, a rate too small to meet normal retirement.

III

During World War II, the industry's inability to meet the calls upon it forced the government gradually to take more and more control of the mines. Among steps taken by the Government were the maintenance of the work force and the drafting of new recruits by compulsory labor direction; the promotion of mechanization projects through the supply of new equipment and training in its use; the establishment of the open-cast mining program; and the temporary settlement of the wages question, the most vexed of all wartime industrial relations problems (the miners ended the war with a \$20 a week national minimum guaranteed wage for underground workers). To meet the cost of the increased wage, to guarantee it against unpreventable fluctuations and to pay for the extended welfare arrangements initiated by the Government, profits were standardized and a Coal Charges Account was established, financed by a levy on tonnage, and used to help the least prosperous districts pay their way. This contributed to the perpetuation of the inefficient mines.

Thus, by the end of the war, the coal industry was far from a free competitive enterprise, operating under normal economic laws. Throughout the war, no new pits were opened and output had continued to fall. When peace arrived, with its demand not just for coal at any cost, but for coal at an economic cost, few doubted that an even more drastic reorganization was necessary. Some collieries had to be closed, others developed, new ones opened, research intensified and enormous sums spent on new equipment. Who could carry out this program? The owners suggested that they themselves should establish a Central Board whose technical and financial decisions would be binding on the industry. But past history led most observers to doubt if the more progressive owners could voluntarily bring themselves to the necessary sacrifice of their weaker brethren. The miners, who for years had called for nationalization and forcibly expressed their reluctance to see the end of government control, could not be relied upon to cooperate. And now, for the first time, the desperate shortage of mining labor made it imperative that the miners' attitude be taken into account. Above all, it was obvious that the industry could not raise the necessary enormous sums for reorganization through normal financial channels. The Government would have to help with the finance, and many felt it

should, therefore, have a say in how the money was to be spent.

Would a continuation of wartime dual control do the trick? The proponderant evidence had shown that this was unsatisfactory; many mine owners clung invincibly to a short-term view — often they could not afford to take a longer one — and refused to play ball with the control. Many miners and their union leaders found the halfway measures unsatisfactory and could not believe in a new deal while the old bosses were in immediate control. The position of the mine manager was invidious — responsible to the Government for policy, he was still responsible to his directors for daily operation and did not feel he could rely on the Government to save him if he went against their wishes. Above all, the control was virtually powerless financially.

Nationalization was no new idea. For many years it had been part of the program not only of the miners' union, but of the Labor Party. Lord Sankey, Chairman of a Government Commission on Coal, had recommended it as far back as 1919. It had been in the air for 20 years, and indeed the continued threat of it was one of the many reasons, on the one hand, for the coal operators' reluctance to invest money in an enterprise they felt might be taken from them any time, and, on the other hand, for the uncoöperative attitude of labor. Above all, the Reid Committee, a group of seven eminent mining engineers (most of whom were drawn from the ranks of private enterprise), appointed by the Coalition Government which reported in 1945, had concluded a long list of technical recommendations with the comment that, "it is evident to us as mining engineers that they [the necessary changes] cannot be satisfactorily carried through if the industry is organized as it is today." The Committee felt that some "authority" drastically different from any then existing in the industry must be established with the duty of ensuring that the industry be "merged into units of such size as would provide the maximum advantage of planned production."

It was, therefore, surprising to no one that one of the Labor Government's first acts was to pass a bill nationalizing the coal mines. Under it, a nine-man National Coal Board was appointed by the Ministry of Fuel and Power and came into office on January 1, 1947. It conducts the affairs of the whole industry. Ultimately responsible to the Minister and to Parliament and subject to policy directions from the Minister, it is, apart from this, quite free to develop the industry.

IV

It is in this dismal atmosphere that the British coal industry must be revived. Even had the economy of the British Isles not been rocked to its very foundations by the effects of World War II, this would be a difficult and slow task. Now it must be accomplished in a country that has suffered much physical damage, where capital investment throughout much of industry has been long deferred, and which has lost most of the invisible income that previously permitted it to buy a large share of the world's raw materials and finished goods. The scarcity of almost every physical requirement of a modern industrial society, be it food, clothing, housing, energy or essential consumers' goods (let alone luxuries), is evident everywhere in Britain.

There is a grave question whether the amount of new capital facilities that can be made in Great Britain will be sufficient both to cover the needs for the plants already authorized by the Government and to meet the export allocation. Every attempt at long-term industrial improvement conflicts with the urgent short-term demand for continued production with the tools at hand. For example, it would be eminently desirable to drive new level haulage roads which could use locomotives and high capacity cars to replace some of the present tortuous "up hill and down dale" entries, but to do so requires miners who cannot now be spared from working at the face, breaking coal that is carried to the shaft in minuscule "tubs" by endless rope haulage.

Similarly, replacing ancient steam winding engines and boilers with efficient electric hoists is not everywhere possible in the near future as there is insufficient electrical energy available in the power grid. Additional central stations, electrical generating equipment, transmission and distribution facilities must be built first, and the coal mines themselves must compete for hoists with the new gold mines on the Rand, the sale of the equipment for which will provide much needed foreign exchange. Shutting down some of the preposterously inefficient surface installations at collieries so that new labor-saving preparation plants can be constructed is not always possible, as the nation can ill afford temporarily to lose the production of even an outmoded mine. And so it goes with almost every plan that is put forward.

It is not difficult to understand that in the period just prior to the vesting of the mines in the National Coal Board there was no

industry-wide campaign of reorganization and modernization. The Board has now made public its general plan for some 100 major projects, 20 of which will be started in 1948 and the last of which will be finished in 1962, as well as for some smaller two-and-three year schemes. It can only be hoped that this plan was not formulated hastily in answer to an insistent public demand for concrete proposals, and is backed up by detailed engineering and estimating work. The technical problems are understood by many and are not mysterious. The question is, can a national authority and its employees exercise that nice degree of judgment between the engineer's desire for a "perfect" mine and plant and the economic necessity of keeping capital costs within reason? One also wonders if the "conference system" of making major decisions, inherent in a top-heavy organization (already employing many thousands of people more than were engaged in the administration of the industry under private enterprise), can succeed in breaking away from the traditional unimaginative approach to technical and economic problems which has so long plagued the British coal industry.

In any general discussion of the technical side of the British coal industry, there are two broad considerations to be kept in mind. First, the process of mining coal is that activity which takes place at the coal face, and ends when coal is placed on the first device that moves it. From that point onward, the winning of coal is a matter of what I choose to call "materials handling." Second, the "materials handling" consists of underground transportation to the shaft bottom, hoisting to the surface, preparing the coal for the market requirements and loading it into cars.

One generally hears offered as an excuse for low output, the broad conclusion "coal seams in England are thinner [*i.e.*, narrower] than in the United States." This is true, but it is an oversimplification. Admittedly, the degree of mechanization which can be achieved in Great Britain will never, under the best conditions, approach that now achieved in the United States. Nature was not as good to the United Kingdom when she laid down the coal deposits. However, more than 50 percent of the coal mined in Great Britain is extracted from seams more than three feet high and is, therefore, subject to some degree of mechanization. There is much room for improved efficiency at the coal face, but, in any case, conditions at the face cannot be made an excuse for failure to tackle aggressively the job of materials handling.

The importance of improving underground transport has been repeatedly stressed by all observers, and plans for reorganizing the industry incorporate measures to cope with this problem. However, none of the reports that have come to my attention has sufficiently emphasized the improvement of surface plant. In the United Kingdom, there is employed on the surface alone at the present time approximately one man for each four long tons of coal loaded. In the United States there is employed on the surface, in underground transport and at the face, one man for each 5.2 long tons of coal loaded. In other words, there are more men on the surface in British coal mines than there are in American mines both on the top and in the bottom per ton of coal loaded. The conditions of the coal seam have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the efficiency of the surface layout. It must be improved not only to release the men employed to other useful purposes, but to contribute to the "atmosphere of efficiency" so necessary to obtain maximum output in all parts of a modern industrial enterprise.

v

Not only technical but also social and psychological factors must be taken into account in assessing the probable success of the Coal Board's program. The first six or seven months of 1947 may be considered to have been a honeymoon between the National Coal Board and the miners. During that period the Board, and the Ministry of Fuel and Power, made many concessions to the mineworkers, the principal one being the establishment of a five-day week with provision for six days' pay. Many other minor concessions were made at division or colliery levels which resulted in better working conditions, and sometimes in more pay. Several schemes for increased medical care and better welfare provisions are either under way or projected for the near future, including a commitment to provide the miners with superannuation and invalid pay at the rate they were paid when they retired. But for these privileges, actual or promised, the miner has given little in return. The relations between the National Coal Board and the miners must necessarily be those of employer and employed, and up until now the Board would appear to have lost most of its bargaining power with the Union, without having impressed on the miners the central fact that even under nationalization any radical improvement in wages, conditions or

hours can only come as the result of increased productivity. For the miners have not only failed to increase production significantly, they have apparently failed even to alter their traditional hostile attitude toward "the boss." This was shown all too clearly with the sudden ending of the honeymoon in September, when the Board decided to meet the urgent need for increased production by increasing each man's daily stint in districts where it was apparent that the existing stint did not employ the miner's full working day. The result was a major strike.

Earlier in 1947, observers had begun to fear that the power of the National Union of Mineworkers in the Trades Union Congress and the Labor Party would make it impossible for the Coal Board to act the part of employer with vigor and authority. And indeed, certain words and actions of the late Minister of Fuel and Power which showed a tendency to by-pass the Board in granting the miners' requests seemed to bear out this view. Probably many of the miners themselves held it. But the September dispute disillusioned them, showing that the Board could on occasion take the employers' rôle all too convincingly, and brought the miners face to face with the less agreeable aspects of nationalization. British newspapers say that the miners complained that the Board was more inhuman, remote and untouchable than even the worst of their late employers. The decision on the increased stint and the accompanying wage provision was taken after less joint inspection and consultation than preceded many similar moves under private ownership; and when the strike had begun, the Board refused to depart from the most orthodox strike settlement procedure, so that movement toward adjustment of differences was painfully slow. The miners felt that the coal owners had been superseded by a "new gang" of bureaucrats who were the harder to fight because strikes caused them no personal financial damage; and they were the more bitter because of a feeling that now even some of their own trade union leaders were not on their side, but, anxious to obtain a position with the Board or elsewhere in the vast army of government officials, took the new bosses' part.

Nationalization has apparently not given the miners a psychological incentive to work, and the material urge is certainly lacking with the shortage of all sorts of consumer goods. Perhaps in any case it is really too late to alter the mental habits of the present generation of miners, either by psychological or material

means. The mental scars of the inter-war years cannot be repaired overnight, any more than can the physical damage to the mines. How, other than by this hypothesis, can one account for the irrationalities in the coal industry? In Lanarkshire, for example, a mine with a 27-inch seam has an output per man shift (O.M.S.) 40 percent above the national average; in South Wales a mine with a four-foot seam is far below the average. A new mine in Fife with good underground conditions does miserably from the point of view of both total and individual output, while mines in Nottingham with no better underground conditions have twice the O.M.S. Similar examples, difficult to analyze and explain on any but a psychological basis, are all too frequent. Obviously they depend on the individual and collective behavior of the human beings who are directly or indirectly associated with the industry. It is not only the miners who are working with insufficient goodwill or effort. The trade union leaders also take a one-sided view. The psychological damage extends to management who, to a significant degree, lack vigor, imagination, and the willingness to take big risks for big gains.

Thus the most hopeful aspect of the new deal for mine workers lies in its effect on recruitment, which is on the upgrade for the first time in many years. The total work force continues to fall, since retirement from old age more than counterbalances the increase in young workers. It will continue to be badly balanced, since the middle-age group, which best combines skill and vigor, still bears the marks of low recruitment in the thirties. But it seems that the future manpower supply may be secure, and one can hope for a new generation of miners who will be without the present crippling attitude.

VI

To evaluate the effect of the present low level of coal production on the over-all economy of the United Kingdom, the present demand for coal must be estimated. In any industrial nation, the demand for this essential raw material is said to vary with the real national income. Over the short term this is essentially correct, although over the longer term the tendency for production to shift from heavy industries to light industries, and for economic activity, on the whole, to shift from production to distribution must be taken into account, so that the relation of coal requirements to national income may be a decreasing function.

Taking the national income in the period 1940, extrapolating to the present, and relating this to internal coal consumption, a demand for 222,000,000 tons is arrived at. As the coal presently produced in Great Britain is not comparable to that placed on the market in 1938 because of increased ash content and the misapplication of types and sizes of coal through faulty distribution, 10,000,000 tons need to be added. Deducting 7,000,000 tons for conversion to oil leaves an estimated demand of 220,000,000 to 225,000,000 tons at present. This estimate must be treated with caution and is not necessarily the tonnage which would be consumed in the present troubled conditions of the British economy, but is the quantity which would be consumed were coal and other commodities available with complete freedom from controls.

The production in 1947 will probably fall short of the Coal Board's target of 200,000,000 long tons by 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 tons. For the calendar year 1948, it may provisionally be expected that production will expand slightly. The target set by the government and included in the report prepared by the Paris Conference of the 16 nations comprising the Committee of European Economic Coöperation is 213,000,000 long tons. To achieve this calls for a marked improvement in productivity per man shift, an increase in the work force, and a reduction in absenteeism — or a combination of all three. It would take, for instance, a productivity of 1.1 to 1.15 tons per man shift and an expanded labor force of 750,000 (as compared with recent figures in September 1947 of 1.05 and 718,000) to reach this total. The experience under the first year of nationalization leaves grave doubts that both or either of these prerequisites will be achieved.

Moreover, should this production be reached, the problem of transportation of coal from the mines to the consuming points will become acute. All indications are that a sustained weekly rate of coal production in excess of 4,100,000 long tons will strain the existing facilities. The annual production of 210,000,000 to 215,000,000 tons means that, to allow for normal weekly fluctuations in coal production, an output of 4,100,000 tons per week or more must frequently be attained for several weeks in a row.

The long-term objective of the Government and the National Coal Board is something along the line of an output of 245,000,000 long tons by 1951, and an eventual output of 250,000,000. An ultimate output per man shift of two long tons and a work force of 500,000 are frequently mentioned by British govern-

mental agencies. While the expected O.M.S. is technically possible — it was almost achieved in the Dutch mines before the war where mining conditions are much more difficult than those generally encountered in Great Britain — the work force figure presupposes little or no absenteeism. A more realistic estimate is that 550,000 to 560,000 workers will be needed.

In the writer's opinion, this estimated target will not be reached in ten years. Any guess further into the future is of no value. It must be realized, however, that a productive capacity of 250,000,000 long tons will possibly be reached in less time by recruiting a large labor force and improving rail facilities. The achievement of a high production rate in this manner can be considered only an interim solution of the final problem of efficient production, and such an interim solution creates more problems for the future. For example, as output per man shift increases, fewer young men will enter the industry and the average age of the miners will increase steadily over a period of 20 years or more, until normal retirement of the older men is balanced by recruitment of an equal number of younger men.

It must not be forgotten that during the period necessary for the British Coal industry's reorganization there exists a distinct possibility that British coal may be priced out of the export market. The principal competitor of the future British export coal market will probably be coal from Poland, and all indications lead to the conclusion that it will be priced lower than coal from Great Britain. From the point of view of the South American coal market, it is significant to point out that at the present time the sales price of railroad and power-house coal f.o.b. tide-water on Atlantic ports of the United States is less than the pit-head cost of coal in the United Kingdom. The coal industries of Poland, South Africa and the United States cannot be expected to stand still while Great Britain sets its coal mines in order.

The British coal industry is in a bad way. It is difficult to see how the steps toward rehabilitation can be either shortened or speeded up. It is essentially an internal British problem, which must be solved by the people of that country in their own way. The effects of the economic laws which are bound to operate, even in a controlled economy, may, however, be the agent which precipitates the ultimate reorganization of the industry.

WHAT RUSSIANS THINK OF AMERICANS

By Frederick C. Barghoorn

FOR about two years the Soviet propaganda apparatus has been conducting what it refers to as a "counter-offensive" against capitalist culture and ideology. Again and again the Communist Party has called upon the Soviet press, radio, literature and drama to rebuff attempts allegedly emanating from the capitalist west to poison the minds of the Soviet people and to shake their faith in their Socialist institutions. Soviet writers, such as Konstantin Simonov, have responded with works depicting the western — particularly the American — way of life as corrupt, venal and decadent. Scholars have reverted to their prewar criticisms of their American colleagues as lackeys of the bourgeoisie and exponents of "international reactionary ideology."

The attempt to deflate the prestige of western culture and civilization has been accompanied by a more somber propaganda line in which "American imperialism" has been substituted for German Fascism as the chief symbol of evil and danger. The Russian people are told in a hundred ways that they must regard America as a potential enemy, and that the American people are wage slaves of capitalists and dupes of a corrupt culture which by escapist films, jazz and pulp magazines poisons their minds and distracts their attention from the realities of the class struggle, *i.e.*, from their own interest in precipitating a revolution. The recent reincarnation of the Comintern as the "Cominform" signalizes the intention of the Soviet leaders to wage this propaganda war without compunction.

The truthful information about America reaching the Soviet public today is a trickle compared to this roaring ocean of denunciation and vilification. A promising beginning of an effective information program coördinated with American foreign policy — the "Voice of America" — aroused keen and favorable interest among Russian listeners, but was curtailed by budget cuts in 1947. It may be said in general that the Soviet public has been conditioned to take radio programs which would seem heavy to many Americans; much of the criticism of the State Department broadcasts to Russia seems to have overlooked this

fact. But the underlying objection to the program was, perhaps, the conviction that the United States Government simply should not be active in this field at all. A marked change of tone in the comments of Congressmen recently returned from Europe seems to indicate that this view has been modified under the pressure of events, and that the appropriation for such a program will be increased. This surely is to be desired, and it may be useful for an American lately returned from four years in the U.S.S.R. to try to suggest, a little more in detail, what the attitude of the Russian people toward America and Americans is, as a contribution to the problem of working out an expanded information program.

It is, I think, correct to say that a reservoir of good will and friendliness toward Americans exists in the minds and the hearts of the Russian people. American observers who have had experience in the Soviet Union agree almost without exception that Russians and Americans tend to like one another and to get on well together when conditions for friendly relationships are at all favorable. It is important that American public opinion realize the existence of this reserve of good will toward America among the Russian people, and that American policy do everything possible to maintain and increase it.

But how much of this attitude remains, after the campaign of suspicion and hate of the past two years? Though the question is a very relevant one, no assured answer can, of course, be given. Russia is vast, and even more than in other lands, the currents can run far below the surface. No observer sees more than signs, here and there. My own opinion is that more of it remains than might be supposed — and more than the Soviet leaders like to admit. In the past, it has often seemed necessary for Soviet officials to warn the Soviet people against the seductive fascination of America. Thus, Stalin in his celebrated conversation with Emil Ludwig in 1931 took occasion to correct the impression that the Russian people had “special respect for everything American.” The necessity seems to continue, as shown by an article in *Izvestia* for August 13, 1947. The article is a diatribe against foreigners, but no less against Russians who have an inferiority complex toward the west. It reveals that this feeling is widespread, and it is studded with such phrases as “Now there exist all the possibilities for the complete liquidation of a most harmful residue in the consciousness of certain citizens of

the U.S.S.R. — subservience to the west.” The carefully controlled Soviet press often offers such hints that there is a gap between what the Russian people believe and what the Kremlin wants them to believe.

In travels to and from Vladivostok, the Ukraine and the Caucasus during 1946 and the first three months of 1947, I noticed no diminution of popular friendship and esteem for Americans. Even at the time of the Iranian crisis and Mr. Churchill’s speech at Fulton, Missouri, I met with the customary cordiality and friendly curiosity from the rank and file of the Russians. There comes back to me, for example, the peculiarly delighted smile with which an Armenian truck driver announced that he had friends in America, and the fervent gratitude of a Georgian woman for the help of her American associates in repatriation work in Germany. A hundred similar instances could be cited. The words “America” and “American” seem to have a magical appeal for nine out of ten Russians.

Perhaps this appeal of things American should be likened to the attraction which the “Soviet myth” exercises over American “fellow travellers;” but the fellow travellers are, of course, intellectuals — and the interesting comparison is that it is precisely among the intellectuals in the U.S.S.R. that one is least likely to find warmth of feeling for the United States. Since Russian intellectuals are apt to be Party members or officials — or, at any rate, men and women who are aware that they are living under the close scrutiny of Party members or officials — this is scarcely surprising. Even so, there are exceptions to the generalization, as will be suggested below. But here I speak only of the “average” men and women of the U.S.S.R., and of the evidence of their compatability with the Americans with whom they come in contact.

II

What, more particularly, do they like about Americans? First of all, they like American personal traits and attitudes. Again and again Americans in the U.S.S.R. are told that “You are like us” or “Americans are simple people.” The latter is high praise from a Russian. The word “simple” (*prostoi*) means in Russian “unaffected,” “sincere.” Russians like American informality and directness. Often ordinary Soviet folk will favorably compare Americans stationed in Moscow with Soviet officials in respect

to these qualities. A young American diplomat made a hit with some of the Embassy's Soviet employees by occasionally taking the wheel of one of the Embassy's trucks. The Soviet employees pointed out that no Soviet official would do such a thing, since manual and intellectual labor were separated by a wide gap in the U.S.S.R. American liveliness and gaiety and the American fondness for "kidding" also strike a responsive chord. While traveling on the Trans-Siberian railway, I was told by a Soviet woman that the Russians, too, are at heart a gay people, but that the hardships of life have made them more somber than Americans. In all of this there is a sense of genuine democracy. Russians often inquire regarding one's occupation, and occasionally regarding one's social status. But they tend to judge foreigners much more by their attitudes, abilities and personality than by class or rank.

It might appear from some of the above observations that only the lighter side of the American character appeals to Russians. While it is true that the relatively carefree Americans probably had a tonic effect on the Russians they encountered during the terrible wartime years, it is also true that the Russians not only enjoy but also respect Americans. Perhaps the most obvious source of this respect is the Americans' reputation as hard, efficient workers. Official Soviet propaganda for years held up this aspect of American character as a model for Soviet emulation. The businesslike quality (*delovitost*) of Americans has often been praised by Soviet leaders, including Stalin. Associated with this quality in the Russian mind are "American punctuality" and "American precision."

Russians also seem to be favorably impressed by the fairness and open-mindedness of many Americans. Probably Americans with whom Soviet people have come in contact have been on the whole more indulgent than Europeans about the rougher aspects of everyday life in the U.S.S.R. This may seem paradoxical, since the American scale of living is luxurious by comparison with that of any other nation. Yet Americans perhaps are somewhat less afflicted with the narrow class outlook which has colored the reactions of so many Europeans to the Soviet scene. Unfortunately, there were also a few Americans in the U.S.S.R. during the war who did not conceal their irritation because they could not readily obtain accustomed material comforts. As all over the world, these Americans made a bad impression.

One characteristic which, fortunately, is displayed by most Americans in Russia and which elicits a favorable response is "politeness." This may seem a trivial matter, and the writer confesses he was often puzzled that Soviet people should stress it. Nevertheless, Soviet women in particular so often express appreciation of the politeness of foreigners, especially Americans, that it is obvious that they consider it important. I believe that what Russians mean by American "politeness" is in part, at least, simply respect for human beings as individuals. This is more important to most Russians than refinement of manners, although if the latter represents real courtesy, it makes a deep impression.

American culture and civilization are esteemed by most groups in the population. The word "culture" is used in the U.S.S.R. in a peculiar sense. Its meaning covers education, good manners, *savoir faire* and poise. Thus, a person is "cultured" if he does not push or shout in a crowded subway train or theater entrance. In this sense, Russians have a high opinion of American "culture." Respect for personal property is also included in this conception of culture.

But they also value other elements of American civilization, both good and bad. There is a demand for American plays, films and music. American jazz, American literature, science, technology and even to a certain extent American scholarship came to be more highly regarded during the war than ever before. Musicians asked Embassy members to get them scores of American music. Officials of the Writers Union clamored for more up-to-date American novels. I even arranged a profitable exchange of American detective stories for Soviet war posters. The film "It Happened One Night" was made into a highly successful play. The movie actress Deanna Durbin became very popular among Soviet young people. (I was asked by a young Georgian girl on a suburban train near Tbilisi whether Deanna had died, as a widespread rumor had it.) In 1946, however, the showing and playing of "bourgeois" productions was denounced as a sinister plot, and none is now permitted.

The most solid impression that one derives from residence in Moscow is that Soviet people are convinced of American prosperity. (Incidentally, many Russian families, especially among Jewish people, have relatives who have prospered in the United States. Personal relationships and family contacts play a considerable part in the formation of Russian opinion about this

country.) Those whose thinking is closest to the Party line admit that America is rich, but are confident that in another 15 or 20 years the U.S.S.R. will catch up. A lawyer on a Moscow-Kiev train in 1946 told me that Russia would attain the American standard of living after the completion of the present series of Five-Year Plans and that peoples such as the Kirghiz and Tad-jiks will share in this standard; he emphasized the belief that in America the Negroes are excluded from the good things of life.

Many Soviet people, however, appear to despair of their country ever attaining a comfortable and prosperous economy. One asks a Soviet person, "When will you have Communism?" and the reply is, "In a thousand years." One old man quoted the saying, "While the grass is growing, the horse will die." The wife of an Army officer of Georgian nationality told me while I was traveling in the Caucasus in February 1947, that seeing American films was to her both a pleasant and a painful experience: after seeing them, she said, she felt depressed by the contrast between American and Soviet life. It is a frequent experience in the parks of Moscow for an American to be surrounded by eager, curious little tots asking, "It's better in America, isn't it?" The writer was even asked this question by a minor police official who was inspecting his documents in Mtskheta, Georgia. This experience is so often repeated that one cannot help concluding that America represents to the Soviet masses the symbol of a promised life which they themselves will never enjoy. It is extremely significant that the Soviet press has lately conceded the prosperity of the United States, and counters with a charge that Americans have material values and no culture.

Wartime psychology, of course, heightened the feeling of mutual friendship between the Russian and American peoples. During the war, Americans were regarded by the Russians not only as "sympathetic" people but as friends in need, and powerful and generous allies. There were signs that the Soviet authorities were worried by the popularity of Americans and America. The Soviet press and radio and the far-flung network of Party agitators played down America's rôle on the fighting fronts and also our achievements in supplying war materials and foodstuffs. The effort to belittle American aid to the U.S.S.R. was, however, faced with omnipresent evidence of American aid in the form of tanks, planes, hundreds of locomotives on the Trans-Siberian

and other railways, powdered eggs, flour, sugar, the tasty *Tushonka* (a pork product manufactured to Soviet specifications), American leather coats, even the cloth in many a soldier's uniform, and so on and so on. The evidence did not disappear with the end of the war. For example, 59 of the 60 trucks which participated in the May Day parade at Vladivostok in 1946 were American.

The Party takes the line that Russia bore the main burden of the war and paid for victory in blood while America was enriching herself. This unfair but shrewd propaganda appeals to Russian pride and to the people's consciousness of terrible losses. But despite Soviet propaganda designed to minimize the American rôle in the war, it made a great impression. Again and again the writer was told by Russian people that without American aid the Soviet Union would have lost the war. Even military personnel, perhaps the most intensively indoctrinated large group of the population, often expressed appreciation of American help in terms far more generous than those of the press. I recall, for example, a 23-year-old aviator colonel and hero of the Soviet Union who told the pilot of our Moscow-Baku plane in 1944 how the appearance of American tanks and planes at Stalingrad had helped mightily to stiffen morale.

Russian expressions of appreciation of American and British partnership in the war reached a new height after the Normandy invasion. It was a moving experience to be in Moscow in those days. Many of us were congratulated even by strangers on the streets or in parks, or by clerks in bookshops. In some cases, Russian acquaintances wept from emotion. The climax of good feeling came on V-E day, celebrated in the U.S.S.R. not on May 8 but on May 9, when there occurred probably the first genuine popular demonstration in Moscow since that of the Trotskyites on the Red Square in 1927. Thousands of people shouted themselves hoarse in front of the American and British Embassies, tossed Americans and Britons in boisterous good fellowship and in general demonstrated their joy with typically Russian abandon. In retrospect this outburst of affection for foreigners is full of tragedy as well as joy, for it symbolized for the Russian people the deepest meaning of the wartime partnership — the hope that at last isolation and fear and suspicion were ended and that they could henceforth live in comradeship with the other peoples of the world. V-E day marked the apogee of a tide which was soon to ebb, leaving the Russian people once

again cut off from even the communion with the outside world which had seemed to be developing during the war. Not long after, *Krokodil*, the Soviet humorous magazine, published a satirical sketch about a young Russian who, disguised as an American, listened for a whole evening to rapturous praise of such manifestations of Americanism as the Lindy Hop and gangsters. At the climax he revealed that he was, after all, a Russian, and that though on May 9 he had tossed an American and embraced an Englishman, he was proud to be a member of a nation to which other lands were grateful not for cigarettes but for liberating whole peoples. It was a significant straw in the wind.

III

The complex question of the Russian attitude to the question of freedom is so frequently discussed that the writer will attempt no analysis of it here. It must not be supposed that the friendliness of ordinary Russians necessarily implies sympathy with American institutions. In so far as apathy and preoccupation with pressing everyday needs have not sapped his ideological zeal, the average Soviet citizen accepts a set of ideas which by implication is condemnatory of the American way of life. Only one of the hundreds of Soviet citizens with whom I talked — a bumptious young Party worker — ever attempted to “sell” me on the Soviet system. But fairly often Russians refer to the impossibility for them of living under a different system — one in which, for example, there could be private ownership of railways. They do not understand the American two-party political system, or American electoral procedure. The writer recalls how some Russians were alarmed by the fact that a Presidential election was held during the war; they feared the mere scheduling of an election indicated that America was preparing to change its policy toward Russia. One Red Army colonel asked the writer after the elections if Mr. Roosevelt had not been made President for life. Accustomed for centuries to a régime of paternalism and tutelage, Russians can scarcely be expected to understand American political democracy. An indication of this was furnished by a conversation with a high official of a Soviet publication agency who told me that we Americans must “eliminate” people like Herbert Hoover before democracy could be safe in the world.

Yet it seems to me that many Russians do have at least some appreciation of the value of American personal liberty and

personal security under the law. Americans are often told that they are lucky to live in a country in which one can, as one Soviet citizen put it, "breathe." Russians also often express envy of Americans for their privilege of changing their jobs easily, or of traveling to foreign countries. There cannot but be a connection in Russian minds between the evident happiness and well-being of Americans, and the political and economic institutions under which Americans live. The Russian people are told by the official propaganda, of course, that high standards of living are withheld from great numbers of Americans and that even the exploiting "capitalists" are soon to suffer a sad fate. I venture to guess that this labored official distinction between American exploiters and exploited does not register too profoundly on the mind of the average Russian (save so far as it relates to Negroes) and that the general conclusion of Russian people is that Americans by and large are rather nice people, a little too rich, clever with machines — and lucky to have a large measure of a somewhat indefinable but precious good called "freedom." And many of those who look upon American life merely as deplorably rich and easy display a poorly concealed fascination with this sinful America. It is no accident that Mr. Vishinsky explained to a foreign diplomat that the Soviet Government objected to its citizens marrying foreigners because they thus escape their share of the hardships incident to building a new society.

IV

I should emphasize once more that the attitudes noted above are those of the man in the street, not those of the Soviet ruling circles. The small fraction of the population who share with top Party circles in the privileges of power also share their ideological zeal. True, even among the higher bureaucracy there are doubts and occasional defections. Marshal Zhukov's eclipse is rumored to have resulted from his friendliness to America.

The few civilian officials of other government departments seem to fall into two main categories in their attitude toward America. Those who are primarily experts, particularly in such fields as medicine and education, are friendly and eager to share their knowledge. Thus, a high official of the R.S.F.R. Education Ministry told me (this was in 1944) that Russia had a "special bond" with America, and that a wide exchange of educational literature between the two countries was desirable. But those who

are primarily Party officials of learned or scientific bodies are, with few exceptions, aloof, usually coldly correct, sometimes hostile. Contacts with the upper echelons of Soviet society are difficult to make; the system of barriers must be experienced to be believed. So far as the upper reaches of the Soviet hierarchy go, a foreign diplomat may be said to enjoy the status of a privileged pariah.

On less exalted levels, Soviet intellectuals are in process of changing their minds about America. It must not be forgotten that, long before the Soviet régime, democratic and intellectual elements in Russia had admired many aspects of American life, particularly those connected with pioneering. Even Lenin made a favorable comparison between the American and "Prussian" types of capitalism, though in his "State and Revolution" he expressed the opinion that the American state had become a police machine which must be destroyed by a Socialist revolution. Until the recent anti-American campaign, Soviet doctrine has pointed out that America, though capitalist and "imperialist," was at least free from remnants of "feudalism," and had even, as Stalin said in his speech of November 6, 1942, "elementary" democratic freedoms. Though Soviet intellectuals are sometimes repelled by American informality and irreverence, and prefer the British for that reason, there was considerable evidence in the honeymoon period of the coalition of much desire among Soviet intellectuals for closer Soviet-American cultural relations. I recall, for example, a professor of history who told me in 1944 that all groups of the population from the simplest workers and peasant to the intellectuals wished to know more about the Anglo-Saxon countries. He said that the Russian public could not learn enough about these countries from its press. He was optimistic about future cultural and political relations, expressing the opinion that the Chinese wall which had sealed Russia off from the world was crumbling. This attitude was widespread. My experience with a casual acquaintance on the Trans-Siberian, the young wife of a naval officer, who had been a teacher before her marriage, was typical. Upon learning I was an American, she burst into excited praise of the United States as "the center of civilization in the world." Respect for American technology has been particularly strong among Soviet intellectuals, as is, of course, so well known as scarcely to need mention. Ilf and Petrov's "One Story America," for example, though a caricature

of American life and society, presents America as a technological wonderland. Our super-highways, gas stations and skyscrapers are objects of vast delight and envy. Now Soviet intellectuals, joining perforce in the current anti-western campaign, must not only convince the Russian masses that they do not want any of these things after all; they must also convince themselves that they do not admire American machinery or technological skill. No doubt they will succeed, for the penalty of not doing so is dire; but the road of Soviet professional men and intellectuals is in truth a rough one.

v

What conclusions may be ventured as to the specific problem of keying an American information service to the pitch most likely to appeal to the Russian people? By far the most important medium available for communication with them is radio, and the writer pretends to no special competence in this highly expert field. In general, however, I think it may be said that our premise should be that there still exists a reservoir of friendliness and even admiration for Americans in Russia. Though we would delude ourselves if we supposed that the Russian people are in spiritual opposition to their government, we may proceed on the assumption that popular thinking there is not wholly a reflection of official propaganda. For the United States to echo the Soviet tone and engage in a propaganda war, full of vilification and abuse of Soviet institutions, would weaken our case rather than strengthen it.

The basic theme of our program, in short, should be the true live-and-let-live attitude of Americans. The program should be truthful, objective, and — for all that it can be full of good humor and high spirits — “serious.” Points at issue between the two governments should not be ignored, but we should assume that we are speaking to people who will be pleased if those controversies are amicably settled. In this connection I recall a conversation with a Soviet army major on the Kiev-Kharkhov train in December 1946. The major was aware that differences of policy and opinion existed between the two countries, but he was confident, he said, that they would be overcome, quoting with approval Ambassador Smith’s statement, which he had read in the State Department magazine *Amerika*, that the two countries must arm themselves with patience.

An effort on our part to establish the superiority of our political and economic institutions by argument is as likely to seem bumptious to the Russian people as the corresponding Soviet effort to belittle our institutions seems to us. I do not worry in the least about the present Soviet propaganda line that seeks to disparage American culture and to prove that our material well-being is a sad defect of our national life. Obviously, it is a confession of weakness on the part of the Soviet régime. The Russian people who, though they live behind the iron curtain (and precisely because they are subject to this censorship) are adept at reading between the lines, will interpret it as such. Moreover, if they can be reached with evidence of American well-being and good humor, more than a few of them will draw their own conclusions as to the validity of the picture of the rapacious America, hungry for foreign conquests, that the official Soviet propaganda is now drawing.

Media other than radio should also be used so far as possible. Certainly the Russian-language magazine *Amerika* is immensely popular with those Russians who have access to it. The exchange of publications and students would be useful in promoting understanding between the two peoples, but unfortunately the Soviet Government is not now willing to coöperate in student exchanges. One step that we might take is the assignment of competent American scholars, writers or artists for short periods of service in the Moscow Embassy. Such persons could do much for the prestige of American culture among the Soviet intelligentsia, although it is necessary to point out that they would work under extremely difficult conditions.

It would be unrealistic to believe that the propaganda campaign against the United States will not make headway among a hungry, harassed people, with the normal human desire to find a scapegoat for troubles and with perhaps more than their share of suspiciousness. But the difficulty of the task of arousing aversion to things American is evidenced by the very magnitude of the Soviet efforts devoted to it. The writer hazards the opinion that America symbolizes so many of the aspirations of the Soviet Russian people that it will be impossible to make them hate us if our message to the world continues to be the "pursuit of happiness" for all peoples.

CONFLICTING PURPOSES IN JAPAN

By Sir George Sansom

IF HISTORY does not repeat itself closely enough to allow us to predict the future, at least it gives some useful hints. Japan in 1868 was a country with no political, military or industrial strength. By 1905 she had become the strongest power in eastern Asia largely because it had suited the United Kingdom and the United States to encourage her development. Already in 1900, Captain Mahan, in a book entitled "The Problem of Asia," had proposed the coöperation of four sea Powers, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan, for the protection of Asiatic sovereignties against Russian land power, arguing that by the annexation of the Philippines the United States was irrevocably committed in Asia. Events have strangely distorted his international picture and cast doubts upon his strategic concepts. They have not, however, entirely destroyed his general theory of world politics, which would seem to justify a belief that the future choice of Japan between peace and war may be determined less by her form of government and her industrial strength than by the general distribution of power in the world during the next decade or so.

It looks as if the discussion of the future treatment of Japan at the forthcoming Peace Conference will deal chiefly with political and economic controls designed to prevent her from developing the will and the strength to make war. These are desirable ends. But it is worth while to examine whether they can be attained by the methods now proposed.

The problem of the future treatment of Japan attracts little public attention, or at any rate causes little public concern, because the comparatively untroubled course of events in Japan since the surrender has been in striking contrast with the melancholy tale of disagreement and failure in Germany. This is a natural result of the unified control exercised with such remarkable success by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and also — it should be recognized — of the sensible behavior of the Japanese themselves. Moreover, the Far Eastern Commission, the Allied body charged with formulating policy for the control of Japan under the terms of surrender, has preserved a fair degree of harmony. This may be ascribed not only to its terms

of reference (which in effect leave the last word on disputed matters to the United States Government), but also to a disposition on the part of its members to approve the main lines of American policy because they recognize that America must carry the main burden of the task of occupation.

These circumstances are obviously favorable to a smoothly running execution of occupation policy; and it is agreed that satisfactory progress has so far been made towards the main objectives of the occupation period. The disarmament of Japan is complete. A new constitution has been promulgated. Elections have been held under universal adult suffrage. Some progress has been made in planning educational reform. Trade unions have been freely constituted and are playing a part in domestic politics. Steps have been taken towards economic reform aimed at ensuring (in the words of the Basic Policy statement approved by the Far Eastern Commission) "a wide and just distribution of income and the ownership of the means of production and trade."

Nobody can raise serious objection to these measures, for, though it is possible to say, according to taste, that they have gone too far or not far enough, they are clearly on sound general lines. But they are at best only preliminary measures; and what is of real and lasting importance is not what happens under artificial conditions of military occupation but what is likely to happen when allied controls are relaxed or removed and Japan regains freedom of action. The work so far done has been in the nature of clearing away the débris of Japan's shattered political and economic structure, preparing a site and sketching out foundations for a new edifice. But it is the Japanese themselves who will have to plan and build.

II

The Peace Treaty when it is concluded will no doubt provide for some measure of continuing control or supervision of Japan, so as to ensure performance of the obligations which will be laid upon her. But, whether such control be loose or rigid, the Japanese will have regained their independence. They must observe certain rules, they will be subject to certain restrictions, but substantially they will be their own masters and responsible for the conduct of their own affairs. Indeed, it is probable that the period of tutelage will be short, since in practice a system of divided responsibility

is at best inefficient and at worst tends to become unworkable.

What the Allies want, above all, is assurance that Japan will not renew her expansionist policy in the Far East. They would like to feel that she will, within the next decade or so, develop such a form of government as will prevent the concentration of power in the hands of an ambitious and warlike group. In other words, they would like the Japanese people to become unwilling to go to war. But they evidently — and rightly — do not regard a democratic form of government as a complete safeguard, and therefore they would like the Japanese people to be unable as well as unwilling to go to war. This combination would make an ideal form of insurance against trouble, and it is useful to consider whether it is feasible.

An attempt to discover how nations are led into war by their rulers raises all kinds of difficult questions which are philosophical rather than political. There is no fixed correlation between forms of government and pacific behavior. Democratic states have often been unprepared for war; but that is not the same thing as being against war if war seems necessary. They have often been reluctant to make war; but that has not prevented them from taking a view of their national interest resulting in war. There have been occasions in the history of modern democratic states when the party in office followed a warlike policy which would perhaps not have been adopted had the opposition party been in power — as, for instance, in the Boer War and the Spanish-American War. Nevertheless, those wars were fought, and fought by democratic states against the wish of a minority but with substantial popular approval. The decisive factors were not the opinions of the public at the time, but previous and gradual developments of foreign policy to which it had not paid attention.

If this reasoning is correct, it would seem that the most we can hope for, if we wish to diminish as far as possible a disposition on the part of the Japanese people to make war, is a government which will not be able easily to persuade them that war will serve their national interests. Such a government would not necessarily be democratic in form, though it might be so in essence. Consequently, it should be the business of the Allied Powers to concern themselves with the realities rather than the appearances of government in Japan; and of those realities the actual condition and temper of the Japanese people will be a most important component. It is true that in 1941 the political institutions of

Japan were such as to favor the rise to power of a small, militaristic group; but they were, all the same, not such as to prevent the defeat of that group by an anti-war party had it been sufficiently numerous and determined. It would be a mistake to suppose that the Japanese people were driven into war only because they had no voice in public affairs. It was a much less simple situation than that, as can be seen from the fact that even today most Japanese blame their leaders of 1941 not for making war, but for getting them into a war they could not win.

This, of course, is not an argument against encouraging the Japanese to build up democratic institutions. It is only an argument against counting upon the adoption of such institutions, especially their adoption under even gentle pressure, as a means of preventing war. The western democracies would not be true to themselves if they did not recommend their own political beliefs and practices, but they would be unwise to assume that these can easily be transplanted into foreign soil. There are signs that many Japanese are now enjoying and appreciating a new freedom, and it is possible that they will know how to make good use of it. Yet there are reasons to doubt whether they, or indeed any people who have an ancient social and intellectual tradition of their own, can assimilate political lessons given to them by foreign teachers. Perhaps they, of all Asiatic peoples, are the most likely material for the ambitious experiment in democratization which is now taking place; but these heady doctrines can stimulate without nourishing, so that in Japan, as elsewhere in Asia, it is likely that the form of government ultimately developed will be something which only superficially resembles its western model.

If we cannot be sure of making the Japanese people unwilling to go to war, can we be sure of making them unable to go to war? Here we are on fairly solid ground, because today the conditions of warfare are such that only a highly industrialized state can be a principal in any but small, localized hostilities.

III

Japan's economic position is extremely weak. She has been disarmed and demilitarized, her industries have been severely damaged by war and may be further reduced by reparations. Her financial position is desperate. It is difficult to see how she can by her own unaided efforts build up her resources even to a modest standard, while an industrial output which would permit her to

make war must be out of the question for as long a time as can reasonably be foreseen. It may be objected that Germany, on her knees in 1918, became a formidable industrial and military power within 20 years. That is so, but the cases of Japan and Germany are not comparable. Germany had land frontiers, across which she could draw strength from contiguous states. The economy of Europe was dependent even after 1918 upon the existence of a prosperous Germany, or at least it was so regarded by the victorious Powers, who therefore handsomely subsidized German recovery and condoned breaches of the so-called Versailles *Diktat*. But the economy of eastern Asia is not dependent upon a prosperous Japan,¹ though a rehabilitated Japan could probably make important contributions to the economic progress of Asiatic countries. Moreover, the damage done to Japan's economy by the recent war and its sequels is far greater than the damage done to Germany in 1914-1918. That portion of her industrial equipment which survived bombing is to a large extent in poor condition or out-of-date. Her merchant fleet has been mostly destroyed. Her capital resources in the form of foreign investments were used up in the war effort, or are earmarked for reparations or occupation costs. More important still, she has lost her overseas possessions and the valuable commercial footholds which she had gained on the Asiatic mainland, as well as the strategic bases which enabled her to carry on war in the Pacific. The only resources she has left are the undamaged portion of her industry and the skill and diligence of her people. The immediate problem is not how Japan can be prevented from developing a high war potential, but how she can support her population.

By 1950 the population of Japan will be about 80,000,000 as against 70,000,000 in 1936 and 64,000,000 in 1930. Even before the war Japan was obliged to import nearly 20 percent of her total consumption of staple foodstuffs, and these had to be paid for by exports of manufactured goods. But Japan has practically no domestic supplies of the raw materials needed by modern industries, so that in addition to food she had to obtain those materials abroad, also by exporting manufactured goods. In other words, she depended for her subsistence upon foreign trade, and she could sell the required volume of exports only by keeping their prices low, which meant that she must keep manufacturing efficiency up and wages down. In these respects she gained,

¹ By Japan here is meant Japan proper, not the former Japanese Empire and its puppets.

especially in the years between 1930 and 1937, a considerable success. This success was due, of course, to the intense effort made by the leaders of Japanese industry and trade and to the competitive advantage of low wage costs. In the years under discussion, Japan also received some temporary benefit from a fall in the world prices of raw materials and other fortuitous circumstances which she was quick to utilize. But what chiefly enabled her to balance her foreign trade was her economic relationship with her colonies and Manchuria. To trade with these was not the same as to trade with foreign countries. They were in the *yen* currency area, and, though the rice, sugar, soya beans, minerals and other essential supplies which she drew from Korea, Formosa and Manchuria had to be paid for in money or in goods, these remained within areas over which Japan retained both economic and political control.²

It will be seen that in the years between 1931 and 1938 (after which her economy was distorted by war and preparation for war) Japan depended for the maintenance of her position in international trade upon factors which are no longer present, namely the possession of colonies and economic satellites, a large body of foreign investments, a stock of gold and annual earnings in foreign exchange derived chiefly from the services of her large merchant marine. All these advantages have been lost. None of them is likely to be regained in sufficient degree to permit of restoring her economic life to the level which it had reached in 1941, except with foreign assistance.

Various estimates have been made of the amount of goods which will be needed to support the population of Japan at a given level of consumption in a selected year after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and on the basis of those estimates the necessary amount of imports and exports has been calculated. Such computations must be largely theoretical, since they contain a number of unknowns and variables. But they are of interest in that even the most optimistic of them show that, far from being able to build up her economy to a level approaching that of 1941, Japan will have difficulty in supporting a population of 80,000,000 (the

² It may be objected that in future Japan will be able to trade profitably with these areas, though she will have lost political control. That is true, but their economies will no longer be fashioned to serve Japanese interests. Thus, to take a simple example, Japan could formerly pay for her import surplus from Formosa by dividends and interest from Japanese-owned investments in Formosa, and where these were insufficient she balanced her payments by the sale of Japanese bonds in Formosa. Similar, but not identical, conditions characterized her economic relations with Korea and Manchuria.

estimated figure for 1950) at a standard of living comparable to that of 1930 — which was a depression year when the great advances in production and trade of the ensuing decade had not yet begun.³ Even that standard can be reached only if other conditions are favorable — that is to say, if world trade quickly revives, if Japanese exports can find markets, if they can be sold at prices which will produce an adequate return in imported food and raw materials, if industrial equipment and other capital goods do not need to be imported in quantity, and if domestic problems of administration, finance and production are adequately handled.

All these are doubtful assumptions, but even if we suppose that they can be realized there is still no way in which Japan can build up her industrial strength beyond the 1931 level unless she receives assistance from outside. If she receives such assistance in future, then it will be the duty of the parties to the Peace Treaty to see that it is not such in kind or in quantity as to permit Japan to make preparations for war or other aggressive action. Only foreign aid can make possible a dangerous revival of expansionist policies in Japan. It is pertinent to recall here that Japan could not have acquired the political and industrial strength which enabled her to make war in 1941 if she had not received from other countries considerable financial help and some moral support at intervals during her career as a modern state. Her government was able to raise important foreign loans in America and Europe from the time of the Russo-Japanese war, and the funds which she thus obtained were applied to redressing her always precarious balance of trade. Without them her industrial development would have moved at a slower speed, and possibly on sounder lines; while the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the friendly attitude of the United States, if they did not encourage, certainly did not check the expansion of Japan in the early twentieth century.

Such considerations lead one to conclude that, from the point of view of security, the actions of the Allied Powers will be, in the future as in the past, no less important than the nature of the government of Japan and the level of Japanese industry. Indeed, it is easy to conceive of situations where a weak democratic government and a low level of industry might drive Japan into

³ The Far Eastern Commission, in a policy decision issued early in 1947, defined the peaceful needs of Japan as the standard of living for the period 1930-1934. This would be a rather higher level than that of 1931.

undesirable courses. The strength or weakness of the government is a matter which the Allies cannot hope to arrange to their own collective or individual taste, but they are in a position to influence Japan's economic development. The question therefore arises whether it will be to their advantage to raise rather than lower the level of industry in Japan.

IV

If it is true that Japan cannot without assistance regain her position as a first-class industrial Power, it is reasonable to assume that for a long time she cannot play the rôle of a principal actor in international politics. She must remain a satellite, dependent upon a single strong Power or a strong group of Powers, since she has not strength enough in herself for true independence, and her strategic situation will scarcely allow her to be neutral. She must sooner or later decide into which zone of power she will enter; and all present indications are that she will choose to remain within the zone of the United States. That is a political situation which would probably be approved with few or no reserves by a majority of the Allied Powers. But a weak and hungry satellite or protégé is a liability and not an asset; so that the United States, not only from a long-term viewpoint but also by reason of its current responsibilities as the major occupying Power, is faced with the problem of rebuilding the economy of Japan to a level where she can support herself without being a menace to peace in the Far East. This is a difficult and delicate problem, and it is no wonder that the United States Government has displayed a certain hesitation in attacking it.

In the early months of the occupation all energies were concentrated upon the political education of Japan and economic questions were neglected, or at least treated as of secondary importance. A year later an economic "crisis" was discerned in a condition of affairs which had been present and obvious from the day of surrender. Decisions were then taken by the United States Government as to the economic future of Japan which were scarcely consistent with previous trends of policy. Governments must be praised, not blamed, for revising their plans in the light of experience, especially in these days when the world picture changes with such dizzy speed; but the results of second thoughts are sometimes a little surprising. No decision as to the level of the economic life of Japan had been reached by the Far Eastern

Commission, nor had the United States Government given a definite lead until May 1947, when the Commission had been sitting for more than a year. Then Mr. Dean Acheson, at that time Under Secretary of State, announced that in order to promote world recovery it was necessary "to push ahead with the reconstruction of those two great workshops of Europe and Asia — Germany and Japan."

Not all the Allied Powers will fully approve of this aim, in so far as it concerns Japan. Most of them will agree that Japan must be put on her feet again and, in the words of the Potsdam Declaration, "permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy but not those which would enable her to rearm." But the declaration does not say what level of economy, and there is room for argument on this point. Evidently an economy that did not furnish sufficient food for her increasing population (and would concurrently not provide sufficient employment) would not encourage democratic institutions and a peaceable outlook. It would throw a burden of relief upon the Allied Powers which none of them is prepared to shoulder. The United States is already spending large sums upon food for Japan, but cannot be expected to continue such disbursements indefinitely. It is clear that the economy must be raised to a level where Japan can support herself at a tolerable standard of living. But what is a tolerable standard? Can it be reached without permitting Japan to retain assets which her victors had counted upon as reparations? Can Japan engage in profitable foreign trade without a sizeable merchant marine? Must she be assisted, perhaps by American credits, to find export markets for her manufactures which compete with the exports of some of the Allies who have suffered at her hands? Is it possible, without checking legitimate growth, to guard against the development of war industries in Japan by imposing controls on the use of a few selected strategic materials? And, finally, is it really possible to plan the economy of Japan for a future which is obscure, or shall it be left to take its own course on the assumption that the Allied Powers will not put their faith in automatic safety devices but will exercise vigilance and determination when those qualities are most needed?

These are questions which will be asked at the Peace Conference and which the American delegate may find it difficult to answer to the satisfaction of all his colleagues. For it cannot be de-

nied that, if Japan is to become once more the workshop of Asia, she cannot be permanently held at a fixed level of production and trade. She must be permitted, sooner or later, an economy capable of expansion.

If that is what American policy involves, then the Allies will hope for some assurance on points which cause them misgivings. Those who are exercised about Japanese commercial competition can argue with some force that, if the Japanese economy is to be encouraged to expand, it will in its early stages be tied to the American economy, because it must be supported by American credits or investments. In that case it is not easy to see how, with the best of intentions, some discrimination against the commercial interests of other allied countries can be avoided if the "workshop of Asia" policy is pursued to extremes. Allied countries will be entitled to ask that consideration be given at least to the short-run competitive position of those whose need for rehabilitation is in some ways not less urgent than that of Japan and not less important to world recovery. A case in point is that of the United Kingdom, whose economic recovery might well be retarded by a too liberally assisted development of the Japanese textile industry and merchant shipping; but other allies are in a similar position.

As to the problem of security, most of the Allies will agree that Japan is not likely to regain substantial military strength. General MacArthur is reported to have said that she cannot become a military power for a century. Allowing for picturesque speech, this judgment is no doubt authoritative and correct. But it leaves out of account an important contingency, because if Japan is to be liberally assisted to rebuild her industry and trade one cannot exclude the possibility that in course of time she will be able to exercise an economic dominance over surrounding areas. This is not the same thing as military power, but it is a step on the way. Perhaps this risk is small, as the writer of this essay is inclined to believe; but it cannot be entirely disregarded.

If the issues to be settled at the Peace Conference were purely economic, it would not be difficult to reach a compromise which, while providing adequately for the needs of Japan, would take into account the misgivings suggested above. But the issues will not be purely economic. They never are. Strategic considerations will be present in the mind of all those around the Conference table, though they may not figure on the agenda.

THE PROMISE OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN JAPAN

By William M. Gilmartin and W. I. Ladejinsky

Would that my daughter were married to a middle farmer
With five acres of farm land
And a fourth of an acre in wood;
No borrowing, no lending,
Both ends meeting;
Visiting the temple by turns —
Someone must stay at home —
Going to heaven sooner or later.
What a happy life!
What a happy life!

SO sings the farmer in an old Japanese folksong. Give him five acres of arable and a quarter of an acre of woodland, and the good life, both in this and in the next world, is his! To the westerner, this ideal is modest enough, but though modest it is within the reach of few Japanese, for the country is small and its people are many. There are all too few bridegrooms in Japan with five and one-quarter acres of land — not in a country where large numbers of farmers own no land at all, and where the average holding is only 2.5 acres.

It takes but a glance at the Japanese countryside and the extraordinary extent to which the farmers of Japan have pushed their neat patterns of cultivation against the rugged natural terrain to understand the hunger of the Japanese peasantry for land. Americans, conditioned to a bountiful endowment, can hardly appreciate the intensity of this appetite of 35,000,000 agrarian Japanese crowded upon a total of 15,000,000 acres of cultivated land, an acreage about equal to the farmland of the state of Washington.

Nature in Japan is stingy enough to the farmers who own their holdings. But these operate only half the farmlands of Japan. The remainder is cultivated by tenants and part-tenants who constitute about 70 percent of the 5,700,000 Japanese farm families. Traditionally, they have been compelled to deliver half or more of the yields from their rented plots to a landlord.

The typical tenant farms so little land that these yields which he must share are meager indeed. Fifty percent of the tenants rent less than 1.2 acres each, or an average of half an acre, and

another 27 percent rent an average of 1.7 acres each. This in itself would explain the poverty of the Japanese tenants. But the situation is made worse by the conditions of tenancy.

Land hunger and the intensity of competition for land ownership and cultivation rights have preserved land values and rental rates far above a level justified by the productivity of the soil. Landlords have taken full advantage of these conditions. Rentals of 50 percent of the rice crop and only slightly less of other crops have been customary. In addition, the tenant meets a number of other assessments and dues, buys his own expensive fertilizer, and provides the farmhouse, farm buildings, implements and seed. The share from which he draws his sustenance frequently represents not more than 30 percent of the crop. Add to this the fact that more often than not a landlord may terminate the lease at will, and it is clear why the life of a Japanese tenant, until the more prosperous war and postwar years, conformed to the feudal adage that "farmers should neither live nor die."

The Japanese tenants have never accepted their burdens as a matter of course and at times their reaction was one of violence. The seething discontent in rural Japan before Pearl Harbor was not lost on Japan's politicians. But remedial measures were vitiated by a refusal to strike at the roots of the landlord-tenant relationships. To convert tenants into independent farmers and institute security of tenure and reasonable rents called for great concessions by the landlords or large expenditures by the Government, or both. Neither was willing to undertake such a task.

Japanese landlords differ from similar groups in the west. Their estates are much smaller and their number is much larger. There are, of course, great landlords in Japan. Three percent of the farm owners possess 30 percent of the cultivated land and nearly one-half of the tenanted land. Among them one finds 3,000 landlords who own 122 acres or more, and 25 who average 4,500 acres each. But there are several hundred thousand small landlords. The scale of operations of an average Japanese farmer is so small and the demand for land is so great that one need not own a thousand or a hundred or even ten acres to become a rent collector. An acre might serve the purpose. Striking examples of landlordism on a molecular scale may be encountered in every section of Japan. Even the northern island of Hokkaido, where the holdings are much larger than in the rest of Japan, is no exception.

Little wonder, therefore, that Japanese landlords, big and small, absentee or resident, are numerous and wield enormous prestige and influence in every village. They have been welded together in support of the status quo by the long and stormy history of agrarian unrest. They dominate local politics, and their position in the village forms the basis of their power in the nation. It is from this class that the army and navy drew heavily for their officers, and it is upon the landlords that the reactionary parties of Japan always relied for support.

Their importance as a bulwark against Japan's social and political reorientation as prescribed in the Potsdam Declaration was lost neither on thoughtful Japanese nor on the American occupation authorities. It was, therefore, as much from a recognition of the close relationship between the anti-democratic tradition of Japan and the rural landlord system, as from an interest in the tenant farmers' welfare, that a redistribution of land ownership became occupation policy. General MacArthur, in his land-reform directive of December 15, 1945, ordered the Japanese Government "to take measures to insure that those who till the soil of Japan shall have a more equal opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor," not as an end in itself but in order to "remove economic obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies, establish respect for the dignity of man, and destroy the economic bondage which has enslaved the Japanese farmer to centuries of feudal oppression." When in late December 1946, the farmers of 11,000 villages of Japan went to the polls to elect representatives to administer the land reform program, the first step was taken toward a fundamental change of rural Japan.

II

In compliance with the directive of General MacArthur, the Japanese Government, in active consultation with occupation authorities, drafted the Special Measure for the Establishment of Owner-Farmers (Land Reform Law) and Agricultural Land Adjustment Law of 1946. This body of legislation provides the legal basis for the land reform now under way.

The reform provides for the purchase by the Japanese Government of approximately 5,000,000 acres, or about 80 percent of the farmlands under tenant cultivation, for subsequent resale to the tenants. The change in title is to be effected in two years.

All the land of owners residing apart from the community where their land is located is made subject to sale. Resident landlords may retain 2.5 acres of tenant-cultivated land, except in Hokkaido where, because of the larger farm pattern, landlords would be permitted ten acres of tenant-farmed land. Had the limit been higher, entire prefectures would have been but slightly affected because landlords' holdings are so small. The acreage that can be retained by a landlord is fixed on the basis of the household as a unit, to prevent an owner from escaping the limitation through distributing his holdings among his family.

The size of holdings of owner-cultivators is also subject to limitations in order to place the maximum amount of land in the hands of as many tenants as possible. Owner-cultivators are restricted to 7.5 acres in Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, and to 30 acres in Hokkaido. However, they may be permitted to cultivate more than the specified acreage if the productivity of the land would be lowered by subdivision or if the holding is cultivated by family labor.

The administration of the land transfer and of the reform as a whole is in the hands of local, prefectural and national land commissions. The local land commissions are the pivotal agencies of the reform. They will designate the actual plots in each village which will be made available by the Government for tenant ownership. A local commission normally consists of five tenants, three non-cultivating landowners, and two owner farmers, all of whom are elected in each village by the categories of farmers or landowners whom they represent. These commissions have now been elected in every village and are at present designating the holdings which are being purchased by the Government for resale to the tenants.

Above the local commissions, there are 46 prefectural commissions, through which the over-all policies laid down by the Central Land Commission will be administered regionally. A prefectural commission is composed of ten tenants, six landlords, and four owner-cultivators, elected by the local commissions. The central commission is the policy-making body, composed of eight tenant representatives of nation-wide farm associations, and five experts, drawn primarily from the universities. The Minister of Agriculture and Forestry is the chairman of the commission.

A crucial element in the land purchase program is, of course,

the price. Part of the reason why all Japanese tenancy measures were frustrated in the past was that the price of land was left to negotiation between landlord and tenant. The landlords were never compelled to sell land, and their strong bargaining position meant prohibitive prices. In the present program the price is officially fixed. The Government will purchase the land at an average price of 3,000 yen per acre for paddy (rice) land and 1,860 yen per acre of dry or upland fields. In addition, the owners will receive a government subsidy of 880 yen per acre for paddy fields and 520 yen per acre for uplands. This subsidy, however, will not be paid on more than 7.5 acres per individual seller in Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku, and 30 acres in Hokkaido.¹ The Government will pay the landlords in 24-year annuity bonds bearing interest at the rate of 3.65 percent per year.

Tenants now cultivating the land acquired by the Government will have priority of purchase. They will buy it at the same average prices paid to the landlords by the Government, except that they will not share the cost of the subsidy with the Government. A tenant may discharge his obligation in one payment or in several, not exceeding 30 annual installments, at an annual interest rate of 3.2 percent. Many of the tenants have benefited from current high food prices and will be able to pay all or a substantial portion of the land-purchase price outright. The annual payments are not likely to be a heavy financial burden even for those tenants who have not accumulated cash holdings from the inflation. Provision is made, moreover, that in the event of a serious drop in food prices the Government may adjust the payments where necessary so they will never exceed an amount which, when added to taxes and other financial obligations of land ownership, is equal to one-third the cash value of the annual crop. Furthermore, when circumstances so warrant, the Government will reduce or exempt altogether the annual installments, or take other measures necessary to lighten the charges borne by the new owners. The Land Reform Law prohibits sales by the tenants of land acquired under the program except through the agency of the Japanese Government and on terms stipulated by the Government.

The program seeks to transform the cultivators of 80 percent

¹These are the prices included by the Japanese in their initial land-reform proposals submitted to SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) in response to General MacArthur's directive. The present exchange rate, fixed by SCAP, is 50 yen for \$1.00.

of the tenanted farmland of Japan into independent proprietors. But even if it is completely successful, one-fifth of the present tenants will continue to rent their lands. Easing the burdens of tenancy is, therefore, an important aspect of the reform. The measure provides for a reduction in rents and for the elimination of rent payments in kind at a fixed proportion of the crop. Rents are now to be paid in cash at a stated amount, which may not exceed 25 percent of the value of the rice crop and 15 percent of the value of other crops. Cash payments are almost as significant in improving tenancy conditions as rent reduction. The practice of fixing rent payments in kind at a given share of the crop placed the marketing of roughly 85 percent of the commercially distributed rice in the hands of the landlords, since the tenant required most of his share for his own needs. Landlords, then, have been the real beneficiaries of the upward trend in rice prices since the turn of the century. Furthermore, rent in kind limited the ability of tenants to take advantage of seasonal price fluctuations in marketing their crops.

The measure also outlaws a long-standing grievance of the tenants — the custom of renting by a verbal agreement, which landowners might terminate on short notice. A written contract specifying the rent, the period of tenure and other terms of the agreement, is to be registered in the village and to conform to a model contract prescribed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

III

Such, in the main, are the principal provisions of the land reform. The most formidable part of the task is to put them into effect. It is understandable that the immediate prospect of so basic a change in a tradition-ridden agrarian society should stir up great passions. The threat to end the landlord's domination of the Japanese countryside has drawn forth the resistance of politicians and intellectuals as well as landlords. Traditionalists know that one of the bases of the tight political and industrial oligarchy was a poor and benighted peasantry rooted in a seemingly changeless agrarian society. And the landlords themselves, who are entirely alive to the issues at stake, frankly justify their rôle with the contention that paternalism is a cultural and economic necessity in rural Japan.

The rationale for the rural élite was eloquently presented by

the Headman of the Homma clan, one of the largest landholding groups in Japan. The 16 families of the Homma clan own about 4,000 acres of choice rice fields in Yamagata Prefecture, accumulated over two-and-a-half centuries according to the pattern of purchase and foreclosure typical of most large Japanese estates. A large proportion of the 5,142 tenants who cultivate these holdings are descendants of small farmers who lost their lands to the Homma families as a result of famine, depression and the feudal and post-Meiji tax exactions and usury practices.

The Hommas branded the reform measure as "penalizing the thrifty, the efficient, and the mentally better endowed." Land ownership, they argued, would be a poor exchange for the economic security provided by the landlord who pays the taxes and presumably provides the tenants' needs in times of distress and crop failure. They foresaw a serious economic and cultural deterioration throughout rural Japan if the landlords were removed and the tenants became small farm owners, all equally poor and with no interest in the general welfare of the community. They conceded the necessity of a "proper" land reform. However, they would eliminate the two most crucial elements of the present measure: the officially established prices at which land is to be acquired, and the provision for compulsory sale. The cash rent provisions of the reform are bad enough in their eyes, but compulsory sale of land at official prices partakes of the nature of the devil.

The arguments of the Hommas are typical of the vast majority of the landlords. It was clear from the feeling with which they presented their case that they will not accept their demise with passive acquiescence. The close identification of the Homma families with the land has persisted for 28 generations, creating a sense of fixed roots. To divorce them from the land, as the reform measure proposes, is to undermine their *raison d'être*. As the Headman picturesquely put it, without their lands the Hommas will be "the most lonesome men in the world."

The situation is not without its pathos. The fact is, however, that whatever the tenants may have derived from the paternalism of their more benevolent landlords was far outweighed by the economic, political and social evils of the system as a whole. If the landlords have been the intellectual and cultural leaders of the Japanese village, their use of this leadership in behalf of aggressive Japanese authoritarianism does not justify its perpet-

uation. Through this reform, SCAP seeks to eradicate a patriarchal system which has served to stifle liberalism and democracy, locally and nationally.

Criticism of the land reform on a more formal and sophisticated level has come from Japanese intellectual circles. It is significant that the opponents are not at all inhibited by the knowledge that SCAP inspired and took an active part in the formulation of some of the crucial features of the reform, publicly gave its approval to the enacted legislation, and is exercising all the means at its command to ensure the successful application of the program. Nor is it without passing interest to note that the Japanese tenants have few spokesmen among the intelligentsia. Very few Japanese intellectuals are truly concerned with the lot of so large a group of underprivileged, and at this crucial moment in the life of the Japanese tenantry such of them as might have been expected to supply leadership to the peasants lend their support to the landlords. This is in strong contrast to the history of agrarian movements throughout most of Europe, which never have lacked articulate, intellectual leadership.

It is argued that an attempt to transfer land ownership and fix farm rents on terms which disregard prevailing market levels is certain to fail. The prescribed land prices, it is pointed out, are only a tenth or less of the levels in the black market. It is concluded that clandestine agreements between landlord and tenant will result in purchase of much of the land at prices which the new owner will be unable permanently to finance, and also that a large part of the land acquired by tenants will be resold *sub rosa*, at a tremendous profit. The opponents of the reform further maintain that competition will vitiate the rent ceiling provisions. In this vein, Dr. Shirosi Nasu, an outstanding Japanese agricultural economist, has written, "The high rent (and high land price) is an outcome of economic forces, and is not an expression of any political privilege. It would be wrong if we did not recognize this fact and considered high farm rent as simply a vestige of feudalism. A democratic society will hardly come about if we disregard economic principles. On the contrary, it might result in bringing about an undemocratic or autocratic society."

These problems were, of course, considered by Japanese officials and occupation authorities, but the enforcement difficulties inherent in fixing land prices and rent below market levels

were accepted as preferable to saddling the new owners with such a financial burden as prices satisfactory to the landlords would place upon them. Nor would the current chaos in Japanese finance warrant a more generous subsidy to the landlords by the Government. It is doubtful, in fact, that the landlords would willingly sell at almost any price expressed in the depreciated yen now circulating in Japan. As one of the Homma family leaders put it, "We are in the business of buying land, not selling it."

This discrepancy between fixed and market prices need not endanger the success of the land reform. It is at this point that the rôle of the Government, as the sole agency for the purchase and sale of land, becomes crucial. With no legal alternative to compulsory sale to the Government, the landlords will be confronted with a *fait accompli* which leaves them no opportunity to withhold lands for better terms or to exact prices above the established levels.

In effect, rent reduction, even below the level fixed by the reform, is already an accomplished fact. It has come about as a result of war and postwar measures by the Government to maintain control over the distribution of foodstuffs. Official food regulations require cultivators to deliver assigned quotas of staples to official agencies, part of the quotas delivered by tenants representing the rental share due the landlord. The collection agency then pays the landlord and tenant for their respective shares in cash. To induce tenants to deliver their full quota, they are paid at a far higher rate than landlords. Actually, the difference is so great that the landlords' receipts represent less than the rental ceiling of 25 percent of the cash value of the crop prescribed by the reform. While the maintenance of low cash rents by this method is contingent on the continuation of food controls, nevertheless this experience indicates that rent ceilings in disregard of "economic law" are not an impossibility.

Another prevalent line of criticism is that the law overlooks the basic evil of Japanese agriculture — the molecular scale of farm operation. The reform, it is charged, aims at the perpetuation rather than the elimination of small-scale farming and the backward techniques that accompany it. According to one writer, "Japanese agriculture will make no progress so long as it is not mechanized, but mechanization is hampered by farming on a small scale. The creation of landed farmers cannot by itself promote progress in agricultural techniques. . . . Essential

democratization of Japanese agriculture cannot be expected from the creation of small holders, which presupposes the maintenance of the status quo. Mechanization of agriculture, and the Kolhoz (collective farm) system, which makes mechanization possible, will lead to democratization of the village. If we abandon this program, farming villages will be left as a permanent nucleus of reaction and tragedy."

There can be no doubt that the fundamental problem of agrarian Japan is the excessive subdivision of the land to the point where the vast majority of farms are too small to furnish their operators with an adequate livelihood. This was emphasized by General MacArthur in his original land-reform directive and by almost every Japanese and foreign observer. The minute scale of farming and the labor-consuming techniques it perpetuates have often and correctly been characterized as a problem of "too many people on too little land." But mechanized collectives will not solve it. Such farming will reduce rather than increase production per acre. The techniques of Japanese husbandry are deficient only in terms of the poor return for the labor expended. From the standpoint of productivity of the land their methods furnish an enormous return: yields per acre in Japan are among the highest in the world. The Japanese farmer grows twice as much rice per acre as do farmers in any of the other rice-growing countries of Asia; his rice yields are 50 percent above those in the United States, while his wheat and barley yields are twice as high.

Japan maintains this productivity from its land through the most careful, painstaking and burdensome hand cultivation of every square inch. Mechanization, while releasing the farmer from this drudgery, would unfortunately also sacrifice these high yields. In addition, it would create a large surplus rural population with no alternative occupation. This situation would hold true whether larger scale mechanized operations were applied in Japan on an individualistic or a collectivistic basis. In none of the arguments of those who propose mechanized collective farming is there any recognition of this dilemma. The problem can be solved only if Japan is released from dependence on her own foodstuffs to an extent sufficient to allow for the reduced yields which mechanization and other labor-saving techniques would entail, and if alternative employment is provided for the farmers.



IV

The real strength of the landlords and their supporters in obstructing the land reform stems not from the cogency of their arguments but from the strategic place of authority which they hold in the Government and the countryside. The patriarchal rôle of the village landlords is most formidable. While they are in a numerical minority on the rural land commissions which will determine the success or failure of the program, their prestige gives them great influence in these bodies. The landlords are assisted in their opposition and obstruction by the widespread ignorance of the tenants about the reform. The tenants are by no means indifferent to the subject, but, as one Japanese writer has summarized the situation, "They are accustomed by long practice to take little interest in the law itself. Therein lies the need of leadership. But much cannot be expected in this regard, for the majority of the leaders in farming villages are landowners to whom the farm land reform is unwelcome." As it happens, moreover, perhaps the strongest ally of the landlords is the prosperity which severe food shortages and the enormous inflation of food prices have brought to the farmers. The memory of past grievances has been dimmed by their relative and momentary well-being. This general atmosphere in which land reform is proceeding was recently described by SCAP officials as one of "landlord hostility, attempts at corruption, sabotage, intimidation of tenants and public officials, and tenant apathy and ignorance."

In spite of all these obstacles recent official figures about the progress of the plan are encouraging. In March and July 1947, the first two periods in which land purchases were made, the Government bought from the landlords more than 900,000 acres or almost one-fifth of the total which the plan envisages. This is many times the acreage involved in all the tenant-purchase schemes launched by the Japanese in the two decades preceding Pearl Harbor. But though acquisition of land by the Government is proceeding according to schedule, only a small portion (60,000 acres) of the Government purchases has been released to tenants. The reason for the delay is the policy of consolidating the widely-scattered strips of land which typically make up an individual holding, in order that the land may be turned over to its new owners in single plots. Consolidation of the scattered fields of individual farmers would be a



tremendous boon to Japanese agriculture, and the land reform offers an opportunity for its widespread accomplishment. Yet the process is complex and might easily provide a fertile field for landlord obstructionism.

It is almost certain that the landlords' hopes have been raised and their delaying tactics encouraged by recent indications of an early peace treaty and a substantial withdrawal of occupation personnel. Once there is only nominal Allied authority in Japan there is no assurance that much of the land held by the Government will not find its way back into the hands of its former owners. Therefore, the real measure of the progress of land reform will be the amount of land which is actually purchased by tenants and registered under new titles. It may take longer than two years to carry out the reform and its goals may never be completely achieved. Yet it now seems certain that a vast number of the tenant farmers, probably the great majority, will become the owners of the land they cultivate, and will retain for their own use or sale a large proportion of the crop which was previously taken by the landlord. Those changes presage a new leadership for the Japanese village. And those who remain tenants will be protected by law against the oppressive exactions and insecurity of cultivation rights which has characterized traditional landlordism. Such accomplishments will mark a revolution in the social and economic pattern of Japanese agriculture and will sever the tie that has bound the Japanese peasantry to the forces of reaction and militant nationalism.

Even the most thorough agrarian transformation will not solve all the problems of rural Japan. There is simply not enough arable land in Japan to give the enormous farm population reasonable assurances of a decent standard of living. If all the cultivated land of Japan were to be equally distributed, the average holding would amount to only 2.5 acres, or nearly two acres short of the amount estimated as necessary to make farming in Japan profitable. With the rural areas contributing the larger part to the annual increase of the Japanese population, at present about 1,000,000, congestion in agriculture will be aggravated in the future.

Under the circumstances, amelioration of the lot of the farm population, rather than ultimate solutions, is all that can be hoped for. Elimination of the landlord system is being supplemented by measures putting the agricultural coöperative associa-

tions which exist in every Japanese village on a democratic farmer-controlled basis. And the taxation system is being studied in order to eliminate inequalities in the tax burden between the farm and urban sectors of the population. Lasting answers to the problem can come only through expanded industrialization and commerce which decrease Japan's dependence on home-grown food and absorb the surplus rural population — and eventually from a falling birthrate.

But to note the great problems that Japan must solve before the farmers achieve real economic and social independence is not to minimize the effect of the present agrarian program. It is one point of attack for the assault on the strongholds of Japanese feudalism. The emergence of a healthier rural society in Japan has promise for all of the Far East. Though the details of Asia's tenancy patterns differ from country to country, in essence the problem is the same. Throughout the east, the institutional exploitation of tenant by landlord makes sound economic and social conditions impossible. The land reform of Japan is the seed from which can sprout a new agrarian order in the Orient.

FRANCE AND THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF EUROPE

By André Philip

FRANCE is about to undergo a very difficult winter, the most difficult she has known since the Liberation. The frosts of last winter, which ruined half the sowings, and the fierce heat of last summer, which reduced the yield on the land sown in the spring, resulted in a wheat harvest less than one-third of that needed for normal consumption and the smallest produced in France since the days of Napoleon I. Only by the most determined efforts and with the assistance of imports from the United States will we be able to maintain a ration of 200 grams; and that will be composed of a mixture in which there will not be very much wheat. Similarly, the drought aggravated the milk problem by substantially reducing the yield of the dairy cows. At present, milk is reserved exclusively for children and old people. Here again the ration can be maintained only by supplementing natural milk with condensed or powdered milk from the United States. Finally, the meat problem is still serious. The abolition of meat control resulted in higher prices, and they are still mounting every day. Increased consumption of meat in the rural centers has resulted in lowered consumption in the large cities. Today, the workers cannot obtain a ration of meat even half as great as what they consumed in prewar times. That is why there has been a wave of strikes for the higher wages which promise to permit the purchase of meat in a rising market. The value of such wage increases is, of course, illusory. They serve only to increase the demand for food; the supply, unfortunately, remains stationary. The result is that any wage increase granted to the workers passes within a few days into the hands of the middlemen in the food trade, especially butchers and cattle dealers.

[However, the seriousness of the French position in the coming winter derives not only from extraordinary factors such as frost and drought; it comes also from the conditions created by the war and from certain continuing obstacles which France has met with throughout her task of reconstruction.

To begin with, the French food supply is limited, from the agricultural point of view, for two reasons:

First, agricultural production itself has not yet returned to the prewar level. For four years, French farmlands were not properly cared for and did not receive the necessary amounts of fertilizer. The soil thus has become impoverished and has lost some of its essential chemical elements. Furthermore, throughout this time there were no replacements of machinery, with the result that at present French agriculture lacks tractors, plows, harvesters and every other type of agricultural equipment. The manufacture of these vital tools has begun again, but it is restricted by the steel shortage and cannot possibly meet all the requirements of the farmers.

Secondly, the entire output of foodstuffs does not reach the market. Actually, it is not to the interest of the peasant to sell his products, because the money he receives in exchange cannot buy the industrial commodities he needs. All through the French countryside today there is an enormous demand, accumulated over four years, for textiles, shoes, rubber boots, furniture, bicycles, radios and other consumer goods which industry cannot at present supply in large enough quantities. In this situation, the farmer simply increases his herds of cattle instead of bringing them to market. The recovery of French agriculture, therefore, and its ability to satisfy the nutritional needs of the country in the fullest possible measure, depend upon two factors: procuring for the farmer the necessary machinery and equipment, and offering sufficient manufactured goods to give him an incentive to sell his agricultural products.

Yet industry also is in an extremely difficult position. It must not be forgotten that France emerged from this war much more weakened than from the First World War. True, the amount of material destruction did not total much more than last time. Then, however, only one part of France was occupied, and the rest of the country, including Paris, remained in contact with the other nations of the world which were participating in the conflict. Like them, France expanded and renewed her productive apparatus, and she emerged from the war with certain basic industries considerably developed and in some cases reëquipped. This time, all of France was occupied and isolated from the rest of the world. Not only were no replacements of machinery made during a four-year period, but plant equipment was abused, worked to the breaking-point. That is why it can be said that the problem of France today is not only reconstruction, but mod-

ernization and the creation of almost entirely new means of production.

Substantial progress has already been made along these lines. By a miracle of "management," the railroads now are functioning almost as well as they did before the war; they are carrying an even greater traffic load with decidedly reduced rolling stock. Roads, bridges, ports have all been reconstructed, and the average level of industrial production is not very far from that of prewar days; indeed, during the last few months it reached 95 percent of the prewar figure. Nevertheless, certain observations must be made in this connection:

1. It must be recalled that 1938 was a year of economic crisis in France. If we wish to have a true picture of the relation of present-day output to normal output, we should take as our point of comparison the last year before the economic crisis, for example 1929, when the level of production was 25 percent higher than it was in 1938.

2. The 95 percent figure is an over-all figure, made up of figures higher than the prewar ones in the case of the principal industries producing the means of production, but considerably lower-than-average ones in the case of consumer-goods industries. Since the Liberation, France has embarked upon an extensive program to raise her productive capacity, but the French people will not reap the benefits for a long time. For the moment, they still lack essential consumer goods: food, clothing, furniture and housing.

3. The 95 percent figure represents the over-all output. From it must be deducted the considerable quantity set aside for export, both to the territories of the French Union and to foreign countries. The export of textiles, especially to the French Union, is an absolute necessity. Unless we provide them with the clothing and textiles they need, the native populations will not supply us with the foodstuffs we require and make it possible for the necessary political reforms to be realized speedily in an atmosphere of coöperation. But while the exports necessary to ensure our balance of trade represent a considerable deduction of the supplies available to the home market, they are still completely inadequate; for after rising sharply from one billion francs' worth in January 1946 to 12 billions in June 1947, they fell in September of this year to eight and one-half billions, as against 22½ billions' worth of imports. Thus, the entire economic

situation of France is dominated by the need for the modernization of industry, the development of scientific working methods and a general increase in production.

Everyone realizes the need for this effort. The labor unions have accepted a 48-hour week, and if the average working time at present is not more than 45 hours, that is because the available supplies of raw materials and power do not permit more. This is the real bottle-neck of French economy. Everything is held up because of the *shortage of steel*, which is directly due to the *inadequate supply of coking coal*. In 1938, the French output of steel was 6.2 million tons; in 1929 it reached 9.7 million tons. In 1947 it is only 5.8 million tons; and a number of blast furnaces in the east of France are idle, while iron ore piles up in our mines, because we do not have an adequate supply of coking coal.

France has put forth a great effort in her coal mines. Already, although modernization has hardly begun and most of our mining machinery still needs to be replaced, we have attained a rate of production five percent higher than the prewar figure. But our imports, notwithstanding the considerable effort made by the United States to send us coal, are still only 70 percent of the prewar total; in particular, our coke requirements are not filled. Thus, it is evident that all the economic difficulties of France are connected with the coke problem. More coke means more steel. More steel means the possibility of increasing the use of farming machinery and furnishing the peasants with the industrial products they need; and that is the way to solve the food problem. More steel means more industrial equipment, permitting a general rise in production and an increase in exports; and that is the only means of achieving a satisfactory balance of trade within a fixed period. The whole economic future of France — her industrial and financial recovery and her political stability — thus depends upon the decisions to be taken concerning the international allocation of coal and coke.

II

This grave situation is not characteristic of France alone. The entire European continent is at present suffering from the same evils and is meeting the same obstacles to reconstruction. All European countries have experienced similar destruction, varying only in degree. For four years they were cut off from the world. Their equipment was not renewed.

Moreover, as a result of Russia's domination over her satellites, Europe now finds herself cut into two blocs. This is probably the gravest of all the present unhappy phenomena. The east European countries which formerly used to exchange their food produce for the industrial products of western Europe have been absorbed into the Russian economic sphere and economic relations with them are exceedingly difficult. As a matter of fact, those countries are not deriving great profit from this new relationship, for Russia is not yet capable of furnishing them with the necessary manufactured goods. Western Europe as a result suffers considerably, for she must get from the United States the products which she used to obtain from eastern Europe. As a result of this heavy demand for American goods the western European countries have a hopeless deficit in their trade balances.

With this situation in mind, one may lay down certain basic principles for a possible retrieval of the situation in France and in Europe:

1. The problems of western Europe are impossible of solution without immediate American aid. In particular, France and Italy have completely exhausted their last reserves. If immediate credits are not to be forthcoming, they will find themselves obliged to stop their wheat imports — which will mean immediate famine — or their coal imports — which will slow down their industrial production and leave their factories idle. Both would lead to terrible misery and inevitably to social unrest. In such circumstances, no one could foresee what the political outcome might be.

2. American aid must be *substantial*, it must extend over a *long* period of time and it must follow a *clearly defined plan*. The aim must not be relief; but it must be recovery. After having furnished the consumer goods indispensable to meeting this year's exceptional conditions, it must plan to provide the European countries with raw materials and the equipment necessary to the recovery of their industries and the steady improvement of their trade balance.

3. The effectiveness of American assistance will also depend on the close coöperation of all the countries of western Europe. In the grave situation which we now face, it is very clear that salvation is impossible in only one country. Reconstruction cannot be attained to any extent if it is conceived of as a purely national affair. We no longer can think in terms of France, Italy,

Belgium or England alone. We must think in terms of the west. The means of reconstruction must be sought on a general western European level.

This is why, at the Conference of the Sixteen Nations in Paris, France took the initiative of proposing a Western European Customs Union. A committee has been nominated to investigate the matter; meanwhile, and, in order to lose no time, we have entered into direct negotiations with Italy for the preparation of a customs union between our two countries. A similar approach has been made to "Benelux;" and we hope progressively to obtain agreements of this type with the rest of our neighbors, thus laying the foundation of a general customs union for the whole of western Europe.

Along with this enlargement of the commercial markets a whole series of agreements is necessary to organize the coherent progress of industries in the different countries. One thing is certain: the successful application of the Marshall Plan requires a coördinating body for the allocation both of the goods furnished by the United States and of the same products made in Europe. In the case of wheat, coal, steel and other essential raw materials, the countries of western Europe must take joint action and handle the allocation of goods in order to obtain the maximum efficiency by the specialization of various industries in the nations involved. Thus in the case of electricity, we have to plan a common policy for the use of the hydraulic power in the whole region of the Alps. Similarly, we must standardize freight cars, electrical machinery, and other forms of equipment. The work begun in this field before the war has to be enlarged by a European agency, acting in the interest of all the people, for the utmost possible increase of productivity on the basis of the division of labor.

Only too plainly the current division of the Continent into two blocs does not favor the complete fulfillment of this project. If difficulties are ever to be completely overcome we shall have to reduce the demands which western Europe at present must make upon the United States and strive for the maximum development of commercial relations inside of the Continent, namely with eastern Europe as well as with the Middle East. Unfortunately, the achievement of this aim does not depend on us. As far as we are concerned, we shall do all we can in that direction; and we can only hope that Russia will not force her satellites to refuse commercial exchanges with us.

III

We now reach the most acute part of the problem: What is Germany's rôle to be in the effort of European reconstruction? The answer will determine the entire political future of Europe. It also will determine the success of the economic recovery plan upon which we are now embarking.

A basic principle can be stated at the start, one on which there can be no discussion at all. Germany is part of western Europe and she should participate in its economic reconstruction. Whatever the crimes committed by the Nazis, whatever the individual or collective responsibilities of the German nation, we cannot incriminate future generations of Germans simply because of the faults of their parents and we cannot turn Germany into an eternal concentration camp. A miserable Germany would be a cancer in the heart of Europe, a source of disorder and anarchy which would inevitably spread to her neighbors. Germany, therefore, has her place in the economic reconstruction of Europe. She must be given a chance to reconstruct her industries and to raise their production level bit by bit.

However, if the production level of German industries is really to be raised, steel, coal and coke are needed. These can be procured only from the mines of the Ruhr, whose production is at present indispensable for the reconstruction needs of French industries. The problem is, therefore, one of priority. Which is to have its steel industry developed first? Germany or France? The criminal or the victim? France opposes too rapid a recovery of the German metallurgical industries, for this would give German steel production the edge over French steel production and enable Germany to develop her exports in a way to hamper the necessary increase of exports by the other western European countries. On the other hand, France insists that the portion of the Ruhr coal and coke allocated to those neighboring countries should be sufficient to enable them at once to make the investments necessary for the reconstruction and modernization of their industry, so that they may be able to produce and export on a competitive basis. At present, the modernization of industries disrupted by the war is more important and urgent than the increase of the production of consumer goods by German or other factories. France is not demanding a sufficient share of Ruhr coke and coal only for security purposes, to prevent the

reconstruction of Germany's military potential. She is doing it because it is for her, here and now, a question of *life or death*. Only the coke of the Ruhr will permit the French industries to recover and her metallurgical industries to develop Europe.

The coke must be delivered to the place where it can produce steel under the best conditions and with the highest productivity for the benefit of all of us. This place is not necessarily Germany. It would pay better to use the coke for the development of the Franco-Belgian metallurgical industry rather than to concentrate everything again in the Ruhr. The steel obviously must be produced in western Europe with German coal and French iron ore (*minette lorraine*). But to produce one ton of steel you need three tons of ore and only two tons of coal; it is therefore more economical to bring the Ruhr coal to the Lorraine ore than to send the *minette* to the Ruhr. As a matter of fact, in the last years preceding the First World War, the Germans began to remove their steel production from the Ruhr to Lorraine, and Germany's development of the Ruhr steel production was only a consequence of her loss in 1918 of Alsace-Lorraine. Of course the Ruhr steel industry could work with the richer Swedish ore; but this source of supply could be cut off under foreign pressure, and it would be dangerous from the economic point of view to destroy the natural unit formed by the German coal mining basin and the French iron ore. This unit would be entirely integrated if France could buy imported German coal with steel exported to Germany.

In any case, it is now clear that all France's economic difficulties are traceable to her inadequate production of steel and that this, in the last analysis, depends upon the lack of coke. Since dozens of furnaces are at present not working because of this lack of coke, measures must be taken to ensure the complete utilization of metallurgical equipment existing in France and Belgium before allowing an increase in Germany's metallurgical output. We think, then, that a sort of sliding scale ought to be arranged, establishing a close unity of interest between the metal industries of France, Belgium and Luxembourg and the metal industry of Germany, the maximum steel output of the Ruhr being fixed each year with reference to the previous year's output in the other countries of western Europe. Thus Germany could be restored as a part of western Europe, and in the service of western Europe, not separately, as a privileged country and

contrary to the interests of the other nations of the Continent.

But this is bound up with a last question, that of the ownership of the Ruhr mines. It is a fact that, at the present time, Great Britain having ceased to figure on the coal export market, and the mines of Silesia having been ceded to eastern Europe, the Ruhr supplies the life-blood of all western industry and, no matter what we may do, in the future *the master of the Ruhr will be the master of economic life in the west*. Just at this time when Europe is becoming conscious of herself she faces the problem in unequivocal fashion. Shall the Ruhr be at the service of the west and be jointly administered by all the nations for which it is an indispensable source of supply, or shall it become again an instrument of German domination, first economically and later politically? Here the results of the war are once more in danger. The people of France will not accept any system which puts the mines either under the control of a German Government or, worse still (even though they may be favored by some American investors), magnates like Thyssen and Krupp who, after they had put Hitler in power, were directly responsible for the war.

If we wish to rebuild Europe, the Ruhr must become the collective property of the western states and its administration must be ensured by a strong Rhine Valley Authority, similar to the TVA, in which Germany and the Ruhr trade union organizations will have their part — but only in coöperation with the United States, Great Britain, France and the other neighboring countries that depend for their very lives upon the coal and coke of this basin.

Such is the main tenor of French opinion on the economic reconstruction of the west. France received the Marshall Plan as an act of generosity and intelligence, as an expression of America's awareness of her international responsibilities, as an effort to organize the reconstruction of the European countries and thus to organize international exchanges. At the present time, the French Communist Party is attacking the Marshall Plan with the utmost violence, representing it as a proof that American capitalists wish to gain control of Europe and impose their will upon the whole Continent. We know that this is an unfounded accusation, that American policy respects all political opinions and sentiments. Furthermore, we know that America herself was built up by the investment of European capital, and that the fact never endangered her liberty. We therefore

welcome American investments and any measures of any kind whatsoever that will ensure the most rapid development of international exchanges between the European and the American continents. But our entire reconstruction problem is bound up with the problem of coke, which in turn closely depends upon the solution that is adopted concerning the status of the Ruhr. We want Germany to recover along with us, at the heart of Europe and in its service. We cannot permit the rhythm of her recovery to be such as to deprive the other countries of raw materials and manufactured products urgently required for reconstruction, thus making more difficult the adjustment of their balance of payments.

On the London Conference depends the final decision. A decision of one kind will definitively give Europeans the courage necessary for their common effort towards a common reconstruction. An opposite decision, ensuring the recovery of the aggressor nation before that of the victim nations, would sow despair among our peoples and would play into the hands of Communist propagandists. I restate the issue once more, since I believe, with many Europeans, that there is the possibility of a great and perhaps deadly error in policy toward Germany. The problem is how to let Europe be dependent on the Ruhr (a fact which cannot be altered) without letting her be dependent upon a powerful Germany. The solution is to shift *some* of the Ruhr steel production to French mills — and to put the Ruhr coal under western control. Let us hope that our governments will succeed in reaching agreement and in organizing the development of the Ruhr's coal resources and industries for the profit of the nations of western Europe and under the direction of the whole of western Europe.

MORLEY AND COMPROMISE

By Byron Dexter

ON COMPROMISE. By John Morley. London: Chapman and Hall, 1874.

I FELT that politics was a cursed profession," exclaimed Lord Salisbury, at a bitter moment of the rearrangement of his Ministry in 1887. His old friend Lord Iddesleigh (the former Sir Stafford Northcote), who had been scourged from the Tory leadership in the House of Commons for incompetence, and whom he had just unceremoniously removed from the Foreign Office, had come to say goodbye and dropped dead at his feet of a heart attack.

A thousand aphorisms attest to men's dismay at the harshness of political tasks. "Government is a very rough business," the dry and acute Sir George Cornewall Lewis used to say to the ardent young Gladstone. "You must be content with very unsatisfactory results." Significantly, however, Gladstone, who was to spend 61 years in the House of Commons and head four ministries, never accepted the truism, and his refusal to do so was a major source of his power. For there are two sides to the medal, and the paradoxical fact is that modern men exalt above all other professions this calling that they disparage so strongly. Political life draws a large proportion of the men whom we recognize as our best. By common consent, the chief western contributions to civilization are those which have a political cast — legal and governmental institutions, and the unwritten laws of forbearance which make self-government possible for large groups of men. Our own era is preëminently an age of politics and political economy. There are few signs among us of a release of the spirit such as marks an age of creative activity in art and literature, or of a generation caught up in a quest for religious truth. The imagination of the era is centered upon finite and worldly problems. In particular, we are intent upon the task of establishing a new order of relationships among the groups called nations. Its immensity is suggested by our awareness that the validity of the idea which has ordered men's political relations for several centuries is in question: we are no longer able to assume that the nation is the final object of political allegiance. To

what degree we must shift our allegiance from this fixed point we do not know, but we reach toward an order based on a relationship of men to men, crossing national boundaries, in which at least some laws will be valid for everyone.

The questions that revolve about the effort of the shaping of interests of nations which will widen the area in which men recognize the obligations of common laws are usually identified as questions of principle and of expediency. There are extreme schools which hold that political conflicts must be resolved by principle only, citing moral law which permits of no argument; or that they must be determined by expediency only, in the name of realism. In practice, most men or nations who wish to maintain relationships with those whose interpretation of principle differs from their own attempt to combine the two approaches. Customarily, this approach is considered the method of critical intelligence. Thus we believe (in the words of William Crary Brownell) that "it is a defect of intelligence to fail to understand the point of view of that which one disesteems." And from the desire to understand comes the effort of analysis, and the effort to reconcile interests — in a word, compromise.

"The interesting question in connection with compromise," wrote John Morley in his famous treatise which served as the textbook of a generation of Victorian reformers, "obviously turns upon the placing of the boundary that divides wise suspense in forming opinions, wise reserve in expressing them, and wise tardiness in trying to realize them, from unavowed disingenuousness and self-illusion, from voluntary dissimulation, and from indolence and pusillanimity." In short, when to compromise, and how far to go? The location of the boundaries of compromise in international relations is the central problem of politics in our time.

Morley would have been the last to suggest that illumination on such a matter is to be found in generalities. The question, he pointed out, is one of "time and circumstance" — a concrete problem always. And as if for the express purpose of providing us with an illustration of the interplay of principle and expediency in practical politics, John Morley, having formulated his answer in general terms, proceeded to test it in action. From an eminent position as author and editor, he embarked in his middle forties on a career as party politician which took him to the House of Commons for 25 years, to the Secretaryship for Ireland, to the

Secretaryship for India, and to the peerage and the Privy Council.

A provincial doctor's son, born in 1838 in the milltown of Blackburn, he triumphed without the aid of money or connections. It was an astonishing worldly success in the England of that day. Yet for two generations of Britons, "honest John" Morley (as, somewhat to his dismay, he was popularly known) remained the symbol of fidelity to principle. His life covered an almost incredible reach of years, from the twilight of the French Revolution, of which he was a sympathetic interpreter, to the hopeful morning of the League of Nations, in 1923. He was the link between Cobden, Bright and Gladstone, and the Liberals of 1908 — Asquith, Grey, Haldane, Lloyd George, Winston Churchill — one of the most brilliant groups of younger men, it has been said, ever assembled in a British Cabinet. He was "the greatest source of the moral authority" of this Cabinet, so Asquith, then Prime Minister, told him appealingly in the tense days of early August 1914, when the Cabinet seemed likely to split on the issue of the first German war. There was no split; but Viscount Morley (and John Burns) resigned in protest against British entry into the war. Morley's resignation was a final act on principle. But it was a deadly error of judgment. It is this climactic event of Morley's career which focuses the significance of his life for us today.

II

In 1883, an enthusiastic writer for the *Liverpool Post* attended a political rally addressed by John Morley, then just elected a Member of Parliament from Newcastle. He perceived with pleasure that the new Liberal standard-bearer was a "tall, well-built man." Morley, who was below middle height, and frail, must have smiled as he read the story and been certain that he was now, indeed, in politics, where men tend to see what they are looking for.

What characteristics might a less impressionable observer have noted in him when, at the age of 45, he moved to the front of the stage? The words that he uses to characterize Voltaire describe himself as a young man: he was "alert with unquenchable life." The middle class from which he sprang had set the direction and supplied the drive in English politics since the first quarter of the century. Both his father and mother were, moreover, members of the most vigorous of the evangelical sects, the Wesleyans. In

1838 the Industrial Revolution was in full flood, and the waters were roiled and terrible. Into the maelstrom the Wesleyans moved purposefully, their kindly hearts armored with an excess of primness to meet the excesses of degradation which confronted them, their weapon the two-edged sword of the Protestant revelation: the duty of self-improvement, and faith in the beneficent power of education. That strong doctrine was everywhere in the air young Morley breathed — in his home, at the nonconformist schools which he attended, and on the streets of Blackburn, so savage and ugly, yet pulsing with a mighty release of human energy.

John Morley's development followed a pattern familiar in young Victorian intellectuals, from early proficiency at school to the loss of religious faith at the university. He won a scholarship at Lincoln College, Oxford, and his family understood that he was preparing for holy orders. But the explosive power of science was breaking apart men's beliefs as it was remaking their environment. For some, liberalism partook of the nature of a new religion. J. S. Mill's "On Liberty" appeared in 1859, Morley's third year at Oxford. Even in advanced England, Catholic and nonconformist students had not yet won the full privileges of the great universities, and abroad the black reaction after 1848 held the Continent in its grip. "On Liberty" was an army with banners:

This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological.

John Morley enlisted. For a while, indeed, he was inclined to wage the campaign in a spirit of hostility toward revealed faith. That attitude disappeared as he matured and as he perceived that religious distinctions were a poor guide for separating friend from foe in his political battles.

The immediate result of his break with orthodox faith was a quarrel with his father, which brought a withdrawal of funds. After only three years at Oxford, Morley was on his way to London, entirely without financial resources and almost without friends. But the period of hardship was short. He took the editorship of the almost defunct *Fortnightly Review* in 1866 and speedily made it not only the lodestone of Victorian intellectual distinction, but a valuable publishing property. His energy belied his

slight physique; at one period he was editing the *Fortnightly* and the daily *Pall Mall Gazette*, contributing copiously to both, editing the English Men of Letters Series and writing the "Life of Richard Cobden." There was no Bohemianism. He liked to sit down to write in a fresh shirt at a clean desk. In his affairs, as he said admiringly of Gladstone at the Treasury, all was order, precision, persistency, success.

The lifelong attraction which Edmund Burke held for him suggests best his taste and temperament. In 1867, as soon as the *Fortnightly* editorship released him from potboiling, appeared the first chapter of his study of Burke — a flash of brightest talent — pages of which he was to use twice again, in the "Encyclopædia Britannica," and in a second book on Burke in the English Men of Letters. Though Burke was the great conservative and he was radical, he found in Burke exactly what he was looking for — the highest thought that was brought to bear directly upon practical affairs.

It is as a product of such a temperament that his famous "On Compromise" must be read. Failure to note the starting point of Morley's thought has caused misunderstanding about the nature of the book. "On Compromise" is often described as a rejection of the very idea of concession and accommodation: one commentator is said to have remarked that there is nothing of compromise in it save in the title. But the opposite is more nearly the case. Morley's purpose was to suggest certain limits of compromise which, he believed, needed emphasis in the England of that day — a quite different matter. His premise was that the political spirit rules in England.

Of all societies since the Roman Republic [he wrote] and not even excepting the Roman Republic, England has been the most emphatically and essentially political. She has passed through military phases and through religious phases, but they have been transitory, and the great central stream of national life has flowed in political channels. . . .

One great tap-root of our national increase has been the growth of self-government, or government by deliberative bodies, representing opposed principles and conflicting interests. With the system of self-government has grown the habit — not of tolerance precisely, for Englishmen when in earnest are as little in love with tolerance as Frenchmen or any other people, but — of giving way to the will of the majority, so long as they remain a majority. This has come to pass for the simple reason that, on any other terms, the participation of large numbers of people in the control and arrangement of public affairs immediately becomes unworkable.

But this deference to the decision of the majority, he main-

tained, was having undesirable effects in two particulars. It had resulted in "an immense decline in sincerity of spiritual interest," and a discouragement of "the sense of intellectual responsibility." Part of the book is a sort of case history of Victorians caught in religious dilemmas: should a husband who has lost his faith tell his wife?, and so on. Morley's answer was a resounding Yes. He wanted questioning pressed to the utmost and every doubt confessed. It was this part of the book which attracted most attention, and which is most dated today. The charge of apathy toward questions of religion is the last one that seems applicable to the Victorians. Morley's very interest was, of course, a reflection of the tremendous wrestle of science and religion in the Victorian soul, which was reaching a climax in the seventies. Gladstone, about this time, threatened to withdraw permanently from politics to devote himself to the defense of the orthodox faith. Morley, a stranger to Gladstone when he wrote, was ardently enrolled on the other side.

It is necessary to note, moreover, that he had a political objective — disestablishment of the Church. A strong motive for intransigency had been supplied by the Education Act of 1870, which angered all nonconformists by widening the area of State support of Church schools — the grievance which was chiefly responsible for Gladstone's overthrow in the next election. But the British nation was to settle the issue of disestablishment in the English way. Morley was presently to drop the matter, and to alter drastically his tone on the whole subject, as indicated by Gladstone's subsequent deep affection for him, and his own discerning treatment of Gladstone's religious allegiances in his great biography of the Prime Minister.

His charge of a weakening of intellectual vigor in his contemporaries seems no less remote from the realities of the early seventies than was the accusation of spiritual indifference. The mighty warfare waged by the stalwarts of Victorian scholarship, philosophy and political economy echoes in this day. Though Morley is always stimulating when he tilts against complacency — as in his scorn of those who insisted that because a reform was not practicable at the moment, there was no point in talking about it or even thinking about it — the weakest part of "On Compromise" seems his estimate of the actualities of time and circumstance to which he applied his point of view. Morley was still in his early thirties. He had stood once, unsuccessfully, for

Parliament and was looking for another opening, but his active political career was not to begin for almost ten years. "On Compromise" was essentially a theoretical statement of the relationship of principle and expediency in the affairs of the world.

In non-religious matters, Morley set the boundaries of compromise wide. Though he would have no qualification whatever on the freedom to form an opinion, and very little on the expression of that opinion (respect for the sentiments of the majority would, he said, "weigh with all well-considering men" — that is to say, he enjoined courtesy), he granted a need for "the very utmost sobriety, self-restraint, and accommodation" in the endeavor to realize an opinion in practice. But he wished to allot to principle the greatest possible share in setting the boundaries, and for that reason he took pains to make principle an extension of the search for a practicable solution to problems, not an enemy of it. Expediency, as Morley defines it, is the present advantage. Principle is the long-term interest — the product of full thought and reflection. Principle not merely corrects but enlarges the scope of expediency. He put it thus:

The supposed antagonism between expediency and principle has been pressed further and further away from the little piece of true meaning that it could ever be rightly allowed to have, until it has now come to signify the paramount wisdom of counting the narrow, immediate, and personal expediency for everything, and the whole, general, ultimate, completed expediency for nothing. Principle is only another name for a proposition stating the terms of one of these larger expediencies.

It is particularly interesting to note that this is the heart of the celebrated passage which Morley deleted from the collected edition of his books when, as elder statesman, he was polishing his works for the eyes of posterity. The fact of deletion is significant, but it bears on the development of his worldly position, not on a change in his ideas. Young radical or Privy Councillor, Morley was an indefatigable moralist; he constantly examined the meaning of his experiences and rephrased his conclusions. But morality remained for him something learned, not something given.

What he was doing, in saying that it is the power of thought which gives drive and reach to principle, was making principle equivalent to intelligence. This is the unifying concept of the various chapters of "On Compromise," for the appeal to the "larger" expediency implies the necessity of deepening and wid-

ening the range of thought and imagination, and of subordinating present convenience to the completed search. The fallacy in Machiavelli's doctrine that intelligence is compounded of force and will, he said, in what is perhaps the most interesting of his shorter writings, lay precisely in the narrowness of Machiavelli's estimate of men. Like most of those who pride themselves in seeing human nature exactly as it is, Machiavelli saw only half of it: "Machiavelli and his school saw only cunning, jealousy, perfidy, ingratitude, dupery; and yet on such a foundation as this they dreamt that they could build."¹

Morley did not pretend that his formulation was original; he was applying the ideas of the utilitarians and Mill — the philosophy created by and for the political spirit. His special contribution is the example which he offers, during about a quarter of a century from 1883 to the First World War, of the conscious application of this theory to great events.

III

His rôle in these events falls into stages as if plotted by a dramatist — the introductory act the fight for Irish Home Rule in 1886, with its climax the shattering of the Liberal Party; the second the long period as a leader of the Opposition during the era of imperialism, which at the end brought him honor and power; the third the unforeseen danger from central Europe, and sudden downfall.

The election of 1885, which overturned Salisbury and brought Gladstone into office again, was, in fact, a triumph for Chamberlain more than for Gladstone; the "three acres and a cow" of the Unauthorized Program, plus Chamberlain's new methods of political organization, were chiefly responsible for the Liberal majority. The majority was 86. But from across the Irish Sea, this first election under an extended franchise brought into Parliament precisely 86 Parnellites, and the Irish storm blew up to hurricane pitch. It is apparent now that Gladstone had hoped to achieve Irish self-government through the characteristic British method whereby a reform, seen at length to be essential, gains national sanction by being enacted by the party which has hitherto opposed it, defections from that party being made good by support from the other. Only thus, under Tory sponsorship, could a

¹ "Machiavelli," by John Morley. The Romanes Lecture, Oxford, 1897. Published in "Critical Miscellanies." Vol. IV. New York: Macmillan, 1908.

measure of Home Rule then have passed the House of Lords. Before the election, the Tories had, indeed, entered into negotiation with Parnell, and Gladstone had tacitly offered to defer a dissolution and maintain Salisbury in power if he wished to undertake this patriotic task. But the inflammable mixture of race and religion in the Irish question made the classic political manœuvre impossible, and Gladstone took the solution imperiously into his own hands. In February 1886, he announced that John Morley would be Chief Secretary for Ireland in the new Cabinet. It was the signal that he had decided to force through Home Rule.

From the time Morley left Oxford, he had addressed himself heart and mind to what he perceived was the central aspect of the deadlock over Ireland — the education of Englishmen in the realities of their relationship with Irishmen. In speeches, in editorials, in articles, in books, he had said to his countrymen, in effect, one thing: you must extend your imagination to grasp the Irish point of view — on the question of rent, for example, where English ideas of contract do not apply to the land usage immemorial in Ireland. (English land was improved by the landlord, but Irish land was improved by the tenant, and hence an evicted tenant was often deprived of rightful capital.) Parnell asked legislative independence, "linked to Great Britain by the bond of the Crown," in the phrase used today to describe the idea of the Commonwealth. This was then called treason. But Morley believed in Parnell, and he believed that though union by force had failed, government by consent could keep the Irish people within the Empire. It was in the British interest, he said again and again, to make the effort of understanding that would permit the working out of terms. To this realistic view, John Morley added a plain English love of fair play, and in its name he was to hold unswerving to the Irish cause up to the day in 1921 when, a bent old man in the House of Lords, he rose to bestow a scarcely-audible blessing on the treaty establishing the Irish Free State.

Farsighted as were Gladstone and Morley, however, were they wise in forcing the issue in 1886? Even before the Bill was introduced in the House, Gladstone had lost the three Liberals who, after himself, commanded the largest followings — Hartington of the Whigs, John Bright (over Ulster), and Chamberlain. Parnell's methods of agitation had brought English feelings to a

climax of exacerbation just at this moment; and, worst of all, he had committed the folly of throwing the Catholic vote in England to the Tories in the recent election, at a cost of 25 to 40 seats for the Liberals. Home Rule was defeated in the House by 30 votes. The Liberal Party was riven. The Tories took office, to hold it — with one interlude — for 19 years. And instead of taking up Home Rule themselves, they turned to coercion again. The events of Easter Week 1916 were inexorably in train.

IV

Morley was left a party leader in a disrupted Opposition. It was not quite the rôle for him. He had learned much about politics since he had written scornfully, in reply to a plea of Sir W. V. Harcourt's for party harmony: "A man's party consists of those who agree with him." When he had been elected to office, he anticipated a charge of party irregularity with a statement which seems definitive on the subject: he would vote with the Liberal Party on a majority of issues, he said, because he was, in fact, a Liberal and would naturally agree with the party; he would in any case be guided by the party on matters on which he had no special competence; and if he did cast a non-party vote, he would come down to his constituents and give his reasons. The code worked close to perfectly; he was to be defeated in an election only once in the next 25 years. Nonetheless, Morley was too much of a Cobdenite and little-Englander to be able to lay down the line that would permit the opposite factions of the party in the era of imperialism — the Cobdenite-Liberals and the Liberal-Imperialists — to coalesce in a positive policy. Cobden, a generation earlier, holding his truth of free trade very close to his eyes, had hoped that the British colonies would simply fall away; the sooner Canada, for example, severed her "few remaining political ties" with Britain the better, he thought, since complete severance was not only rendered inevitable by Canada's commercial interest, but would spare Britain a possible war with the United States. Morley saw that the Empire was a reality; but he could not imagine its extension save as an act of sheer wickedness. "You may add a new province," he thundered, when Chamberlain and Milner were hastening to cut the knot in the Transvaal with the sword; "It will be wrong . . . it will be wrong . . . it will be wrong." But the blind forces pushing every western Power into frantic appropriation of undeveloped areas could not be dis-

solved by exhortation. It was Campbell-Bannerman who saw at the beginning of the Boer War that the point at issue was reconciliation, and by putting the emphasis there, translated Morley's denunciation into terms of statesmanship. These were the years when the British investment in an Opposition paid its most spectacular dividends. Campbell-Bannerman and Morley together were the positive and negative of the current which awoke the English people to a new awareness of their responsibilities and opportunities, and fastened in their minds the working principle that freedom is the strongest of bonds. The "forces" thus ceased to be blind, and the conquered Transvaal turned out not to be a province after all, to Britain's enormous advantage.

When the Liberals came into office again, united at last under Campbell-Bannerman's leadership, there was a great and honored place for John Morley. It was Indian summer for him. The coming young men were proud to be his protégés. Winston Churchill, for example, has told what it meant to find himself seated in Cabinet next to his father's friend, now his own colleague. And to young literary men, no less than to young politicians, the call on Morley, with its likely sequence of generous and discerning friendship, was almost a required pilgrimage. Morley had gone to the Lords in 1908, at his own request, and Viscount Morley was something of a lion. But it was a time of accomplishment for him, as well. With Lord Minto, the Viceroy, he introduced as Secretary for India the reforms which opened the door to self-government there. And though the new crop of radicals in the House of Commons was sometimes bitter at the measures of repression in India which the old radical now sanctioned — in particular several instances of deportation without trial — Morley, behind the scenes, was trading that concession (which he greatly disliked) for the inclusion of Indians in the Executive Council and the election of a few members to the legislative councils. The flow of admonitory letters to Lord Minto, now available in the "Recollections," is the thought of a man to whom J. S. Mill was still a great guide, and liberty the great good.

What letters they are — high-minded, sagacious, suave, rich with the reflections on long experience with ministers and parliaments, full of Morley's own profound cultivation of mind and feelings, put with all his literary facility. They are, alas, the clue to the tragedy which was soon to follow. For the letters are too perfect; they seem less communications with a particular indi-

vidual in India than ideal and half abstract Letters of a Secretary to a Viceroy. Consciously or unconsciously, Lord Morley was writing for publication and communing with posterity. This was the mood of these happy, triumphant, benign years.

He could have met the challenge of the German threat only by reëxamining the axioms of the Cobdenite doctrine of non-intervention in the affairs of Europe which had served him in the field of foreign affairs for half a century. But when he looked at the Europe of 1914, he seemed to see little more than the situation of 1870, or of 1859, when Palmerston and almost everyone except Richard Cobden misread Napoleon III's intentions and indulged in a preposterous invasion panic. Morley had never studied Germany carefully even in his early days, and, though he had later noted the danger of Bismarck's militarism, he had dismissed the matter as Europe's affair. In the crisis of 1914 he could only urge the 1870 policy of neutrality, and, protesting the precipitancy of it all, resign. Shall there be no one to testify for conviction? he asked sadly. The phrase explains the action. Lord Morley's response to the new situation was merely the reflex from an old one. He testified earnestly; but his mind was closed.

For a few years after the débâcle, he was filled with bitterness, but as the end of his long life approached, he achieved serenity again. Still one more generation of able young Englishmen came to him as mentor, and his old friends did not fail in respect or affection. If, by an unhappy paradox, we must write down the mistake in judgment of 1914 as the final step in the demonstration of the validity of Morley's own contention that the degree of principle in any action is in proportion to the degree of thought and awareness which lies behind it, we may also say that his life as a whole is an instance of the political spirit at its best.

v

The practical results of applying such a yardstick for compromise are to mark off from the field of government an area which is the special province of religion, in which compromise is not to be entertained, but to widen the boundaries of compromise in non-religious matters. The challenge of the Communist system — a Church no less than a State — to both religion and government in the west has tempted some men to seek to revive the ancient alliance of government and religion

to bulwark both. By the criteria of the political spirit, it is a shortsighted expediency. Few men escape the realization that the crust which they ask to bear their weight on earth is very thin in places, and the knowledge that it is so tends to pull down men's eyes. But the faiths by which men succeed in lifting their heads again vary as men's natures vary, and history makes plain that men will fight for the unhampered use of the truths which serve them in this regard more quickly and more fiercely than for any other concern. A major purpose of government is to bind men together; but the political proclamation of binding religious truth has in our day, as so often in the past, been the signal for civil wars. Franklin, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, who chose the principle of separation of Church and State as the rock on which to build a peaceful society in America, were, no more than Morley, spiritually insensitive men; nor were they theoreticians in politics. There seems no evidence that warrants reversing their conclusion that both Church and State are stronger when well apart, and all too much that reinforces it.

The positive virtue of Morley's yardstick for compromise is that it makes political and economic principles subject to analysis, and thus makes possible the program of deliberate shaping of interests which can weld nation states into a community. It is precisely because such principles are articles of faith in the Communist creed that there is no meeting of minds between Russia and the west; and it is because of the resulting situation that we cannot afford to mark off any political or economic conflicts among the various western systems as beyond the bounds of adjustment. We may note from the study of Morley that compromise is by no means necessarily a matter of "splitting the difference," as is often assumed. Campbell-Bannerman's sound and principled policy in the Boer War was a compromise, but it was successful not because it represented a middle position — the grant of self-government to the Boers was, in fact, daring — but because his analysis of the whole situation was fresh and full of understanding, and his purpose clear. ("The policy of cultured and conscientious statesmen," wrote so great and moderate a democrat as President Masaryk of Czechoslovakia, "... is deliberately to pursue a clear aim, not to seek the golden mean.")

More and more it seems apparent that the growth of such a concept of deliberate shaping of national interests is the dis-

tinguishing characteristic of the development of United States foreign policy over the past 30 years. In 1918, the assumption was that the harmony of interests of sovereign states should be perceived; in 1948, that it must be constructed. The clarification of United States purposes at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, the effort of 1942 to 1946 to gain mutual acceptance of a policy of live-and-let-live with the Soviet Union, the realization that the U.S.S.R. will not honor such a policy, and the turn to a positive program of adaptation of interests with the countries whose views of the necessity of conflict are not determined by doctrine, seem related steps of the emergence of this principle as a controlling idea in our conduct of foreign relations. Is it not this concept which can put our strength wholly behind the purposes of the United Nations?

There is no generalization that will tell in advance where the point of compromise should fall. But a process of welding requires that two ends be malleable.

TRUTHS ABOUT TURKEY

By Walter Livingston Wright, Jr.

TURKEY is under heavy pressure from the Soviet Government, for Turkey controls both the Straits connecting the Black Sea with the Aegean and the mountain-ringed Anatolian plateau, the two direct southern routes of Russian expansion into the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Again, as in the last half of the nineteenth century, the interest of a World Power in limiting Russian expansion coincides with Turkey's interest in survival. Britain is today unable to balance the power of a Russian empire far stronger than in Tsarist times and driven by leaders with far more crusading zeal. But an explicit statement by President Truman has recognized the common interest of the United States and the Turkish Republic, and a program of aid to Turkey has been adopted by the United States Government to give the "Truman Doctrine" practical effect.

Naturally enough, so important a development of United States foreign policy has elicited diverse opinions from diverse western minds. I have no intention here of analyzing the Truman Doctrine (though I believe that the substance of the President's statement and the action taken by Congress were proper and wise), nor of disputing the views of those who see it unfavorably. One aspect of the disparagement of the program of aid to Turkey, however, seems based on a misconception so odd and yet so prevalent as to necessitate special attention. It is the assumption that the Turkey of 1947 is the Turkey of 50 years ago. Thus one hears talk of the "feudal régime" of the Turkish Government, and finds cartoonists using the symbol of the fez to represent the Turkish state. And, of course, one meets with constant reference to the famous "wrong horse" which Britain is supposed to have backed by supporting Turkey instead of Russia in the past century. No less a notable than Professor Harold J. Laski triumphantly produced this cliché several times in the course of a confident demolition of American policy in a recent article.¹

We may note that in a longer perspective than Lord Salisbury enjoyed when he said in 1897 that the British had been "staking their money on the wrong horse," Britain seems plainly to have backed the right one, for by allying herself with Turkey she did

¹ Cf. Harold J. Laski, "Britain Without Empire," *The Nation*, March 29, 1947.

keep Russia out of the Mediterranean basin and did safeguard an interest which was vital to her. But it is even more relevant to note that the point at issue when Salisbury made his famous statement indicating a reversal of Tory policy was whether Turkey would reform herself. The Tory assumption had been that such reform was possible, and that British policy should be designed to promote it. In 1897, on the heels of new and atrocious manifestations of Sultan Abdul Hamid's tyranny toward subject peoples, Salisbury abandoned that hope, and pointed out that unless the Turkish Empire was able to take measures of reform, its ruin was certain.

He was quite right. Ruin did come to the Empire. But the central fact of the whole matter, so far as our problems are concerned, is that, at long last, reform came to Turkey. The United States is not dealing with the Turkish Empire, but with a Turkey which, since the British Prime Minister coined his phrase, has changed more radically than any country in the world. The apparent ease with which this truth is overlooked is my justification for setting down in the following pages some brief and pertinent facts about the Turkey of today.

II

The Turkey of Lord Salisbury's time was the 600-year-old Ottoman Empire, a medieval Moslem anachronism straight from the pages of the "Arabian Nights." Its ruler was the despotic sultan-caliph, who claimed to be the Shadow of Allah on earth, successor of the Prophet Mohammed as head of state and religion. Its dominant minority of Turks governed a host of mutually hostile peoples in Europe, Asia and Africa who differed in language, religion and way of life. The whole structure of government, economy and society was feeble, corrupt, insolvent and on the verge of dissolution. Complete collapse came in 1918. The victorious Allies appropriated the Arab-populated provinces of the Empire as mandates of the League of Nations, and sent armies of occupation into most of the remaining territories. Only the arid interior of Anatolia was left to the Turks, and even this was invaded by the Greeks with Allied encouragement.

But then the grim determination of the Turkish people to survive wrought an almost miraculous change in the situation. There, in the Turkish homeland, spontaneous local resistance was organized by a National Assembly headed by Mustafa

Kemal, later surnamed Atatürk. By 1923 the Greeks had been driven out, the British, French and Italian occupation forces had been withdrawn, the sultanate had been liquidated, and a republic had been established with Ankara as capital and Atatürk as president. In the same year the negotiated peace of Lausanne legalized Turkish national independence. The Empire was gone. In its place was a homogeneous population, and a national state within its own proper boundaries which was making its way into the modern world with remarkable success and (compared with other revolutionary states) absence of bloodshed.

As long as the war of independence continued domestic reform was almost completely neglected. The revolution sought the support of every group, including the numerous civil officials and military officers, the great landlords of the southeastern provinces, the numerous peasant proprietors, and the city merchants; its driving force was nationalism of the simplest sort. But eventually the revolution affected almost everything in the country except land titles. Atatürk and his immediate entourage were convinced that there could be no stopping place short of complete westernization. They insisted that the Turks could not borrow piecemeal from the west as they had done in the past, but must with utmost rapidity become westerners in every sense of the word, retaining only that modicum of Turkishness which would correspond to the differences between European nationalities.

These reformers were mostly military officers, impatient of disorder and delay, accustomed to orders crisply given and promptly executed. But though they were authoritarian in temperament and experience, they apparently believed the World War demonstrated that parliamentary democracies were in the long run healthier and stronger than other European types of society and government. The Turkish Republic which emerged was a remarkable hybrid. It had all the machinery of a democracy, and its leaders believed in the superiority of western parliamentary ways; but, until recently, it actually was a benevolent despotism led by Atatürk and the party which he founded.

Atatürk was a man of extraordinary acuteness, vigor and ambition. He developed a capacious grasp of national and world affairs, unerring judgment as to what the Turkish people would

approve or at least tolerate, and qualities of restraint which saved him from political or military adventures. His personal prestige was immense and well-deserved. He could have won in free elections by tremendous majorities, but he chose to take no chances in that direction. As head of the People's Party he selected personally every one of its candidates for the Assembly; as President of the Republic he appointed the officials who operated the governmental machinery in a way to make sure that the Party's candidates would be elected; and the Assembly repeatedly reelected him to the presidency.

The constitution adopted by the Assembly established a highly centralized government. The one-party régime which was set up gave such fair representation to all influential elements of the population, however, and balanced so expertly the interests of classes and localities, that it was able to carry out a fundamental reorganization of Turkish society without significant dissidence save among the Kurds, the one minority of consequence which remained in the country.²

The organized Moslem religion was regarded by the leaders of the Party as the chief obstacle to that westernization which was to be the guarantee of national existence. The endowments which supported Moslem preachers, teachers, students of theology and muezzins had long been administered by the Ottoman Government. The Republic appropriated most of this income; a large proportion of those who made religion a profession were left without livelihood. The semi-secret dervish orders, which had served the emotional needs of a people unsatisfied by the stern formality of orthodox Islam, were abolished and their property confiscated. Schools other than those of the Ministry of Education and of organizations enjoying its approval were closed. Religious instruction was forbidden in all schools except those of the Christian and Jewish minority communities and the National University.

The sacred law code of Islam and the religious courts which administered it were next swept away. Enactment *en bloc* of the Swiss civil code, the Italian criminal code, and the commercial code of the German Republic substituted almost overnight a legal framework which provided every citizen, male and female, with all the rights and duties of western Europeans. The position of

² Cf. William L. Westermann, "Kurdish Independence and Russian Expansion." *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, July 1946.

women in society was revolutionized. Polygamy was abolished and the veil either disappeared or ceased to have any significance.

To weaken the hold of tradition and modernize the mentality of a conservative people the Latin alphabet was substituted for the Arabic in which Turkish had been written for a millennium. The new alphabet (unquestionably a great improvement from the viewpoint of phonetics) was given out, a campaign for adult education launched and the old characters outlawed all within a few weeks. Thenceforth only such of the old literature as might be transliterated and printed with official approval was available to those who did not already know the Arabic script. Future generations will be almost completely cut off from the literature and thought of past centuries.

The public wearing of fezzes, turbans and costumes associated with religion was prohibited, and the edict efficiently enforced by the police. The government was determined to make the Turk look like a westerner, as part of the process of making him consider himself one. It acutely embarrassed western-educated Turks, however, when it promulgated a startlingly nationalistic interpretation of history, locating the source of civilization and even of language among the pre-Islamic Turks of Central Asia. Doctrines of this sort were more than the police could enforce. But Turks nonetheless accepted loyally the necessity of severing many of their oriental roots, even at the cost of much pain to themselves. The break with the Ottoman past was sharp.

III

Economically, the Republic found Turkey a land of peasant agriculture, with practically no industry, with commerce in the larger cities almost monopolized by non-Turks, mineral resources largely unexplored and unexploited, and transportation woefully inadequate. Local Christians and Jews had modest amounts of capital, but ardent nationalists could hardly be expected to permit distrusted minorities to profit disproportionately from the country's development; the recently-liquidated Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt was vividly remembered as an example of foreign financial imperialism. Turkish capital (plus Turkish manpower) would have to do the best it could.

Through taxation and domestic borrowing the Government obtained enough capital to undertake a limited program of industrialization. Existing railways were bought from their foreign

owners. New lines were constructed, and all were run with reasonable efficiency. State-capitalized banks financed and operated mines, lumber mills, textile and other factories, and even a steel plant. High tariffs and complicated international trading arrangements provided a high protective wall for domestic industry. Expansion of governmental activity into the economic field meant more positions, increased power, and better pay for bureaucrats, whose loyalty to the régime was consequently solidified. That the enterprises which they operate are often inefficient and are in many cases highly uneconomic goes almost without saying. Turkish steel, for example, costs several times as much as American steel delivered in Turkey, freight and customs paid. But though state capitalism has been costly to Turkey, it has at least provided a certain amount of education in industrial techniques for Turkish personnel.

Most Turks and many foreigners believe Turkey to be rich in minerals, and there has been a good deal of prospecting. The search for oil has been quite intensive, but it has not been found in any quantity. On the Black Sea coast near the Straits is a sizable field of bituminous coal. Lignite is found in many places and in large quantity, but exploitation is only beginning. Iron ore is plentiful but located far from the coal field. There is much chrome ore in widely separated localities and a great deal of it was exported during the war, when prices were high. A little copper is produced and deposits of a number of other valuable minerals are known. Water power resources are considerable but unfortunately are located far from existing centers of population. The fact is that no one really knows enough about Turkey's mineral and power resources to be entitled to a firm opinion about the possibilities of her industrial development.

The country's agricultural resources are better known. In foodstuffs Turkey is self-sufficient, though at a bare subsistence level for a large proportion of the peasantry. Considerable quantities of specialized products such as tobacco and dried fruits are normally exported. The peasants are the main producers of wealth, and the success of any régime must be judged largely by its effect on them. They have profited under the Republic by the longest period of peace in many generations, by the firm maintenance of public security, and by the substitution of tax payment in cash for the Empire's wasteful method of collection in kind through tax-farmers. New railways and developing motor trans-

port have begun to open distant markets. More of the land has been cultivated and cultivation has been more intensive. The Government has set up experimental farms to encourage the planting of new crops, the improvement of seed and livestock and the use of modern methods, but success has been limited by ingrained peasant conservatism and distrust of officials. Millennia of experience with rapacious governments cannot be quickly forgotten; but the peasants give the Republic a good deal of credit as the least oppressive régime they have known.

Unfortunately, the gain in agricultural and indeed in all other production has been more than offset by the general mobilization of the army which threat of invasion made necessary in December 1940. The Nazi menace was promptly replaced by the Russian, which still continues and keeps the best of the country's manpower under arms. The boys, the old men and the women have done what they could, but production has suffered badly and a serious inflation has developed. Demobilization has seemed out of the question because the inadequate transportation system could not effect remobilization quickly enough to meet a sudden attack. Soviet pressure has been slowly and inexorably exhausting the economy of Turkey.

Turkey's manpower is probably her most promising resource. Turks of both sexes and of every class have shown during the last 25 years that they have the ability to master the techniques of modern industrial civilization. The popular demand for education, fostered by the Government, has been tremendous and literacy has improved dramatically. Technical training is being stressed and an effort made to avoid educating peasants to leave the land. The cessation of loss of life in wars, which for centuries decimated the villages, and the introduction of public health measures have resulted in a rapid increase in population, which now totals about 19,000,000.

Attainment of freedom from want is still distant. Turkey is a rugged and partly desert country, its more fertile plains and valleys already densely populated. The large areas now used for dry farming and grazing, though thinly peopled, provide only a bare subsistence. Much additional land can be made cultivable by irrigation, but agriculture must become a great deal more efficient if the general standard of living is to be raised. Thus far the curve of population increase has risen at least as steeply as that of production.

IV

The People's Party has in general exercised great restraint in dealing with its opponents, at least when judged by local standards. Only a handful have been executed and a few score exiled. The contrast here between the Turkish revolution and the revolutions in China and Russia is striking. Atatürk encouraged the organization of rival parties, but in each case had them liquidated when incitement to violence rather than peaceful political activity resulted. One-party rule has not been glorified as an ideal system of government and its eventual replacement by a two-party or multi-party system has always been envisioned. Within People's Party caucuses there have been many genuine debates, and uninstructed votes. Committees of the National Assembly have frequently thrashed out questions of policy in free discussion. Majorities have learned the importance of restraint and tolerance while minorities have realized that argument and patience can win votes and change unacceptable decisions. In short, democratic concepts and procedures have been studied, and to some extent they have been practised.

In August 1946 the Democratic Party was organized, undoubtedly with İnönü's blessing, and has already grown to such stature that it could hardly be suppressed without violence. The new party, headed by a former premier whose background is in banking rather than military affairs, endorses the Government's foreign policy but disagrees on almost everything else. For example, it proposes to reduce the scope of state economic activity and to decentralize the administration. It is attracting many of the younger generation, who regard İnönü and his advisers as "old-fashioned," that is to say, more authoritarian and military in outlook and practice than present conditions justify. In the Assembly the strong Democratic group is outspokenly critical, clear evidence that its members do not fear persecution.

President İnönü has resigned the leadership of the People's Party and is apparently trying to establish the presidential office above the level of party politics. He and his immediate collaborators, who have held power for almost a quarter of a century, cannot be expected to want to relinquish control. Yet their genuine patriotism and their confidence in the long-run virtues of democracy might well enable them to accept an unfavorable verdict at the polls, should it come. A factor of importance is their clear

understanding that the existence of their country is dependent on the great democracies of the west and that the approval of American and British public opinion is of tangible value in their struggle to survive.

The proportion of the country's educated manpower which is engaged in government is very large. Thus far the bureaucracy has been able to provide a job for practically every university and technical school graduate who wished to enter it. But unless the fields open to professional careers and commercial enterprise are enlarged, there may soon be an "intellectual proletariat." If, on the other hand, all candidates continue to be welcomed into the unproductive bureaucracy a top-heavy society will result.

Military officers constitute a very large group of government employees. They have contributed immensely to the Republican régime and have consistently supported the whole program of westernization. No one knew so well as they the technical backwardness of Ottoman Turkey, for they and their troops repeatedly paid for it in blood on the battlefield. No one can say that Turkey's military expenditures have been unjustified, for she is today independent and respected, but the tendency of officers to assume the attitudes of a privileged caste is unhealthy. Thus far the presidents of the Republic have been ex-officers, who have seen to it that their former colleagues had no legitimate grounds for dissatisfaction. The first president who lacks a military background may have a delicate task in maintaining civilian ascendancy without impairing the splendid *esprit de corps* of the army and navy.

v

It is not only unfair, but downright stupid, to pretend that such achievements as these are not impressive and encouraging. Of course they have been interspersed with backward steps. The most notorious relapse of recent years occurred in 1942 in the treatment of the Christian and Jewish minorities, a field in which substantial but hard-earned gains had been made between the two World Wars. The government lost its head in a moment of great financial difficulty and administered a capital levy upon the minorities in terroristic fashion. Though the folly was eventually perceived and the law repealed, great damage was done, for in the Near East confidence among different religious groups grows slowly and painfully.

Turkish suspicion of foreigners and foreign enterprises is intense. This was justified a generation ago, but is certainly out of place now that coöperation with the democratic west is an accomplished fact. The foreign capital and skill desperately needed for development of the country will surely not be forthcoming unless the existing excessive regimentation and taxation of foreign activities are relaxed. Both government and public seem to be obsessed by fear lest foreigners make immense profits and take them out of Turkey, in the pattern of the old days. To prevent this a vast web of laws and administrative regulations has been created. When the foreigner travels from one part of the country to another he must have a sort of domestic passport which the police visé in and out of every precinct where he stops. In addition, military regulations exclude foreigners from much of the country. It is only fair to state that police control of Turkish citizens is only slightly less vexatious — but the Turks are accustomed to it.

Taxes on incomes, on business transactions and on capital gains are so high that honest enterprises are hard pressed to survive. The bureaucracy is everywhere, watching the public as though suspecting everyone of tax evasion, spying or some illegal practice. The real danger to orderly democratic development within Turkey comes not from Communism or Fascism but from indefinite expansion in function and personnel of a bureaucracy which is often (though not always) honest and public-spirited but has inherited and perfected all the devices for control of the people that both orient and occident have invented.

Intellectual freedom is almost complete, except for Communists, who are all lodged in prison. The omnipresent police do not concern themselves with the citizen's thoughts but concentrate their attention on organized activities. Clubs and societies are closely watched, but the individual can think and say what he pleases. The press is theoretically free, but in practice is still subject to very strong pressure from the Government, which can always find legal excuses for closing down an obnoxious newspaper, or disciplining an obstreperous correspondent. Much improvement has been made in this field in recent years, but there is room for a great deal more.

Freedom of religion is absolute for the individual, but the Government continues to cherish what seems an unreasoning fear of organized Islam. It is high time that citizens of all faiths be per-

mitted to organize freely for worship and for the religious instruction of their children, who have been growing up with little religious faith and very fragmentary ethical standards.

But the Turkish Republic's credits far outweigh its debits. It has moved an almost incredible distance along the road from the Ottoman Middle Ages toward western democracy. The tremendously significant fact is that to the Turks the west does represent the good society. Turkey really wants to be a "western" country, and takes American approval or disapproval very seriously. Such off-hand criticism as Henry A. Wallace's recent statement that "Many Allied divisions were immobilized throughout the war because we never knew on whose side this [Turkish] army was preparing to fight" — a statement which has in it not the smallest grain of truth — seems to go unnecessarily far out of the way to take a slap at people who want to be friends with us. Perhaps American journalists and public speakers who are intent upon altering the course of American foreign policy might remind themselves that tolerance is, after all, one of the democratic virtues, and that although Turkey is by no means a perfect democracy neither are we, though we have been at the business much more than a short quarter of a century. Turks believe that our immense power is not merely the result of luck but is somehow the product of our society and government. They welcome the assistance which we are currently giving them and grant us the right to insist that it not be used deliberately to perpetuate the one-party system, to consolidate the control of civil and military bureaucracy, or to subsidize a fatuous economic autarchy. They are willing to believe that the United States will use its power and prestige for the benefit of the Turkish and American peoples, whose interest in a free and peaceful world is mutual.

The Turkey of today is a free nation, fiercely determined to remain free. It is struggling toward democracy against tremendous obstacles, and making progress. We may properly be pleased at her friendship.

MOROCCO BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

By Robert Montagne

IN EASTERN eyes, Morocco, the *Maghreb el Aqsa*, is nothing more than the most westerly of a long chain of states which, from Indonesia to the Atlantic, live according to the same religious, political and social laws, revealed by the Almighty in Mecca 1,300 years ago. Because its civilization is Arab, it is part of the domain claimed by the Arab League. Easterners, therefore, feel that, like 'Iraq and Egypt, it should immediately be given complete independence, and foreign interests there left to the guardianship of the Moroccan Government.

Most westerners are inclined to take a different view of this question. Morocco, along with the other North African lands, seems to them to belong to the special strategic and economic area of the western Mediterranean defined by the coasts of the three Latin countries. It has participated for 2,000 years in the great historical process of intermingling that has given western civilization its richness and particular character. The entire Mediterranean world was unified by the Romans; then Berber Islam overran Spain, Provence and Sicily; and since 1830, 2,000,000 Europeans have settled on the shores of North Africa. The resulting fusion of races and interpenetration of cultures have many aspects that cannot be expressed by the too simple word "colonization."

France, with whose national life Morocco has been closely associated since the beginning of the present century, hopes that this country will join the French Union, at the same time retaining its own many-faceted personality. The east, on the other hand, dreams of reconstructing the Arab Empire of the Middle Ages, sometimes expanded in imagination to embrace the whole of Islam. It is pursuing in Morocco the reconquest of all North Africa and, at the same time, preparing to advance into the interior of the continent.

While these two theses are in sharp opposition, an examination of the facts suggests possibilities of accommodation.

II

Morocco has the greatest number of Berbers of any of the Moslem countries. Moroccans of Arab blood number barely 10

percent of the population, while the peoples of Berber language account for 45 percent of the total, grouped in various strong and anarchic tribes. While the historical expansion of Morocco was accomplished under the aegis of Arab Moslem civilization, the great dynasties of the Middle Ages, who at one time ruled all Spain, North Africa and the Sahara, owed their conquering power to the mobilization of the Berber elements among the Moroccan people. It was Berber anarchy that preserved this country, alone of all the Moslem countries, from the Turkish conquest that began in the sixteenth century. And it was this same anarchy that made the Sherifian Empire, at the dawn of the twentieth century, a fantastic aggregate of unsubdued tribes, independent religious or temporal fiefs and vast dissident mountain regions where the customs of the people recalled those of Germany in ancient times. The existence of this land, so like Afghanistan or Yemen in character, at the very gates of the Mediterranean was an extraordinary historic and geographic paradox. It resulted in a series of grave international crises at the time of the "division of Africa;" its eventual consequence was the establishment of a protectorate burdened with heavy international mortgages.¹

France countered this fragmentation, resulting from international treaties, by affirming the unity of the Moroccan Empire in the Spanish zone and in Tangier. In the French zone, it was Lyautey, Resident General from 1912 to 1925, who, more than anyone else, can be called the architect of Moroccan unity. He insisted that the pacification of the dissident tribes, a task patiently accomplished in the course of 27 years of judicious military operations and skillfully exercised political pressure, be undertaken in the name of the Sultan of Morocco, not of France. By systematically restoring the ruined prestige of the *Makhzen* (the Sultan's Government), by maintaining the position of the upper classes, by giving an important rôle in public affairs to the young educated Moslems, and by insisting that modern agricultural colonization be limited in extent and serve only as an example, Lyautey showed that he considered Morocco a nation still in process of formation. His policies won him the affection of the

¹ Morocco's economic régime is that of the Open Door, established by the Treaty of Algeciras, 1906. According to the terms of the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1904, the country consists of a zone under French protectorate (7,500,000 inhabitants) and a number of less important zones: a zone under Spanish protectorate in the north (1,000,000 inhabitants); the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla; the islands of Velez and Alhucemas (150,000 inhabitants); the Spanish zone of Ifni in the Sous region (75,000 inhabitants); the international zone of Tangier (70,000 inhabitants).

Moroccan people. His administration was the "honeymoon" of the Protectorate.

Lyautey's successors, however, sometimes displayed a less clear understanding of the evolution of the country. The French administration often attached more importance to material improvements than to the development of Moslem youth and, therefore, governed directly. This neglect was all the more regrettable because in 1934, when the pacification of the empire was completed and Sherifian authority was established over the last of the ancient tribes, a strong, young and ambitious nationalist movement became powerful in Morocco.

The ideology of this movement had been created by a few hundred college and secondary-school students. The process began in 1930, when an ill-considered reform of the Berber judicial system was undertaken. The reform was based upon the idea that Berber law could be assimilated to French law, and ran counter to the authority of the *Makhzen* without giving the Berbers an adequate framework within which to develop their own institutions. Its controversial features were abandoned in 1934, but it caused these youths to raise the cry that Moroccan Islam was threatened by proselytizers. The protest was taken up by the Emir Chekib Arslan, the declared enemy of French policy in the Levant, who was living in Lausanne and conducting extensive activities with the aid of German and Italian subsidies. He spread the cry throughout Islam, even as far as Indonesia. In 1934, a group of Moroccan students in Paris, encouraged by the Leftist parties, drew up a Charter for the movement, which proposed radical reforms and the creation of a parliament. In view of social conditions in the country, the French authorities regarded this proposal as completely premature. Moreover, they felt that a few hundred students did not represent public opinion in this vast backward land. The students thereupon attempted to broaden their movement by provoking incidents and riots in which they could involve the Moroccan city populations, and in 1936 and 1937 they succeeded fairly well in this purpose.

General Noguès, who was appointed Resident General at the end of 1936, showed skill in allaying their agitation. He corrected administrative abuses, gave human problems their proper value, and sought the advice of young Moroccans. He succeeded in establishing much calmer conditions throughout Morocco. Un-

fortunately, however, the looming world conflict made it necessary to postpone the two great reforms which were the precondition of Morocco's development as a nation: the cultural and political education of the masses and the organization of a modern government.

III

News of the defeat of France in 1940 was received in Morocco with stupefaction. Never in the memory of the Moroccans had France been beaten in war. Here was the opportunity for which the warriors of the tribes, who had not resigned themselves to the life of peaceful herdsmen, had been waiting. But there was no revolt, and the movement for emancipation was slow in getting under way, a fact which indicates that, on the whole, good feeling prevailed between the Moroccan people and their French protectors. Indeed, in all circles, even among the educated Moslem youth, there were numberless expressions of sympathy for the unhappy French. The French administration was alert and energetic, and everything went on as before. This tranquillity was all the more remarkable because a German armistice commission, with headquarters in Fedhala, arrogated to itself all the prestige that Germany had enjoyed in the Sherifian Empire before 1914, and sought to estrange the Moroccans from France.

The Germans, moreover, were busy reminding Franco of the Treaty of 1902 which had put Fez, Meknes and Kenitra in the Spanish zone, but which was rejected by the Spanish Cortes because it involved too heavy responsibilities. Now the Germans tempted Spain with the suggestion that part of Algeria and northern Morocco might be hers, though they had no intention of giving them to her. General Franco maintained a force of 140,000 men, armed with the most modern equipment, in the Spanish zone, which threatened to invade the Sherifian zone at the first sign of a Gaullist uprising. The French administration and the Sultan's representative were expelled from Tangier and the Khalif of Tetuan, Moulay Hassan, a cousin of the sovereign, was encouraged to use the parasol, the prerogative of the Sultan. A "Moroccan unity" movement, advocating the unification of Morocco under Spanish auspices, was supported by German funds poured into the pockets of nationalists like Mekki Nasiri and Abd el Khalek Torres who insulted France most coarsely. Several young nationalists of Fez and Rabat took up residence in Spain with the

support of the German political agencies in that country. There was grave danger that hostile activities would be carried on in Rabat, within the Sherifian Government itself, in order to throw Morocco's rulers into the arms of Germany by frightening them with the specter of Spanish intervention. Fortunately, the discredit into which Spain, once so feared by the Moslems, had fallen, made them suspicious of these manœuvres. Nevertheless, it is now established that secret relations existed between very high Moroccan officials and the German Government from the beginning of the war until 1943.

In order to maintain an atmosphere of good understanding at all costs, General Noguès relaxed the close supervision which France had hitherto exercised over the Palace. He also permitted in the city of Fez many exceptions to the strictly controlled economy of the rest of the territory. The results were manifold. The Sultan's Government immediately returned to its old customs, which 30 years of orderly administration had sought to eradicate. Under the régime which ensued, respect for authority again had to be expressed by rich gifts. Power over the tribes was used to levy irregular and exorbitant tribute. At the same time, the ruling family favored its friends and evened old scores with its enemies. Such methods of administration were even more difficult to combat after the Resident General, obeying Vichy's commands for two days following the Allied landing on November 8, 1942, ordered French troops into an absurd conflict, since he was thus placed in a position of extreme moral weakness.

The great masses of Moroccan tribesmen, included within the administrative framework of the Protectorate since their fairly recent subjugation, remained bound by their century-old traditions and were in no way stirred by the currents of modern life. The conflict of the great world forces was an event far beyond their judgment and understanding. After the Allied landing, they learned with interest that war was once more going on in the world and 90,000 mountaineers joined the regular and supplementary troops — the *goums* and *tabors* (Moroccan cavalry) — to seek glory and adventure in Tunisia, Italy and France. The victories they won filled these soldiers with pride; like the great children they were, they marveled at the petty advantages brought them by the war. No national spirit filled the hearts of these fighters.

IV

Following the Franco-British disagreement in the Levant, London had sent an ultimatum to the National Liberation Committee at Algiers on November 17, 1943, demanding that it restore to power the Lebanese Government arrested on the order of the French High Commissioner in Beirut. General de Gaulle and his Ministers, desirous above all else of avoiding an inter-Allied crisis only a few months before the expected liberation of the French capital, complied with these imperative injunctions. France was thus obliged to abandon her authority as a Mandatory Power without receiving anything in return, and was denied the advantages she might have gained from treaties concluded with the Lebanese and Syrian Governments according to the British precedent established in 'Iraq and Egypt. This obvious setback was immediately interpreted by the Moroccan nationalists as a sign of French impotence. At the same time, boundless hopes were placed in the Anglo-Saxon Powers. It was thought that they would surely intervene against their weak ally in North Africa to gain independence for the peoples. Their power in the area was known to be irresistible, for they had just landed large armies on the North African coast.²

The nationalists set afoot a bold, though carefully concealed, scheme to proclaim the independence of Morocco and the abrogation of the Protectorate. The plot was hatched in Fez and, after an incubation period of more than a month (which was punctuated by secret audiences at the Imperial Palace), resulted in the presentation of petitions to various notables by the nationalists, supposedly under orders from the Sultan. Finally, on January 11, 1944, the Sherifian Ministers made a solemn *démarche* at the Residency (where General Noguès had been replaced), suddenly confronting the Resident General with what was said to be the ardent aspirations of all Morocco. Against this the Sultan declared himself powerless. At the same time, the walls of the northern cities were covered with slogans and a feverish atmosphere prevailed in the streets. The townspeople, secretly mobilized by

² President Roosevelt's visit to Anfa evidently inflamed the imagination of many people; some even declared that the United States intended to establish a protectorate over Morocco, a notion recently brought forward in several public statements by Abd el Rahman Azzam, Secretary of the Arab League. These statements were immediately denied by the State Department. Information gathered in Morocco itself completely confirms this denial. Any conversation on the future of Morocco was obviously impossible "at a time when America's signature on an agreement guaranteeing the integrity of the French Empire during the war was not yet dry."

the leaders of the conspiracy, from day to day expected a complete and miraculous success. The Europeans who, until then, had known nothing of this clandestine political activity, found themselves suddenly isolated and confronted with a *Makhzen* seemingly once more omnipotent. The firmness of the Provisional Government at Algiers, which tersely reminded Morocco of the existence of the Protectorate, sufficed to restore calm. At that point, a kind of panic succeeded the mood of exaggerated hope, especially when the Sultan himself, faced with his treaty obligations, formally disavowed those who claimed to have his support. The sobered townspeople quietly returned to their daily occupations, while rural Morocco, that is, nine-tenths of the country, which was only vaguely aware of these events, learned simultaneously of the crisis and of its end.

These events taught valuable lessons, although they came to an unfortunate and bloody conclusion. On January 29, 1943, the Military Security Services had arrested, on insufficient evidence, certain nationalist leaders suspected of maintaining relations with Germany. Riots accordingly broke out in Rabat and Fez which resulted in prolonged repression. The Palace, for its part, made cautious by its setback of January 1944, but by no means reformed, worked with extraordinary tenacity to reoccupy, one by one, the positions of power it had held before the abortive crisis. Its dreams of grandeur, inspired perhaps by the example of the King of Egypt, led it to free itself in fact from the tutelage of the Protectorate and to substitute for that authority its own absolute temporal and spiritual power over the entire empire.

v

The new Resident, M. Eirik Labonne, who took over the heavy political heritage of the postwar period, was determined to carry out a program of radical reforms as soon as favorable circumstances presented themselves. He wished first to put Moroccan economy on a firm basis. Since the country is threatened with disastrous overpopulation and impoverishment if its economy remains almost entirely agricultural, M. Labonne drew up a far-reaching industrial program, which carried on the plans of his predecessors for the erection of enormous power dams. Large companies were founded with the harmonious participation of the French and Moroccan Governments and of private interests — French, Moroccan and foreign — for the purpose of intensifying

the exploitation of the country's mineral resources and the development of its industry.³

At the same time, M. Labonne realized that the weak point in the political development of Morocco was the lack of education of the Berber tribes, who were in a state somewhat comparable to that of the Mexican Indians before the creation of the Mexican Government's itinerant educational missions. He therefore began a determined campaign against illiteracy and set up travelling schools all over the territory, with the generous and enthusiastic assistance of the French population of the interior. This campaign was extremely successful.

Yet these liberal efforts did not win the full support of the youth movement and the Palace. A most important change has taken place in the mentality of the educated youth since the war. Before 1939, they were deeply influenced by the west. But the Second World War, which was fought above the heads of the Middle Eastern peoples, so to speak, by methods that were considered barbarous and which utilized colossal material forces, frightened them and drove them to return with a kind of fearful ardor to their old religion and tradition, conceived in an idealized form. And now hope is arising that soon a third World War will result in the mutual destruction of the great western empires and thus leave the field clear for the accomplishment of Islam's eternal mission. The creation of the Arab League, originally conceived for other purposes, has given a broad political framework to these confused religious aspirations. Morocco is particularly affected by this reaction, because of the ever-increasing rôle played in the movement by numerous emissaries from the Spanish zone. These are young men, now reaching maturity, who for 20 years have been trained in the east with the support of the Spanish Government. Narrow in their culture, strongly indoctrinated with the dogmas of the Arab renaissance, they know very little of the real life, needs or aspirations of the Moroccan people, especially the tribes, and they know nothing of the west.

Certain economic developments have contributed to the politi-

³ For example: the *Société des Charbonnages Nord-africains* (coal) with a capital of one billion francs in which Belgian interests are represented; the *Société d'énergie thermique nord-africaine* (thermal energy) with a capital of 800,000,000 francs; the *Société minière du plomb* (for the exploitation of the Zellidja lead deposits) with a capital of 500,000,000 francs of which American investors account for one-third; the *Compagnie franco-marocaine de navigation* (shipping) with a capital of one billion francs. Three billion francs will be spent over a three-year period to complete the power dams. In the year 1946-1947 private capital in Morocco in search of a field for investment amounted to 15 billion francs.

cal activity of the youth in the cities and the neighboring countryside. During the war enormous profits were made in business and these have created great fortunes, some of them exceeding a billion francs. Landowners enriched by the sale of their crops, *Makhzen* agents who play a part in the controlled economy and are less carefully watched than formerly, have prospered mightily, paid their debts and established themselves in modern city houses.

The tribes, on the other hand, have suffered from famine during bad years, like 1943 and 1944, and in prosperous times they have had to submit to compulsory collections of grain, wool and cattle for the benefit of the cities. The absence of manufactured goods to exchange for agricultural products has made necessary very unpopular economic restraints. Political agitators, therefore, can win the ear of the tribesmen more readily than in the past. Furthermore, the development of the autocratic tendencies of the *Makhzen* has strengthened the absolute power wielded in the localities by the tribal chieftains.

Moreover, the surplus population of the countryside, and the peasants ruined during the bad years whose land has been taken over by the large landowners, are flocking to the towns, where they create extensive proletarian slums on the outskirts of the modern city districts. Casablanca, to cite one example, has become, like the great cities of China, an enormous camp, picturesque but wretched, of men and women in search of problematical employment. These slums are excellent breeding grounds for agitators, both nationalist and Communist.

Communist activities are only in the initial stages in Morocco, but the evolution of the Moroccan Communist Party is significant. It was founded by Frenchmen in 1943. Two years of determined efforts were required to draw Moslem militants into its ranks. But as soon as an Algerian teacher, Ali Yatta, became its leader, the Moroccan Communists ceased to base themselves upon the French Union and drew closer to the nationalist movement. The National Communist Congress held at Casablanca on April 6, 1946, was attended by 1,000 delegates, of whom 125 came from the Kasba Tadla region. The party leaders have far less education than the nationalists. A certain number of French Communists, frightened by the xenophobia of the movement, have disassociated themselves from it. While cells of the party multiplied in the little cities and even flourished in certain Berber

regions where they served as centers to which the people could bring their grievances, a mysterious directive was issued in August 1946 advocating a united front with the nationalist parties and an alliance with Messali's anti-French proletarian party in Algeria. The Palace and the nationalist youth, while carefully maintaining their contacts with the Moslem leaders of the party, do not hold the organization in very high esteem, a fact which can be explained by their social and religious prejudices and by the very slight results thus far obtained in a country still strongly attached to all the forms of the past.

VI

In the best period of the Protectorate a youthful, enthusiastic and enterprising French population easily succeeded in controlling the various social and economic currents of modern Morocco. But its leaders grew old, and its agents were too numerous and too ignorant to adapt themselves to the internal developments of this "young" country where everything has been changing rapidly. Under normal conditions, French leadership would have been rejuvenated, but Morocco was cut off from France for seven years. No new blood came from the home country to restore the vitality of the administration. The educated Moroccan youth are deserting administrative jobs because the salaries of civil servants are too low, compared with the enormous profits to be made in business. It is waiting for the day when it takes power; then it will gain administrative experience, it reasons. One particularly serious aspect of this is the extreme difficulty with which Moslem teachers are recruited for the countryside. On the other hand, in the cities there is a craze for the development of Arab culture, presented in an anti-western spirit.

The general international picture intensifies the ardent national aspirations of the city youth and the demands of the Palace. Every month brings news of political progress by the Asiatic states, many of them more backward than Morocco, yet admitted into the United Nations. Meantime, agencies established in the western capitals for the purpose of carrying on propaganda in the Middle East are reiterating their promises of support.

Finally, the Arab League seems to fear that the French Union will be achieved in the near future and for this reason is making determined efforts to keep Moroccan nationalism a strongly "eastern" movement. It is well known that the Constitution of

the Fourth Republic provides for the participation of the lands under French protectorate and the states of the Indochinese Federation in the High Council of the Union and the Assembly of the Union. Up till now, the prospect of this degree of self-government has aroused no enthusiasm among the Moroccan youth, but, on the contrary, has encouraged the opponents of France to redouble their activities.

Thanks to the diplomatic action of France in 1945, the Sherifian administration was reestablished in Tangier, from which Spain had expelled it during the war. Under the pretext of reaffirming his sovereignty, the Sultan of Morocco, after six months of insistent demands, secured permission from the Resident General to travel through the Spanish zone to the international city, so that he might receive the homage of the Moroccan people. His real purpose was "to put the problem of Morocco before the whole world." In a series of skillfully-worded speeches, the Sultan, his son and even his daughter affirmed the unity of the Moroccan Empire as opposed to the territorial fragmentation resulting from international treaties; they further proclaimed the identity of Moroccan aspirations with those of the eastern countries, the Islamic rôle of Sherifian sovereignty in the political complex of the Arab nations, the absolute identity in culture and civilization of Morocco and the east, and, finally, Morocco's need to obtain its "full rights." The rôle of France was almost completely ignored.

These speeches were received with enthusiasm by the nationalists in Tangier and the Spanish zone. The speakers deliberately avoided mentioning revision of the statute of Tangier or the status of the Strait of Gibraltar, for the rivalry of the great empires is to be feared in all strategic zones of international importance. Their reference to cultural and ethnic matters also passed over the essential facts that though Morocco is an heir of Moslem and Arab civilization, it has always held a place apart from the Moslem east, not only because of the Berber character of its people, but also because of the prestige and influence exerted in the past by the great center of civilization that was Andalusia. The idea that Morocco is part of the east seems no more than an oratorical device inspired by immediate political objectives.

Two months after the events at Tangier, the French Government, for humanitarian reasons, decided to transfer Mohammed Abd el Krim, the former Berber leader of the holy war in the

Spanish zone, who had been living in exile on the island of Madagascar for 21 years, to a comfortable residence in France. Just as Abd el Krim's ship passed through the Suez Canal, Allal el Fassi, a nationalist leader previously exiled to the Gabun and recently pardoned, secretly went to Cairo. Assisted in Egypt by other North African leaders and with the support of the *Ikhwan el Mouslimine* or Moslem Brotherhood (a new fanatical sect which is carrying on activities in Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Mecca, and trying to establish itself in North Africa) he succeeded in persuading the old Riffian chieftain to leave the ship and ask for the protection of the King of Egypt. A few days later, Abd el Krim, established in Cairo and surrounded by advisers from the Spanish zone, filled the press with violent attacks upon France and announced his return to the political scene by invoking the possibility of a recourse to arms. The significance of this incident was considerably lessened in the eyes of the west by the well known fact that Abd el Krim and his associates owe their lives to French protection, to which they had appealed when threatened with capture by the Spanish Army and treatment as criminals.

VII

The new Resident General, General Juin, appointed in May 1947, has expressed his determination to continue energetically the economic program of M. Labonne. But since the precondition for that is to set the old Sherifian Government upon the path of progress, he secured the approval of the Sultan for the creation of a mixed Council, composed of French administrators, traditional viziers and Moroccan councillors, under the chairmanship of the Grand Vizier. This governmental reform, while modest in appearance, is intended to avoid a disastrous return to the old *Makhzen* institutions and practices. If the Sherifian Government coöperates in making this Council work, the basis will be laid for the administrative training of Moroccan officials and the formulation of a modern constitution. The French Government, with the unanimous support of French public opinion, does not envisage a radical transformation of the Protectorate until the extensive common interests of both countries which were developed during the last 40 years have been safely guarded. Its thesis is that neither an agreement in the form of a Franco-Moroccan treaty, nor the participation of Morocco in the French Union, is possible unless France can deal with a "qualified representative." So far none

has presented himself; certainly, neither the *Makhzen* reconstituted along medieval lines nor the isolated and inexperienced nationalist youth, nor both of them together — for though they are often in opposition, they do unite upon occasion — could be taken as such. Security in future Franco-Moroccan relations, therefore, lies in an agreement ratified by the whole Moroccan people. Their political maturity must be promoted by all possible means, so that they themselves can determine their fate.

Thus the French subordinate any major political advance to the prior need for education. The Nationalists, on the other hand, assert that all gradual reforms are useless and that there is no purpose in studying plans for coöperation until complete independence is granted to Morocco. Each side lacks confidence in the other. The east violently denounces colonialism, while the French population in North Africa, confronted with recent events in Palestine and Egypt, rejects the idea of accepting the status of a protected minority within insufficiently modernized Moslem states.

Skill and patience could mitigate and even conciliate this conflict of forces and views. But is there perhaps a still more serious divergence of purposes than this? The west is trying slowly to foster autonomous communities capable of one day becoming modern nations, in the Sudan, as in Morocco and other parts of Africa. But the east has lost confidence in modern civilization and, deluded by the memory of its own past greatness, seeks to reconstitute old empires based on racial solidarity, not on the humanistic values of the west. France's difficulties in Morocco are perhaps only an episode in the struggle between the east and the west in which, in the last analysis, spiritual factors play a much more important rôle than material forces or power rivalries. Just as the Kingdom of God is "within," so the secret of peace and harmony among civilizations lies in the hearts of men.

RUSSIAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

By Abram Bergson

HOW much of Soviet Russia's national product is she allotting currently to military preparedness? A partial basis for an answer to this much-discussed question is provided by the data in the following table, which have been assembled from Russian sources.¹ The figures given represent the defense expenditures reported in the annual budgets of the Soviet Government. Those for the period 1933-46 represent realized expenditures, while the figure for 1947 is a budget forecast.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Billions of rubles</i>
1947 (forecast)	67.0
1946	72.6
1945	128.2
1944	137.9
1943	125.0
1942	108.4
1941	80.0
1940	56.7
1939	39.2
1938	23.1
1937	17.5
1936	14.9
1935	8.2
1934	5.0
1933	1.4

The budget figures for defense, it should be observed, are not entirely comprehensive of Soviet military outlays. One omission, military pensions, is not of special concern here, since outlays for this item reflect previous rather than current military activities.² Beyond this, the defense figures apparently do not include the outlays of the N.K.V.D., which reportedly engaged in some military as well as internal police operations during the war. The expenditures of the N.K.V.D. in 1937, the most recent year for which data on this organization are at hand, amounted to three billion rubles.

In respect of the figures for postwar years, there is a question also as to the

¹ Data for 1946 and 1947 from A. G. Zverev, "O gosudarstvennom biudzhete SSSR na 1947 god" (On the State Budget of the USSR for 1947), Moscow, 1947, p. 16; for 1945, from "Zasedaniia Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Vtoraia sessiia, 15-18 oktiabria 1946 g." (Meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Second Session, October 15-18, 1946), Moscow, 1946, p. 7; and for all other years except 1940 and 1938, K. N. Plotnikov, "Biudzhets sovetetskogo gosudarstva" (Budget of the Soviet Government), Moscow, 1945, pp. 71, 79, 90, 93. The figure for 1940 is calculated from data in A. G. Zverev, "O gosudarstvennom biudzhete SSSR na 1945 g." (On the State Budget of the USSR for 1945), Moscow, 1945, p. 7; in Plotnikov, *op. cit.*, p. 93; and the data for the years 1941-1944 in the table. The figure for 1938 is from Alexander Baykov, "Development of the Soviet Economic System," Cambridge (England): Cambridge University Press, 1946, p. 397.

² Pension payments already have mounted to a very considerable sum by Soviet standards. In the budget, military pensions are included under the same heading as pensions paid to certain special categories of persons not covered by the workman's social insurance system (scientists, invalid children, etc.); it seems clear, however, that the military pensions would be the main element in the total outlay for all these persons together, which is to be 21 billion rubles in 1947.

extent to which two other items are covered. One of these is atomic energy research. In the budget there is a separate heading "scientific research," which may possibly include some work on atomic energy. The total outlay for scientific research in 1947 is to reach the sum of about 6.5 billion rubles, which is three times greater than the prewar figure. The other possible omission is supplies requisitioned by the Red Army in occupied countries. Reportedly somewhat over a million Soviet troops were quartered outside the Soviet borders early this year. According to rule-of-thumb calculations, the total value of foodstuffs consumed by these troops probably would not exceed, at the very outside, five billion rubles per annum.

The presumption is that the budget figures *do* include capital outlays for the construction of war plants, as well as current expenditures for munitions. Since there is no explicit Soviet statement to this effect, however, a reservation must be introduced in the subsequent discussion on this account.

In interpreting the data in the table, we must for our present purposes take into account the changes in the prices of military goods and services which have occurred in the period under consideration. The budget figures represent *money* outlays in terms of current prices; necessarily, unless price changes are allowed for, the figures cannot be taken to represent the changes in defense expenditures in *real* terms.

On the extent of the changes in prices, there are two bits of information worth noting here. First, according to A. G. Zverev,³ the Minister of Finances, if allowance is made for the rise in prices and in the pay of troops from 1946 to 1947, the defense expenditures in real terms in 1947 will be 24 percent below those for 1946. Taken together with the figures on money expenditures, this means that the prices of defense goods and services rose 21 percent from 1946 to 1947. Second, according to a rough estimate of the present writer, the general level of money wages has risen about 85 percent since 1939.⁴ This figure on the rise in money wages tends to corroborate reports from all sources that since the outbreak of the war the Russians, despite their planning system, have experienced a wage-price spiral of very considerable dimensions. In the case of munitions, however, the increase in prices probably has been appreciably less than 85 percent. While money wages in the munitions industries may have risen even more than elsewhere, there were very real gains in techniques during the war, and working hours in industry generally are now somewhat longer than they were before 1940;⁵ hence, wage costs per unit of output probably have not risen by nearly as much as wages.⁶

³ "O gosudarstvennom biudzhete SSSR na 1947 god," p. 17.

⁴ This relates to the sector of the Soviet economy covered in the current reports of the central Soviet statistical agency (TSU), which sector apparently pays out about 80 percent of the total Soviet wage bill for the whole economy. (See A. Bergson, "A Problem in Soviet Statistics," an article to appear in a forthcoming issue of the *Review of Economic Statistics*.) The figures on wages for 1947 and 1939, respectively 7,090 and 3,768 rubles, are calculated on the basis of data in the annual plan for 1947 (*Pravda*, March 1, 1947) and in Bergson, *op. cit.*

⁵ The Russians are now on a 48-hour, six-day-out-of-seven work week, introduced in June 1940. Previously the usual working hours were five seven-hour days out of six, which is equivalent to about 41 hours on a seven-day week basis.

⁶ This discussion, of course, assumes that the Government fixes prices on the basis of costs, which seems to have been the case since 1936, when the practice of subsidizing heavy industries generally was discontinued.

Let us try now to answer the question that was posed. Bearing in mind the limitations in the data that have been referred to,⁷ the available information would seem to indicate a twofold conclusion:

(1) The Soviet military establishment is now far smaller than it was during the war. The figures in the table show a decline in *money* outlays of more than 50 percent from 1944 to 1947. (The year 1944 was the last full war year and the one in which *money* outlays were at an all-time peak.) If allowance is made only for the 21 percent increase in the prices of defense goods and services from 1946 to 1947, and not at all for the rise in these prices which presumably occurred from 1944 to 1946, this would mean that in real terms the defense outlays of 1947 were 40 percent of those of 1944.

The same general conclusion regarding the progress of demobilization in the U.S.S.R. is, of course, indicated by a great deal of other information reaching the United States. Reportedly, the Soviet armed forces now number about 3,500,000 to 4,000,000 men, while in wartime their strength is said to have reached about 12,500,000. In the Soviet press itself, there have been many reports on the demobilization of various classes of the armed forces, as well as on the reconversion of various branches of industry to the production of reconstruction goods. Reference to the foregoing facts inevitably calls to mind the forecasts that circulated in this country some time ago to the effect that the Russians planned to keep their military establishment on something like a wartime footing. Clearly these forecasts were wrong.

(2) By peacetime standards, however, the present outlays are still quite substantial. The current expenditures in real terms are perhaps about as large as, if not larger than, those of 1939, the year after Munich and the one in which the European war broke out. This allows for an increase of fully 85 percent in the prices of defense goods and services from 1939 to 1947 — the amount by which, as indicated above, the general level of wages rose in the same period.

According to rough calculations, Soviet Russia's military outlays probably amounted to about one-seventh of her gross national product in 1939. As a result of the war's destruction, the Russian national income is now less than it was in 1939;⁸ hence the defense expenditures now must be a larger share of a reduced total product.

The foregoing remarks inevitably raise but scarcely answer the question of the day: What are the Russians after? Regarding the Soviet military outlays, as regarding the military outlays of other countries, one is free to speculate as to whether they are for offensive or defensive purposes, for aggressive or peaceful aims. It might be surmised that expenditures on something like the 1939 scale are intended to support a foreign policy involving large risks; or it might be surmised that expenditures of this magnitude merely reflect Soviet feelings of insecurity in a threatening world. If the defense allocations are considered alone, there is difficulty in deciding which viewpoint is right. All that can be

⁷ For reasons which the writer has set forth elsewhere, he believes that, while there are many pitfalls in the interpretation of Soviet statistics, they are not basically false. Cf. A. Bergson, "A Problem in Soviet Statistics."

⁸ Some data on Russia's postwar economy are presented in A. Bergson, "The Fourth Five-Year Plan: Heavy Industry versus Consumers' Goods," *Political Science Quarterly*, June 1947.

said is that we have here one more commentary on the tense state of world affairs.

In this connection, the fact that the Russians have demobilized much below peak wartime strength must be read in the light of their urgent reconstruction tasks and long-term plans for the development of their basic industries (steel, coal, machinery, etc.). As the recent war has shown, these industries are the core of military power. The resources that were freed by demobilization in the U.S.S.R. are being used currently for the purposes of reconstruction in general, and according to all indications for the further building up of basic industries in particular.

The Soviet defense allocations raise a question also as to the nature of Russia's more immediate military aims and strategy. Here, one feature would seem to be of special interest: in the atomic era, the Russians apparently are continuing to invest heavily in preparedness of a conventional sort, including a large standing army in particular. One need not be a military expert to perceive that this fact must be connected with another to which such experts in the United States recently have called attention. Now that the German Army has been destroyed, it is said, the Russians in case of war could occupy all of Europe in a matter of weeks. As far as this writer can see, there is no basis for thinking that such action by the Russians is imminent; but it is easy to believe that they would wish to be sufficiently prepared to take advantage of this possibility and to hold the Continent in case of need. The facts assembled here suggest that, whatever their underlying intentions, an immediate objective may be to be prepared for this eventuality. The Russians now are no longer menaced by a great land army either in Europe or in Asia; but considerable preparedness of the conventional sort, including a large standing army, would still be needed for the occupation of the Continent.

Perhaps, however, the Russians have not yet finished demobilizing and are planning to scale down further their military establishment. While, as the table shows, the *money* outlays for defense in 1947 are to be just about as large as for 1946, this does not mean that the expenditures *in real terms* have ceased to decline; as was indicated above, the expenditures in real terms in 1947 will be 24 percent below 1946. Further cuts in defense outlays still may be in prospect. This is, of course, speculative. The reverse is also possible.

OIL FOR SPAIN

A CRITICAL EPISODE OF THE WAR

By Herbert Feis

THE summer of 1939 Franco was master in Spain. The remnants of the broken Republican forces took refuge in wretched camps across the Pyrenees, while their leaders scattered the world over. The small elements of opposition remaining in Spain were repressed without mercy.

Germany and Italy had given Franco vital aid in the battle; Germany had flown Franco's troops into Spain and then provided tanks, planes, instructors and technicians. Italy had smuggled a large army into the field. These forces from abroad had enabled Franco finally to break the resistance of the ill-equipped Republican forces, exhausted by their struggle against the Moors. Their contribution created a lien to Hitler and Mussolini, which the Fascist leaders mistook for fiery determination to aid them. Thus Serrano Suñer, the leader of the Executive Committee of the Falange (and Franco's brother-in-law) waved off the Italian legions on the quay at Cadiz on May 31 with the words:

Every time the war — or battle-cry — resounds on the Italian shores of the Mediterranean, the Spanish people from the Iberian shores of that sea will answer with the shout of "Rome, Rome, Rome." In this immortal word is our common destiny both Latin and Mediterranean. If Italy were threatened a forest of Italo-Spanish bayonets would defend our common spiritual inheritance. . . .

Still, all in all, Franco had no real reason to resent the way that Great Britain and the United States had behaved during the years of his war. Neither had interfered with him or the forces behind him. The British Government had evaded all claims for sympathy or support in a deceptive program of "non-intervention." The United States, in a hasty and extraordinary action, had prevented the government under assault from buying arms in the United States. Despite some distress of spirit, the British and American Governments had allowed the Republic to be destroyed. At the time, it had seemed to them part of the price of peace; and to the Conservative British Government the prelude to friendship. Chamberlain wrote on the eve of Franco's victory (February 1939): "I think we ought to be able to establish excellent relations with Franco who seems well disposed to us."

Chamberlain was self-deceived. Franco and his circle felt no thanks for the helpful conduct of the democracies. They took it as a forced tribute to the virtue of their cause and the power of their allies. If any thanks were due, it was to Germany and Italy for recognizing their valiant fight against the evil movements that threatened the whole world. The new ruler of Spain felt a passionate distrust of all forms of popular rule — as a wild seed-bed of opposition, anarchy, Communism, as it so often had been in Spain. Only as long as Hitler and Mussolini lived to dominate such forces could Franco feel safe.

Editor's Note: This article is part of a book to be published in the spring by A. A. Knopf, to be entitled "The Spanish Story: Franco and the Nations at War."

The obverse of this fact of fortune was that he might share in the triumph of the others.

The governments of the Allies came, in the midst of the war, to rue having consented to Franco's victory. For Spain became a specter — a dark, brooding form that might, in their time of weakness, pounce upon Gibraltar and the coast of Africa. But not until the fall of France. Before then Spain was sentenced to watch and tend her weakness. The Spanish islands in the Atlantic and even in the Mediterranean were exposed to attack by the British and French fleets. The Spanish colonies in Africa could not long have been defended. The invasion of Spain herself from the sea or across the Pyrenees was possible. The imports of food, fuel and raw materials into all parts of the Spanish Empire were subject to an effective sea and land blockade. By these facts, as long as France was in the battle, the Allies were protected against any vital wound. Spain was a suspect center of enemy action, but not a menace.

When France fell, however, the specter was released, or so it seemed in that fearful period. All of Britain's strength was needed in the desperate struggle to defend her own island and keep the sea lanes open. There was none to spare to meet an attack by or through Spain. A strong German army camped along the Pyrenees frontier. Gibraltar could not defend itself against a well-organized assault. Even though the Rock were held, the airfield and naval base could be made useless and passage through the western Straits impossible. If Britain lost the entry into the Mediterranean, the battle for Malta, Suez and the whole of the east would be lost.

Thus the Spanish Government seemed possessed of the power to decide whether Britain could continue to resist outside her own island — perhaps, even, of the power to decide whether Britain could continue to fight at all. For if Germany could use the Spanish coasts in Africa and the Spanish islands in the Atlantic, the sustaining flow from the United States might be broken.

The British and American Governments took the measure of these dangers. The struggle to influence or control Spanish action became crucial to their battle plans and hopes. To quiet the specter, or keep it confined, they used all their arts and powers. Spain became the focal point of their diplomacy. Every day the Rock remained unsurrounded was a day gained — until there was no further need to count the days gained. Their allies were Spanish misery and the internal divisions over which the Franco Government ruled.

II. THE FLOW OF OIL IS PINCHED

On May 12 of the year 1940, President Roosevelt told the British Ambassador in Washington that he would be willing to consider any other ways, beyond those already in use, by which the American Government might assist the Allied Governments. Among the wishes expressed in the British response of May 20 was that the United States deny supplies to the enemy direct or through neutral channels. By June we were ready to try to do so, ready to lay aside the mask of neutrality.

The gaze of suspicion fell upon the flow of oil from the United States and the Caribbean to Spain. That country had been permitted to secure as much oil as it was able to pay for and have transported. With the consent of the nations at war, the cargoes moved untroubled through the blockades. The Spanish

official oil monopolies in Spain (CAMPASA) and in the Canary Islands (CEPSA) were amply and smoothly served under contracts with American companies. The volume of imports grew and grew again.

About the middle of June the French and the British Governments both placed a finger upon that fact. On June 14 the French Ambassador called to Under Secretary Welles' attention the fact that 21 ships, mostly of American registry, were then on their way to Spain with oil; some of this oil, the French Government believed, was en route to Italy. A few days later, the British Government in a note passed on by its Ambassador in Washington, expressed great concern over this concentration. The figures cited traced the recent abnormal rise in Spanish imports. They were taken to prove that Spanish reserve stocks were excessive, and rapidly increasing. The statistical graph had an ominous hook; it curved towards the Straits of Gibraltar.

Here it may be commented that the figures then in hand were necessarily rough estimates. When, much later, the actual record was compiled, the bulge in shipments was greater than had been surmised. In June, American exports of fuel oil to Spain were triple the usual rate, and of lubricants an ample half-year's supply. But the estimates of the size of Spanish reserve stocks was much too high and was later corrected by the British.¹

A substantial part of the oil for Spain was carried in neutral tankers, mostly American. The Texas Company arranged many, if not most, of the shipments. The British note stated that the British Government had the clearest possible evidence that the Chairman of the Texas Company had arranged with the manager of the company's Italian affiliate to assist Spain in every possible way to charter neutral tonnage for the transport of oil — part of which seemed to be intended for Italy. There was, it may be interjected, solid ground for this suspicion.

The British Government asked us, in view of these facts, first, to restrict the use of American tankers for the transport of oil to Spain; second, to limit shipments from the United States to Spain of lubricants and aviation gasoline. These latter products were carried by ordinary cargo vessels. The British Government had no sure way of checking them, even if it were to try; and it feared that any try might cause unwanted trouble with the Spanish Government.

The French and British requests were first put in the cooler of routine. There they were treated merely as minor complaints by the Allies concerning evasions of their blockade. As such they might long have been ignored, since some branches of the State Department, particularly a corner of the Legal Adviser's Office, was still bent upon preserving our neutral trade chances and supporting the "neutral" rights written into the text books of an earlier era.

But after a few days the papers were taken away from the lawyers. It was perceived that the size of the shipments to Spain, and of the Spanish stocks, were the main questions of interest — not that of diversion to the Axis. A search began for means by which the excess flow might be prevented without

¹ During June 1940 (according to unpublished figures of the Department of Commerce) the United States exported to peninsular Spain 466,000 barrels of fuel oil as compared with 830,000 during the whole second half year of 1939; and 50,000 barrels of lubricants as compared with 34,000 during the whole second half year of 1939.

noise or detection. Secretary Hull was not eager to hear a cry from Congress that the Administration was taking sides in the war. He was even less eager to incite an internal row over our relations with Franco. Therefore a British suggestion that we openly control the export of oil to Spain was rejected — as too likely to cause a fight. It was not foreseen that all the oil of Texas would soon be needed for our own defense.

But a number of other steps were taken to serve the same end. First, the Maritime Commission ruled that this trade with Spain was dangerous and that American tankers should not engage in it. Even tankers chartered to foreign buyers of oil were included in this order. Second, the Department arranged with the Treasury to have all oil cargoes labelled for Spain inspected—in order, it was said, to guard against diversion to other destinations. The Secretary of the Treasury, who knew of the British and French notes, had been urging stiff control. His Department at once set about inspecting every tanker in reach, including those already loaded, from keel to cabin. The crews of ships calling at Port Arthur to secure oil for Spain became very well acquainted with the look of the harbor.

These measures were put into effect as quietly as possible. The Secretary of State, in the few troubled moments which he gave to the matter, had shown his hope that the purpose could be achieved without admitting the intent. But the Spanish Government quickly sensed that someone was shutting the valve. Spain had no dollars to spare. Behind the decision to use so much of the short supply to buy oil, there was a pressing reason. Whether the reason was for peace or for war, no one in Washington, and perhaps in Madrid, could then be certain. Probably the enlarged buying orders were first placed as a cautionary economic move; they were in part intended for Italy. Then when the German assault on the western front surged forward, new great values were seen in having large stocks. They were the fee for opportunity — the ticket for Gibraltar and Africa. Germany was being asked to supplement, as a condition for entering the war, what Spain could buy elsewhere.

The Spanish Government took swift heed of the delays in tanker sailings from the United States and the cancellation of contracts. The head of the Petroleum Monopoly inquired of the American Embassy in Madrid at once. The Spanish Ambassador in Washington tried to quiz the Under Secretary of State on June 18. The answer he received was opaque — consisting merely of a statement that the Maritime Commission was of the opinion that it would be dangerous for American tankers to enter European waters at that time.

III. THE PINCH GROWS TIGHTER

Secretary Hull relapsed into a relieved belief that the needs of the situation had been met. But he soon learned otherwise. On July 10–11, 1940, the Treasury refused to clear two tankers of the Texas Company loaded with oil for Spain on the ground that it was safer for the preservation of American neutrality that they should not be seized carrying contraband. In accounting for this action to Secretary Hull, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Morgenthau, referred to reports that Spanish imports were still excessive. This was so; the rate of flow had been reduced, but it was still enough to enable Spain to add to reserves. Morgenthau then asked orders in regard to the future

clearance of tankers for Spain — in such a way as to seem to give orders. The Secretary of State did not welcome this pushful interest. The cut in his skin left by the quarrel over our denial of arms to the Spanish Government during the Civil War still pained. He felt ill-treated and was quick to take offense at any hint, no matter how soft or indirect, that there was anything to regret in our record. Were critics, ignorant of his worries, again to force the same quarrel upon him in regard to oil? Britain would bear the brunt of the consequences of whatever was done. Let it take the lead! All these ideas could be glimpsed in the comments which he dispensed with tired irritation.

After the telephone failed to reconcile their views, the two Cabinet officers met, only to part in sulky anger. Secretary Hull resented the pressure to act — sustained by those who would not be held responsible for error — without more time to gauge the situation. He disliked quick decision. Secretary Morgenthau was convinced that there was no time to wait, since Spain was on the verge of joining Germany. Secretary Hull tried to shake himself free by proposing that Morgenthau should act as he saw fit. But then the latter seemed to become afraid that if Spain rebuked us or entered the war he would be exposed to blame.

Relations between the two Departments were unhappy. Differences in policy separated them, and mistrust made the separation angry. The State Department was aroused over stories in the press and on the radio which were thought to originate in the Treasury. These gave inaccurate accounts of action and prejudiced views of motive. Thus the State Department participants in any meeting with their colleagues from the other side of the White House came to fear the experience. For it was all too likely that, when it was over, versions which did them no credit would shortly circulate. The State Department, it should be added, was not defenseless. Journalists also called there, and the more faithful ones at the Carlton Hotel as well.

While the Departments argued, tankers moved, though not in the same numbers as before. The President was consulted, but he would offend neither one nor the other of his Cabinet. The thought of further reducing the flow of oil was encouraged, but the Secretary of State was left to decide how. Within the next fortnight (in the first part of July) his slowly travelling judgment arrived at the next action station. But he remained anxious lest a mistake be made, and possibly a grave one. We might incite or hurry the Spanish Government to do what it otherwise might not do. We might be accused in Congress of thrusting the country toward war; for if Spain entered we could not ignore the fate of her Atlantic Islands. We did not know, but could guess (and correctly) that Hitler had his eye upon them. Therefore the hunt continued for an unobtrusive means. The Secretary conveyed to his staff, as a kind of pendant to his talk, his assent to the idea that the oil companies might secretly be asked to reduce shipments.

For about a fortnight longer this idea hung suspended in the void of doubt. Secretary Hull's hints of action seemed to dissolve in mid-air. The political officers concerned, who had handled this question of Spanish oil since it first came up, were dubious of the finality of the Secretary's wish and avoided the chore. It was suggested to the writer, on a holiday in New York (on July 19), that he drop in on the oil companies and let them know that the Department

would be pleased if they sent less oil to Spain. This seemed to him a futile step. In view of the size of the trade and the contracts under which it was conducted, he argued, upon his return to Washington, for more impressive action by the State Department. The Texas Company would surely want to be certain that the Government was in earnest, and almost as surely would have to explain to the Spanish Government why it did not fill orders.

At this point, the situation might have had a dramatic solution. For the question of oil for Spain became mingled with the greater question of oil for Japan. We were pouring into that aggressive empire increasing quantities of oil — including great quantities of those grades used in aviation. This nourishment of a likely enemy became in July the subject of anguished talk between the members of the Cabinet and with Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador. Congress, by the National Defense Law, had on July 2 given the Executive legal authority to control all exports. We had informed the British Government that we did not feel that we could justify the use of this power to control the flow of oil to Spain — on the grounds of defense. But on July 25 the President signed an order to do so, as part of a program to regulate the supply to all countries except Britain and her Allies.

All the night before the cables and wires had sluiced their reports of battle and anxiety into the receiving room on the fourth floor of the State Department. On the morning of the 25th the stream was of exhausting dimensions and, save for the report of England's courage, all of it of bad meaning for the United States. Acting Secretary Welles was intently reading through the neat stack of cables on his desk when an assistant entered. The White House, she explained, asked that he countersign the Presidential proclamation that she held in her hand. One glance was sufficient to extract its essential meaning from its formal phrases: the American Government would thereafter subject all exports of oil, scrap iron and other metals to license. The cables were thrust aside and colleagues hastily summoned to discuss the meaning of this order.

While they were on the way down to Welles' office, it was learned that the White House had already announced the issuance of the proclamation. The group took their chairs with perturbed wonder, especially those who were immersed in the crisis in the Far East. Almost at once they learned that it would be of little use to ask the urgent questions that were in their minds. For Welles said that he had not known how it was to be applied. If he could surmise, he did not choose to. His habitual coolness resisted the contagion of excitement. He was not inclined to retell tales out of the Cabinet or White House until they were condensed into succinct orders.

Thus he listened with blank expression to the points and queries of his staff. Of these the Chief of the Control Division was the most obviously disturbed. That was not unusual, since this harassed official was by nature easily aroused. Further, his place within the government subjected him to all the detailed consequences of the sudden moves above. He knew that within the hour every oil company in the United States would be on the other end of his telephone asking what the order meant. This was a spur to his detective faculties. They led him to the conclusion that the manner and form of action had been conceived within the Treasury. His evidence for that opinion was not bad. Clipped to the draft proclamation was a small piece of paper on which the word "Treas-

ury" was typed. Further, he asserted that in response to his inquiry the White House told him that it thought that the Treasury had cleared the proclamation with the other branches of the Government, including the State Department. The basis of this impression remains even today obscure. With whom the matter might have been discussed no one present knew or could find out.

Whatever the originating source and intention, the questions presented were urgent and of consequence. What would the regulations be and how would they be applied? Had the President decided to end, or greatly curtail, the shipment of vital materials to all whom we regarded as aggressors and potential enemies? Were we about to take this crucial step? Both the manner and the language of the proclamation seemed to indicate that we were.

Like observers of an atomic bomb test stretched out on the ground, the conferring officials sought to discern what shape the fiery cloud took. It might contain enough energy to vaporize history. Upon the meaning of this order depended the chances of war with Japan and of Spanish entry into the war against Britain. The more safely to face the glare, some put on the dark glasses of discretion. The Secretary of State, they knew, doubted whether it was wise, as yet, to invite the strains and dangers that would follow if we directly denied vital supplies to countries not included in the British blockade. His mouth had seemed to sag at the corners with worry as to whether Congress or public opinion would support him in that course, and whether the American Army and Navy were prepared for the struggle. But he was absent.

Welles, after hearing the review of anxieties felt in various divisions of the Department, said that he would try to persuade the President to confine the order to oil of grades useful in aviation, and to scrap iron of the highest type only. That afternoon he did so. Whether or not this was a reversal of the idea that the President had in mind when he signed the order was not discussed. But it probably was. The Treasury's slip was removed, the State Department's appended.

The currents toss and twist where fast rivers join. Now one, made turbulent by the night's rainfall, runs more swiftly and strongly than the other and dashes over it with high foam; now the other, having washed away some obstacle, suddenly pours out in greater depth. So the streams of desire within the Government clashed and whirled about in the years before the war: the will to prevent Axis victory, the wish to remain out of war, and the longing for time in which to strengthen ourselves for whatever struggle was ahead. The breakers of decision constantly foamed as they rolled on.

The reduced order (issued on July 26) was of little importance — except to Japan. It did not affect the question of whether and how we would further reduce the flow of oil to Spain. Welles decided to consult with the heads of the oil companies concerned. They came to Washington around August 1. They were asked to keep their shipments to Spain within previous customary limits and cautioned to be sure that none of it was passed on to Germany or Italy. This caution was directed particularly at Captain Thorkild Rieber, head of the Texas Company. His close associations with Nazi Germany were at that very time being exposed in the public press.

Thus by some quiet turns of the wrench of authority during the summer of 1940 the flow of oil to Spain was reduced. At first the hands that grasped the

tool had been lax and doubtful. But they grew firmer as American policy evolved into one of open opposition to the Axis. During the next few months, while Britain's fate was being decided, the tanker sailings were few; the quantities of gasoline, fuel oil and lubricants were insufficient even for ordinary needs. Spain had to begin to empty its tanks and to worry about what would happen if the shrinkage went further.²

IV. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT PIVOTS

The Spanish Government tried to loosen the valve by reviving the threat against the American-owned telephone company. On June 22, it will be recalled, Serrano Suñer, in an attempt to irritate, had denied his promise to allow the owners to resume control. Ambassador Weddell took up the case again with zeal, but Franco took no notice of his scattered appeals. Weddell concluded that the Spanish Government was trying to use our protective concern to force us to supply all the oil wanted. The State Department instructed him to make clear that it would not consider any such bargain. He was told to insist upon the restoration of American control as a matter of right and past promise, and to let it be known that the American Government would not discuss any other matter of interest to Spain (meaning a loan) until this was done.

Weddell expounded these views in a number of rasping talks with Foreign Minister Beigbeder, Serrano Suñer and Franco. On July 29, August 3 and again on August 6, the Ambassador and the Foreign Minister exchanged complaints. Each of these talks roamed far. Beigbeder said that the attitude of the Spanish Government was misunderstood. Spain, he averred, had no thought of entering the war unless attacked; the time for any such action in conjunction with Germany had gone by. These comforting words were wholly unlike the versions of the ideas of the Spanish Government — since become known — which the German Ambassador in Madrid was sending to Berlin. For example, in a memorandum that Ambassador Stohrer prepared for the German Foreign Office on August 8, he stated that the Spanish Foreign Minister had several times reminded him of the offer made by Spain in June to enter the war.³ The only way to acquit Beigbeder of duplicity at this juncture is to believe that he believed that the offers to Germany were not genuine.

These avowals were spread like a carpet to deaden the tread of suspicion, but they did not do so. The Foreign Minister pleaded for gasoline, but the State Department continued to doubt that it was needed for peaceful purposes. Its opinion was shaped by estimates provided by the British Government of Spanish reserves and by the record of shipments during the previous year.

² The extent of reduction is shown by the following table from unpublished records of the U. S. Department of Commerce, showing exports from U. S. to Spain, in thousands of barrels:

	<i>Gasoline</i>	<i>Fuel Oils</i>	<i>Lubricants</i>
Second half year 1939.....	1,267	830	34
First half year 1940.....	1,165	1,403	110
Second half year 1940.....	357	891	76

³ Stohrer wrote as follows: "The Spanish Foreign Minister and also the Minister of the Interior, have up until the last few days repeatedly pointed out the Spanish offer to me, so that it may be assumed that Spain even today will keep its promise made in June." (No. 1, State Department Documents Concerning Relations Between the Spanish Government and the European Axis.)

True, the restrictions imposed on the use of oil within Spain were severe and ordinarily would have been taken to connote a genuine shortage. But the available facts suggested another meaning, that the restrictions were being used as a means of hoarding for war, or possibly even as a measure of deception.

The truth of the situation is still not easy to decipher. The opinion that Spanish stocks were excessive and that the need was not critical was in some measure valid. So were reports that certain shipments had been turned over to Italian and German ships. But the estimates of stocks which influenced decision were wrong. Spanish reserves were smaller than was thought.

The next requests of the Minister of Foreign Affairs for oil were met by Weddell with the placid reply that the American Government was waiting for a settlement of the telephone dispute. Our wish to wait for clearer proof of what lay ahead was strengthened by attacks in the controlled Spanish press that grew more and more harsh. An evident attempt was being made by spirits hostile to us to prepare the minds of the Spanish people for entry into the war. At this juncture (August), Serrano Suñer, who controlled the press and radio, was doing his utmost to arouse the Spanish people against Britain and the United States. Hence he was glad of any quarrel, and ready to risk the loss of overseas supplies in the thought that Germany would take care of Spanish needs. The refusal of Germany to do so during the next three months was to prove one of the reasons why the drive for intervention finally failed.

Franco, we now know, was testing through Serrano Suñer what he could hope for from Germany. But with ever-present instinct to take from each day whatever might be had, he guarded himself against the loss of American products. On August 6 the Foreign Minister met Weddell at the door of his office and stated that the telephone matter was settled at last. Weddell, acting on orders in hand, then stated that the American Government would permit Spain to obtain such quantities of oil as it could transport and the British would navicert.

Of the circumstances of this midsummer Spanish pivot we now know much more than the American Government knew at the time. But we are still left to guess at the thoughts which made Franco's bargaining mind go around, made it give in to get oil. Was it foresight that Germany would refuse to supply his needs except on objectionable terms? Was it fear that the whole Spanish economy would collapse if he remained at odds with us? Spain might find herself deprived not only of oil but of fertilizers, cotton and wheat. The Spanish Government was about to pick up again the dropped request for a large credit to buy these products. Or was he afraid that the American Government might welcome the growth of the quarrel as a pretext for attacking the Canary Islands?

Or was it because of a wish to preserve Spanish oil reserves while he waited the approach of his chance to inherit — by default or by arms — Gibraltar and Morocco? Had he not on July 17 publicly declared that:

It is necessary to make a nation, to forge an empire. To do that our first task must be to strengthen the unity of Spain. There remains a duty and a mission, the command of Gibraltar, African expansion and the permanence of a policy of unity.

As Hoare has written, these words were not merely rhetoric. Even after close scrutiny of the exchanges between Spain and Germany during this period, it is difficult to know what was in his mind. At all events, in conceding to us he had given but little, and nothing that could not be taken back.

V. BRITAIN'S LEAD

The cold and untrusting wind that blew across the Atlantic made good weather for British sailing. The American pinch upon the flow of oil to Spain gave the British Government a prized chance to display its influence and usefulness. With quick insight Britain made the most of it. Shrewdly, seeing behind the posters that called for war at once, Hoare wrote home to Lord Beaverbrook, August 7, 1940:

My own impression is that the Spaniards are sitting on the fence until they see how the invasion of England, and possibly Egypt, goes. They are convinced that they will get something for certain out of the war in Africa and an arrangement about Gibraltar. But they are terribly short of everything that is needed for fighting and on that account they would only come into the war if they were convinced that it was virtually over.⁴

His conclusion, accepted by his Government was, that

to treat Spain as an enemy is playing into the hands of the Germans, who were determined to force the country into war against its wish.⁵

Britain in that summer was too close to mortal danger to choose her enemies or friends. Most of the Spanish people might be counted on, she thought, to be friends if not driven by injury or necessity; they had not been drilled or beaten into supine obedience. The Spanish Government — even if it wished — could not ignore them. Thus Britain strove to maintain the flow of trade from the Empire into Spain and to advertise the fact in all parts of the needy land. After the first gust of alarm in June, she quickly set about to make clear that she had no wish to see the Spanish economy collapse for lack of oil. Once assured that Spanish stocks were not excessive, British tongues would speak of Spanish needs, make sure they were not neglected.

Thus, while invasion talk filled the air, British representatives sat down with Spaniards to prepare a long-term program of supply which would take care of Spanish requirements but not permit the accumulation of great stocks. The American Government gave assent. By September the schedules were approved; the oil question was for the time being settled.

At this time Spain could have had more oil had it wished. Britain offered more if the Spanish Government would end the restrictions on consumption. How better, the British thought, to pamper the Spanish people in a season of shortage? But the offer was refused on the ground that Spain could not pay for more. The program envisaged an inflow equal to Spain's usual past imports, so scheduled as to enable Spain to maintain a safe level of stocks — two and a half months, but no more.

The American Government, while refusing to lend Spain the dollars needed to pay for this oil, favored the operation of the agreement with Britain. We

⁴ Sir Samuel Hoare, "Complacent Dictator." New York, Knopf, 1947, p. 24.

⁵ Letter to Lord Hankey, July 27, 1940, printed in Hoare, *ibid.*, p. 23.

permitted American owned tankers sailing under foreign flags to carry oil to Spain — after obtaining a promise from the British Government that they would not be hauled within the combat zone. We raised no objections to American tankers sailing under British or Norwegian flags. We issued cargo licenses for Spain and the Spanish colonies.

These arrangements regulated, although not without some breaks in the schedule, the flow of oil to Spain and the Spanish colonies during the rest of 1940. They were maintained in the face of frequent and anxious rumors that Spain was about to enter the war. Each time that Serrano Suñer went abroad — to Berlin, Rome, Berchtesgaden — the regulating hands quivered. Each time a new report was received of the fueling of a German ship, they tightened in anger. But they continued to match out oil against German promises.

This policy was justified by events. Scrutiny of the secret record of Spanish negotiations with Germany warrant the conclusion that the opposite course, a refusal to permit Spain to secure oil, might quite possibly have caused the Spanish Government to come to terms with Germany; and that the continued receipt of food and oil from overseas nourished Spanish popular opposition to the Axis. Oil was a universal particle in the stream of Spanish life. It enabled the fishing boats to bring in their catches, the factories to operate, the railroad locomotives to make their runs, the buses to move through the city streets, the trucks to bring food to market. Britain was effective, despite the many forms of censorship, in making it known that it was the guardian of this particle.

Our interference had saved the American telephone company in Spain, ended diversion to the Axis, depleted the Spanish reserves (for whatever purpose accumulated), given Britain a chance to bring home her usefulness, and brought future supply under control. In all these ways it hindered the junction of Spanish and German policies.

The dialogue of difficulties between the Spanish and German leaders was soon to become routine. At each meeting, the Spaniards argued that Spain could not properly prepare or start to fight, unless supplied in advance with oil and food. The reply was always that Germany would provide enough when, and only when, Spain began to fight; it could not spare such essentials merely to earn good will. This difference was never spanned. Franco waited in the hope that military events would make it possible for him to gain his aim without a fight or in so short a one that he would need no outside help. In the meantime, while he refused to promise to remain at peace, he also refused to go to war at any time except one of his own choice. The oil supplies of the western hemisphere made it possible for him to assume that position; British resistance made it advisable for him to maintain it; German lust for power made it perilous for him to do otherwise.

During the autumn of 1940 the American attitude towards the war changed rapidly. We moved from stunned alarm towards determined action. The United States was becoming ready to see England through the fight at no matter what risk. The State Department, free of the fear of punishment, moved along with the country. Sessions within the office of the Secretary of State ceased to be searches for tactics that would cover the movement with an invisible or reversible cloak.

VI. AN END WITHOUT GRACE

With the settlement that the United States and Great Britain reached with Spain in April 1944 — after a long and critical quarrel — the wartime struggle with and over Spain passed down a branch road of history. The Allies, for better or for worse, had chosen to let events evolve in Spain rather than dictate them. In the winter of 1943-44, we suspended all oil shipments to Spain for a period of almost three months in order to secure the Spanish Government's consent to a group of Allied demands. The most important of these were that Spain should send no more wolfram to the Axis nations, that she should close the Spanish Consulate at Tangier, the German espionage center of Africa, and that she should turn over to the Allies certain Italian warships and vessels. Spain accepted all the Allied demands, except that she insisted that some small shipments of wolfram to Germany should continue. When Spain made these concessions in the spring of 1944, oil shipments to her were resumed.

Spain could not have gone without oil much longer. By summer a crisis would have come — which would have forced Franco either to make way for a government more pleasing to the democracies, or defiantly to have thrown in his lot with Germany. Either would have caused a division within his government, the army and among the Spanish people. What the scene in Spain would have been at the time of our landing is — for me at least — an unanswerable question. Franco still in power — ruling with strong measures? A parliamentary government and a satisfied people? A weak government and sullen people which would have later come under Communist control? Or no government — anarchy and cruel civil war again?

These questions loomed sharply and then were passed on, unanswered, to the future.

The results of the brief oil suspension were severe, despite — or in a way because of — the drastic rationing. Private automobiles disappeared. Only buses and taxis equipped with charcoal burners were allowed to circulate. The reduced movement of trucks caused food shortages. Railway transport services, freight and passenger, were jammed. The government did its utmost to meet farm needs for harvesting and threshing, but only partly succeeded. Some industries were shut down completely, including glass factories which created a bottle shortage in the wine and brandy business. The fishing catch was reduced. Had supplies ebbed much further, Spanish economy would have been near collapse — if only for lack of lubricants alone.

Had Spanish stocks at the beginning of the suspension been smaller, the crisis would have been briefer and sharper. The stocks gave the Spanish Government time to curvet its way through opposed demands and secret liens. The original American oil program, as we have noted, had been based on the idea that maximum Spanish stocks should never exceed amounts needed for two months' use, three months for lubricants. The Spanish Government showed that under duress they could make what they had last for much longer. This hedge of time was, perhaps, a decisive historic fact.

The April 1944 agreement brought the Allies various military benefits of certain and prompt value. These — rather than the end of the wolfram trade

— had been the primary objects of British effort in Spain. The German Consulate in Tangier — the directing center of German activities throughout Morocco — was closed, though not without wrangling. The expulsion of many — but by no means all — German agents from both Morocco and the Spanish mainland was hurried, though only after nagging. The last remnants of the battered Spanish army unit in the east was withdrawn, though not without an attempt to absorb its men into the German forces. Most of the interned Italian merchant ships were released, but not all. Though all these actions had been promised, they had to be hauled out of the lax net of Spanish decision.

With the resumption of the oil shipments, the stale three-cornered differences of how much oil to send and how large Spanish stocks should be re-emerged. The American Government wished more than ever to keep the supplies low. But the British Government remained of the contrary mind. In fact, it now pushed hard to get a share of the trade for British oil companies and to secure an equal place in the administration of the system of oil control. During this last space of the war, small squabbles took the place of big ones. They have no special interest or importance. They might even be regarded as an advance signal of the ending of the war. The nations were beginning to feel themselves free to relapse into their customary commercial rivalries.

As our troops moved across France, our trade with Spain ceased to have vital wartime significance. Government offices in Washington began to figure out how they could prevent Spain from becoming a safe haven for the property and persons of the defeated Germans. They had cut off all the spreading branches of German influence. Now they wished to pull out the roots. For the memory was still green of those anxious times when only the misery of the Spanish people, their proud independence, and the divisions among them, prevented the crooked cross from flying over the vital Straits.

Spain ceased to be a main focus of Allied diplomacy. The beams swept across the vaster sky of the Continent, writing as they moved "unconditional surrender." Of all the leaders who had once been near Hitler's side and wished him victory, Franco alone has survived in power. He has survived to see, during the few years that have since passed, the beams of Allied diplomacy scatter and crisscross in lost confusion — survived to see them separate into two great hostile bolts, as he had been so sure they would.

This end without grace cannot be an end. But who knows what the end will be?

CHINA'S NEW CONSTITUTION

By George W. Mallory

ON December 25, 1946, the Chinese National Assembly adopted a permanent constitution, to come into effect on Christmas Day, 1947. This new Constitution is a more democratic document than might have been expected, for the history of constitutionalism in China has been a story of frustration.

Leading figures at the court in the Manchu régime of the late nineteenth century entertained the idea that the country's lack of constitutional government accounted in part for her weakness in resisting the encroachments of the western Powers and of Japan. Talk at that time, however, failed to lead to action, and it was not until the overthrow of the dynasty in 1911 and the establishment of a republic that a Provisional Constitution was adopted. This provided for absolute ministerial responsibility in conjunction with a powerless Chief Executive modelled on the French plan of government. Its framers had disregarded China's peculiar political needs in their eagerness to import from the west; the result was confusion and the ascendancy of military provincialism. During the war-lord years, successive constitutions were drafted but none of them was given effect.

With the establishment of the Nationalist Government at Nanking in 1927, however, constitutionalism began to assume a semblance of reality. The outline of governmental organization then adopted was based on the theories of Sun Yat-sen and evolved into the Provisional Constitution of 1931. The need for unity in the face of Japanese aggression gave rise to a more concrete expression of constitutional principles. These were elaborated in the Draft Constitution of 1936. This has been the document under which the national government has ostensibly operated up to the present day. Actually, however, China has not been governed under a constitutional system at all, for the Kuomintang, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, has been acting as the "trustee" of the people and in practice has exercised dictatorial authority. The decision to declare the period of tutelage at an end, and at last to establish a constitutional government was, therefore, even if only in principle, an event of the greatest importance.

The Constitution is a lengthy document, containing 14 chapters and 175 articles. Chapter I starts with the declaration that, "The Republic of China founded on the Three People's Principles is a democratic republic of the people, for the people, and governed by the people." It is interesting to note that despite the passage of years and shattering events, the political doctrines of Sun Yat-sen still demand formal recognition. Chapter II is an extended Bill of Rights, following the American pattern. Infringement of civil liberties on the part of a public functionary is punishable under the Constitution, as well as under civil and criminal law.

The National Assembly, containing approximately 3,000 delegates elected on a geographical and occupational basis, is authorized to exercise political power on behalf of the whole body of citizens. Its functions include the election and recall of the President and the Vice-President, amendment of the Constitution, and ratification of amendments proposed by the Legislative Yuan.

The new Constitution reduces the duties of the Assembly from those outlined by the Draft of 1936, due primarily to the body's unwieldy size and infrequent meetings. The powers of legislative initiative and review previously granted are no longer present.

The President of the Republic holds considerable power; he represents the nation in foreign relations, commands the armed forces, and promulgates laws and mandates with the countersignature of the President of the Executive Yuan. The President concludes treaties, declares war, peace and martial law, the latter with the approval of the Legislative Yuan, and appoints and removes all civil and military officers. In addition, he may issue emergency decrees, subject to confirmation within one month by the Legislative Yuan. Legislative dissent renders such decrees null and void. The term of office of the President and the Vice-President is six years, and they may be elected for a second term.

Agreements reached in January 1946 introduced a system of limited cabinet responsibility. The members of the cabinet, or Executive Yuan, consisting of a president, vice-president, heads of ministries and commissions and members without portfolio, are to be appointed by the President of the Republic. The cabinet is required to submit to the Legislative Yuan administrative reports, and Legislative Yuan members have the right of interpellation. If the Legislative Yuan dissents on any important policy, it may ask alteration or withdrawal of such policy, and may, by a two-thirds vote, carry its point or force the resignation of the premier. Cabinet responsibility is limited, however, by the requirement of a two-thirds majority in the legislature rather than the simple majority called for in the British system. Subject to the review of the Legislative Yuan, the cabinet exercises control over the budget. Expenditures listed in the executive budget may not be increased by the legislature.

The legislative power under the Constitution resides in the Legislative Yuan. Representatives have power to decide upon statutory or budgetary bills, or measures concerning martial law, declaration of war, conclusion of peace, treaties, and other important affairs of state. As has already been pointed out, however, the responsibility for initiating most of these measures remains in the hands of the President and the Executive Yuan. The legislature actually wields a power much more limited than that entrusted to the American Congress or to the British Parliament. The election of members is on the basis of population. Each province or municipality with a population of less than 3,000,000 has five representatives. In case the population exceeds 3,000,000, one additional member is elected for each additional million persons. Members of the legislature serve a three-year term and are eligible for reelection.

The Judicial Yuan, as the highest judicial organ, is charged with disciplinary measures against holders of public office, as well as with civil, criminal and administrative suits, and interpretation of the Constitution.

The civil service, as distinct from the judiciary, is under the control of the Examination Yuan, which supervises the examination and employment of all public functionaries. As is the case in the judiciary, Examination members, appointed by the President, are to be independent of party affiliation.

The feature of the new Constitution which is most reminiscent of traditional Chinese governmental practice is the series of articles defining the duties of the Censor or Control Yuan. The powers of consent, impeachment, ratification

and auditing are entrusted to a separate organ of the government rather than to the legislative representatives of the people. Provincial and municipal councils directly elect the members of the Control Yuan. With the exception of the power of impeachment of individual officials, its powers are confined to investigation and recommendation.

In the new Constitution there is a clearer differentiation than formerly existed between the authority of the central and the local governments. Residual powers are left to the Central Government rather than to the provinces. The Constitution follows no plan of division of powers such as that used in the American Constitution. The system is one of delegation of authority under the absolute supervision of the Central Government. The people of the province elect a Provincial Council to exercise the legislative powers delegated to them. The Provincial Governor is elected by the people of the province, a decided improvement over past practice which required that the governor be an appointee of the Central Government.

There is a chapter on fundamentals of national policies, which deals in some detail with questions of national defense, foreign policy and the economic system. Article 141 requires adherence to the United Nations Charter, this being the only such reference in any existing national constitution. In the economic sphere, private ownership of land is guaranteed, while public utilities and enterprises of a monopolistic nature are to be socialized. Finally, the chapter on National Policies stresses the importance of free elementary education and provides for supplementary education for those beyond school age.

Political events in China since the Constitution was promulgated on January 1, 1947, have been far from encouraging. During the spring a few municipal and provincial elections were held on the basis of a limited franchise. Reorganization of the government was promised but no important steps were taken. A few members of minority parties assumed minor cabinet posts, while preparations for the fall elections went forward amid a conspicuous absence of public enthusiasm. The state of general uncertainty was symbolized to some extent by the postponement of the date for the election of the National Assembly from October 21 to November 21. The submission to the Kuomintang of lists of minority party candidates in return for assurances as to their ultimate election strengthened suspicions that the election would not be free.

The Constitution of 1947 is evidence that China has made great progress in political theory during the past few decades. Without certain far-reaching reforms in administration, however, it will remain no more than an outline of good intentions. Implementation will mean the democratization of the Kuomintang, the end of one-party control over the military and financial power of the country, the guarantee of political equality to all loyal Chinese, and the encouragement of democracy in local government. Above all, the present Communist effort to establish an autonomous régime must be met, not only militarily, but on the political and ideological fronts as well. Whether or not the new Constitution can provide a rallying point for true democratic forces in China — indeed, whether it can, and will, be given effect in the coming months — nobody can now tell. It will fulfill its promise only when the government in power is willing to allow it to do so, for constitutional government in China means the end of one-party rule by the Kuomintang régime.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

NOTE—FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free*, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N. Y.

General: Political, Military and Legal

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS READER. EDITED BY HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1947, 492 p. \$5.00.

Representative essays chosen from FOREIGN AFFAIRS during its first 25 years, designed to show how ideas and events unfolded in the critical era between the two wars and down to the present. The selection runs from our own Root, Baker, Willkie and Stimson to eminent Europeans like Thomas G. Masaryk, Jules Cambon, Lord Grey, and Russian writers like Bukharin, Radek and Trotsky. The volume closes with the article by "X" on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," recently commented upon so widely, and Croce's famous essay "On Liberty." The contributions, 29 in number, are linked together with brief historical notes, giving each its setting and providing a useful running commentary on the development of world events throughout the period.

YEARS OF CRISIS. BY KENNETH INGRAM. New York: Macmillan, 1947, 487 p. \$5.00.

This "outline of international history" from 1919 to 1945 improves as it proceeds. Part I — Between the Wars — is mercifully short and fairly good on the 30's. The remaining three-fifths provide a competent résumé of World War II.

END OF A BERLIN DIARY. BY WILLIAM L. SHIRER. New York: Knopf, 1947, 369 p. \$3.50.

There are, in effect, two parts of unequal value in this book by one of our leading liberal-minded journalists. In the first he has recorded his day-to-day reactions to events during the last year of the war, including the negotiation of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco. In the second and more valuable part he tells of his return to a defeated but unregenerate Germany in 1945, and warns against the mistake of bringing on a Third German War by allowing, even helping, her to make an economic and military comeback. An interesting feature is Mr. Shirer's reconstruction of several crucial moments in Nazi history on the basis of captured documents and revelations by important German prisoners.

APPEAL TO THE NATIONS. BY NORMAN THOMAS. New York: Holt, 1947, 175 p. \$2.75.

The American Socialist leader, finding that previous routes to peace have led only to more war, comes up with a plan for joint disarmament by the three Great Powers and a renunciation by them of expansionist policies.

LA PAIX MODERNE (1899-1945): DE LA HAYE À SAN FRANCISCO. BY ALBERT DE LA PRADELLE. Paris: Éditions Internationales, 1947, 528 p. Fr. 600.

This volume in large format contains the author's review of progress made toward institutionalizing peace since 1899, followed by the principal documents which illustrate the record. M. de la Pradelle is a distinguished French authority on international law.

FREEDOM AND ORDER: LESSONS FROM THE WAR. BY EDUARD HEIMANN. New York: Scribner, 1947, 344 p. \$3.00.

A Dean at the New School for Social Research tackles an old problem in the light of new conditions. Much of the book has already appeared elsewhere.

LES DÉMAGOGIES CONTRE LES DÉMOCRATIES. By J. TCHERNOFF. Paris: Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1947, 440 p. Fr. 400.

Though the author, a Paris lawyer, has little new to contribute, his correlation of domestic trends within France, Germany, Britain, Russia and the United States up to the outbreak of World War II may be of some interest.

LES DOCTRINES POLITIQUES MODERNES. By B. MIRKINE-GUETZÉVITCH AND OTHERS. New York: Brentano, 1947, 322 p. \$2.50.

Contributions by a dozen European experts.

HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC PEOPLES. By CARL BROCKELMANN. New York: Putnam, 1947, 582 p. \$6.00.

This is an English translation (by Joel Carmichael and Moshe Perlmann) of a book originally appearing in German just at the outbreak of World War II. It is a remarkable *tour de force* of historical synthesis, covering as it does North Africa, Spain, the Balkans and the Upper Nile Valley as well as the Middle Eastern countries. It does not, however, deal with the Moslems of India, Malaya or the East Indies. The translators have appended a review of events for 1939-47. Chronological tables and selected bibliography.

THE NEW EUROPE. By WILLIAM Z. FOSTER. New York: International Publishers, 1947, 128 p. \$1.25.

The American Communist leader observes working-class politics, Soviet activities and capitalist imperialism in western and southeastern Europe.

THE YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS: 1947. EDITED BY GEORGE W. KEETON AND GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER. London: Stevens (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1947, 344 p. 20/.

Though called a yearbook, this first volume in a projected series is in reality a collection of brief monographs on a variety of specific political, legal, economic and cultural problems. The last 60 pages contain reviews of recent books, grouped by subject.

MAN AND THE STATE: MODERN POLITICAL IDEAS. EDITED BY WILLIAM EBENSTEIN. New York: Rinehart, 1947, 781 p. \$5.00.

Excerpts from the writings of numerous modern philosophers, political scientists and statesmen, selected and arranged under 18 principal headings, of which several directly concern international relations.

GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS ABROAD. By JOSEPH S. ROUCEK AND OTHERS. New York: Funk, 1947, 585 p. \$5.00.

The countries dealt with are European, except for the chapter on Turkey and a composite one on Latin America.

THE GOVERNMENTS OF FOREIGN POWERS. By PHILIP W. BUCK AND JOHN W. MASLAND. New York: Holt, 1947, 439 p. \$3.25.

An historical and analytical treatment of England, France, the U.S.S.R., Italy, Germany, Japan and China.

THE INDIVIDUAL, THE STATE AND WORLD GOVERNMENT. By A. C. EWING. New York: Macmillan, 1947, 322 p. \$4.00.

In this searching reevaluation of the moral premises of contemporary society, a lecturer at Cambridge University proceeds from the rights of the individual, through the concept of the state (in particular, the democratic one) to the problem of international government and the prevention of war.

NEW WORLD PRIMER. By JULIEN CORNELL. New York: New Directions, 1947, 174 p. \$2.00.

A young New York lawyer states the need for world government and puts forward suggestions as to its form and functions.

DOCUMENTARY TEXTBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS. By J. EUGENE HARLEY. Los Angeles: Center for International Understanding, 1947, 952 p. \$7.00.

A wide assortment of material, official and unofficial.

LE PRÉAMBULE DE LA CHARTE: BASE IDÉOLOGIQUE DE L'O.N.U. By ANDRÉ SALOMON. Geneva: Trois Collines, 1946, 228 p. Fr. 225.

An historico-juridical analysis, with bibliography.

LA CARTA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Y LA POSTDATA SOVIETICA. By TOMÁS ELORRIETA Y ARTAZA. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo, 1947, 263 p. Ptas. 15.

A critical examination of the structure and functioning of the U.N., with particular reference to Soviet policy and to the Security Council's action in regard to Spain. The author is a professor at the University of Valencia.

VOTING PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS. By WELLINGTON KOO, JR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1947, 349 p. \$4.00.

A scholarly monograph, giving prominence to the rules and practices of the Security Council and other United Nations organs and agencies.

A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS. By ARTHUR NUSSBAUM. New York: Macmillan, 1947, 361 p. \$4.50.

This thoroughly annotated synthesis fills a real need for students and laymen alike.

THE RIGHT TO FLY. By JOHN C. COOPER. New York: Holt, 1947, 380 p. \$5.00.

An analysis of the nature of air power, a review of its development, and an appraisal of the present and potential air strength of the major Powers. Mr. Cooper, until recently Vice President of Pan American Airways, warns against repeating in our coming treaties with Germany and Japan the mistakes of Versailles in regard to air rights. There are notes, bibliography and extensive documentary appendices.

EL NUEVO DERECHO DE GENTES. By EDGARDO MANOTAS WILCHES. Bogotá: Editorial Litografía Colombia, 1946, 251 p.

Chapters on the dynamics of international law as evidenced by the writings of contemporary authorities.

FULL POWERS AND RATIFICATION. By J. MERVYN JONES. New York: Cambridge University Press (Macmillan), 1947, 182 p. \$2.75.

A painstaking investigation into the evolution of two of the most important components in the treaty-making process.

IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF INTERNATIONAL OFFICIALS. By MARTIN HILL. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1947, 281 p. \$2.50.

A careful legal study, based on League experience.

INTERNATIONAL STRAITS: A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW. By ERIK BRÜEL. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1947, 2 v. 32/6.

This important monograph by a Danish authority deals in Volume I with the general legal status of international straits, and in Volume II with particular Straits: Danish, Gibraltar, Turkish and Magellan.

SEIZURE OF TERRITORY. By ROBERT LANGER. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947, 313 p. \$3.50.

This juridico-political study of "the Stimson Doctrine and Related Principles in Legal Theory and Diplomatic Practice," after reviewing the relevant history and law, analyzes diplomatic practice in recent cases of aggression (since 1934) in the Far East, Ethiopia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania and by the Soviet Union.

INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS. By HARRY AUBREY TOULMIN, JR. Cincinnati: Anderson, 1947, 1068 p. \$15.00.

Primarily a compendium of American legislation and court decisions.

LA COUTUME DANS LES CYCLES JURIDIQUES INTERNATIONAUX. By NICOLAS MATEESCO. Paris: Pedone, 1947, 302 p.

A conscientious examination and appraisal of the sources.

MAHAN ON SEA POWER. By WILLIAM E. LIVEZEY. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947, 334 p. \$3.50.

A diligent effort to describe and assess the effect of Mahan's writings and personal influence on the development of American naval power and colonial expansion.

FUNDAMENTALS OF NAVAL WARFARE. By LEE J. LEVERT. New York: Macmillan, 1947, 488 p. \$5.00.

A practical treatise for the layman on weapons and tactics.

THE ATOMIC STORY. By JOHN W. CAMPBELL. New York: Holt, 1947, 297 p. \$3.00.

An illustrated popular exposition.

LETTRES SUR LA BOMBE ATOMIQUE. By DENIS DE ROUGEMONT. New York: Brentano, 1946, 163 p. \$1.25.

Eighteen letters in which the author mulls over a number of problems, political and otherwise, raised by the bomb.

WORLD AFLAME. By LEONARD ENGEL AND EMANUEL S. PILLER. New York: Dial Press, 1947, 126 p. \$2.00.

A history of "the Russian-American War of 1950" which the authors envisage as lasting at least five years despite the use of atomic and bacteriological weapons.

WHITE'S POLITICAL DICTIONARY. By WILBUR W. WHITE. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1947, 378 p. \$3.50.

A handy work of reference, with many entries on foreign affairs.

FACTS ON FILE YEARBOOK 1946, VOL. VI. New York: Person's Index, 1947, 422 p. \$20.00.

The weekly issues of this useful reference review bound as one volume.

General: Economic and Social

WORLD ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. By C. ADDISON HICKMAN AND OTHERS. New York: Pitman, 1947, 400 p. \$4.00.

A coöperative work in which 11 social scientists examine the manifestations and causes of our present worldwide economic breakdown.

PERSISTENT INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. EDITED BY GEORGE B. DE HUSZAR. New York: Harper, 1947, 262 p. \$3.00.

A coöperative work on outstanding economic and social problems.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMMERCIAL POLICY. By LAWRENCE W. TOWLE. New York: Harper, 1947, 780 p. \$4.50.

A comprehensive manual in which the subject matter is broadly defined and which takes account of wartime and postwar developments.

AN INTRODUCTION TO WORLD ECONOMICS. By ERNEST MINOR PATTERSON. New York: Macmillan, 1947, 704 p. \$5.00.

A systematic handbook, primarily for student use.

MONETARY THEORY. By GEORGE N. HALM. Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1946, 491 p. \$3.50.

A readable textbook dealing with the supply and value of money; money and foreign

exchange; and money, investment and employment. The book is written from a descriptive rather than analytical approach, and contains a good chapter on the International Monetary Fund and Bank.

THE LIMITIST. BY FRED I. RAYMOND. New York: Norton, 1947, 166 p. \$2.00.

The author maintains that giantism is not the mark of industrial efficiency or economic justice. He suggests that "we should explore the possibilities of using limitist laws as the method of control, and we should favor their use as opposed to the use of regulation or taxation."

CYCLES: THE SCIENCE OF PREDICTION. BY EDWARD R. DEWEY AND EDWIN F. DAKIN. New York: Holt, 1947, 255 p. \$3.00.

The authors of this volume, consultants in the field of corporate enterprise and public relations, adduce interesting second-hand statistics to the effect that cyclical tendencies have been observed in industrial, biological and solar phenomena.

LE PROSPETTIVE ECONOMICHE DELLA PACE. EDITED BY MARIO MATTEUCCI. Rome: O.E.T., 1946, 435 p. L. 380.

Documents and discussion on recent international financial arrangements and practices, with special attention to the Bretton Woods agreements.

PROBLÈMES D'ÉCONOMIE INTERNATIONALE: LES ÉCHANGES DU CAPITALISME LIBÉRAL. BY JEAN WEILLER. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1946, 232 p. Fr. 240.

A technical study, with particular emphasis on experience since World War I, by a professor at the University of Poitiers.

STRATEGIC MINERALS: A SUMMARY OF USES, WORLD OUTPUT, STOCK-PILES, PROCUREMENT. BY JOHN B. DEMILLE. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947, 626 p. \$7.50.

The geography and economic policy involved in the world's major minerals.

THE ALUMINUM CARTEL. BY LOUIS MARLIO. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1947, 130 p. \$1.50.

Dr. Marlio was Chairman of the International Aluminum Cartel from 1926 to 1939. In this little volume he presents a reasonably objective analysis of its operation and proposes legislation for keeping such combines under control.

LA PHILOSOPHIE DE LA LIBERTÉ COMME INTRODUCTION À LA SYNTHÈSE HUMAINE. BY FRANÇOIS DALENCOUR. Port-au-Prince: The Author, 1947, 544 p. \$3.00.

A treatise by a Haitian surgeon and sociologist.

ECONOMICS OF MIGRATION. BY JULIUS ISAAC. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947, 285 p. \$4.50.

The economic motivation of the great migratory movements of the last hundred years.

POPULATION, PSYCHOLOGY, AND PEACE. BY J. C. FLUGEL. London: Watts, 1947, 142 p. 2/6.

Professor Flugel seeks to explain and to remove the emotional basis on which population problems are so often discussed.

INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL. BY BERTIL A. RENBORG. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1947, 276 p. \$2.50.

A documented "study of international administration by and through the League of Nations," by a former official in the League's Drug Control Service.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR AND PEACE. BY ALBERT C. KNUDSON. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1947, 221 p. \$2.00.

A Dean Emeritus of Boston University's School of Theology denies that war fulfills

fundamental needs but concedes that world peace presupposes man's capacity and willingness to make full use of his intelligence.

THE CULTURAL APPROACH. BY RUTH EMILY McMURRY AND MUNA LEE. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947, 280 p. \$3.50.

An informative survey of the means employed by the principal Powers, and several of the smaller ones, to disseminate information abroad about their cultures. Both authors have been associated with the State Department's Division of Cultural Relations.

RACISM: A WORLD ISSUE. BY EDMUND DAVISON SOPER. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1947, 304 p. \$2.50.

A survey of race discrimination and the treatment of racial minorities throughout the world, with concluding chapters on the problem in general and what the churches can do to help solve it.

APPROACHES TO GROUP UNDERSTANDING: SIXTH SYMPOSIUM. EDITED BY LYMAN BRYSON AND OTHERS. New York: Harper, 1947, 858 p. \$5.00.

Several of the papers in this Sixth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion concern international cultural and administrative problems.

VISAGES DE L'ISLAM. BY HAÏDAR BMMATE (GEORGES RIVOIRE). Lausanne: Payot, 1946, 587 p. Sw. Fr. 12.50 (New York: Heinman, \$4.75).

Useful for its review of the Moslem contribution to western civilization and its discussion of recent political and religious movements within Islam.

The Second World War

THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER IN WORLD WAR II. BY CAPTAIN W. D. PULESTON. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947, 310 p. \$5.00.

A rather pedestrian review by an authority on the writings of Admiral Mahan.

THE RED FLEET IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. BY ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET I. S. ISAKOV. London: Hutchinson, 1947, 124 p. 10/6.

A propagandistic account, dealing with joint army-navy operations in the several theaters. Seven sketch maps.

THE ARMY: BRITISH AND ALLIES: FROM JULY 1943 TO SEPTEMBER 1944. BY MAJOR E. W. SHEPPARD. London: Hutchinson, 1946, 320 p. 21/.

The text and illustrations deal primarily with the European theaters.

THE ROYAL NAVY AND ALLIES: FROM JULY 1943 TO SEPTEMBER 1944. BY COMMANDER KENNETH EDWARDS. London: Hutchinson, 1947, 312 p. 21/.

A profusely illustrated companion volume to the above, with only two chapters on the Pacific campaign.

LES SECRETS DE LA GUERRE DÉVOILÉS PAR NUREMBERG. BY RAYMOND CARTIER. Paris: Fayard, 1947, 318 p. Fr. 150.

Certain crucial episodes from the German and Italian plan of aggression, and its execution, as elucidated in the revelations at Nuremberg.

PERCHÉ PERDEMMO LA GUERRA. BY GENERAL CARLO FAVAGROSSA. Milan: Rizzoli, 1947, 306 p. L. 350.

General Favagrossa was from September 1939 in charge of Italian war production (after February 1943 with the rank of minister). In this important book he documents, among other things, the inefficiency of the Fascist productive apparatus and (as he describes it) "the excessive complacency of Mussolini towards the Germans" and the "rapacity" of the latter, against which he protested upon several occasions. There is a good concluding chapter, and a 60-page appendix of documents.

5 YEARS: THE OCCUPATION OF DENMARK IN PICTURES. EDITED BY ERNST

MENTZE. New York: Bonnier, 1946, \$3.50. 230 p.

A remarkable photographic record.

OPERATIONS IN NORTH AFRICAN WATERS. OCTOBER 1942-JUNE 1943. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II, VOLUME II. BY SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1947, 297 p. \$6.00.

The author, professor of American history at Harvard, was commissioned early in the war to prepare an historical account of the part played by the United States Navy. There are to be 14 volumes, of which this is the first to be published, though it is second in the series as planned. Though he claims that this is not an official publication, Professor Morison has had every sort of assistance from the Navy Department and was present at the landings in Morocco — to which most of this volume is devoted.

LA DISFATTA NEL DESERTO. BY GEROLAMO PEDOJA. Rome: O.E.T., 1946, 209 p. L. 160.

An Italian correspondent with the Axis forces in North Africa during 1942 and early 1943 describes their defeat and analyzes its causes.

AND BLOW NOT THE TRUMPET: A PRELUDE TO PERIL. BY STANLEY D. PORTEUS. Palo Alto (Cal.): Pacific Books, 1947, 304 p. \$3.50.

A psychologist explores the civilian state of mind in Hawaii just before and after Pearl Harbor, and finds that it was better prepared than the armed forces.

BATTLE REPORT: PACIFIC WAR — MIDDLE PHASE. BY CAPTAIN WALTER KARIG AND COMMANDER ERIC PURDON. New York: Rinehart, 1947, 434 p. \$5.00.

This is the third volume in a competent series on the rôle of the United States Navy in the Pacific and describes in factual detail the period from the Battle of the Coral Sea to the end of the Solomons campaign.

THE JAPANESE AT LEYTE GULF. BY JAMES A. FIELD, JR. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947, 162 p. \$2.50.

The author has performed the unique feat of describing, in accurate detail, the action of a defeated fleet in a great naval battle within less than four years of the event. Mr. Field, who was present at Leyte Gulf, has based his account on data revealed by Japanese naval officers and in official Japanese documents.

SEMPER FIDELIS. EDITED BY CAPTAIN PATRICK O'SHEEL AND STAFF SERGEANT GENE COOK. New York: Sloane, 1947, 360 p. \$3.50.

Numerous vignettes of Marine Corps action in the Pacific from 1942 to 1945.

GATEWAY TO VICTORY. BY CAPTAIN JAMES W. HAMILTON AND FIRST LIEUTENANT WILLIAM J. BOLCE, JR. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1946, 220 p. \$3.00.

The story of the vital San Francisco Army Port of Embarkation.

THE FARMER IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. BY WALTER W. WILCOX. Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1947, 410 p. \$4.00.

A statistical analysis of government policy, production, prices and related problems of American farming, by one of the country's leading agricultural economists.

NEW YORK 1939-1945. BY PIERRE DE LANUX. Paris: Hachette, 1947, 223 p. Fr. 140.

How New York reacted to the war, reported by an observant French political writer.

The United States

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. EDITED BY QUINCY WRIGHT. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947, 404 p. \$4.50.

These papers and discussion reports constitute the proceedings of the 22nd Institute of the Norman Wait Harris Foundation, in which some 70 American scholars took part.

THE CALCULATED RISK. By HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG. New York: Macmillan, 1947, 68 p. \$1.50.

In this compact little volume, the Editor of *FOREIGN AFFAIRS* draws together some of his ideas on the Soviet-American problem and makes concrete suggestions as to how we can handle it most effectively in Europe and in the United Nations. His proposal for strengthening the U.N. has been approved by Senator Vandenberg and others.

AMERICAN POLICY AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 1925-1928. By DOROTHY BORG. New York: Macmillan (for the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1947, 440 p. \$5.00.

A first-rate monograph, well documented and with appraisals of men and policies.

AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT: ITS ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES. By HAJO HOLBORN. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1947, 243 p. \$3.50.

An authoritative account of how our military government of occupied territories was organized and how it operated during the early months, by one who played a significant part in planning it. The second half contains "documents on civil affairs 1943-46."

IL COMMERCIO ESTERO DEGLI STATI UNITI D'AMERICA CON SPECIALE RIGUARDO AGLI SCAMBI CON L'ITALIA. By ALBANO MURGI. Rome: Edizioni Italiane, 1946, 204 p. L. 370.

Part Four deals cursorily with Italo-American trade in recent decades.

AMERICAN TARIFF POLICY TOWARDS THE PHILIPPINES 1898-1946. By PEDRO E. ABELARDE. New York: King's Crown Press, 1947, 233 p. \$2.75.

A scholarly historical analysis of the effect of American tariff legislation — for better and for worse — on the development of the islands' economy.

TREASON'S PEACE. By HOWARD WATSON AMBRUSTER. New York: Beechhurst Press, 1947, 438 p. \$3.75.

Mr. Ambruster, an American chemical engineer, has long made a study of the close relations between the German chemical trust — I.G. Farben — and certain American corporations. By citing a wealth of official sources, he spells out in detail the nature of this tie-up and warns against its perpetuation.

THE AMERICAN INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISE SYSTEM. By THE ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES COMMISSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946, 2 v. \$10.00.

A series of papers replete with statistical information and graphic illustration.

AMERICAN COMMUNISM. By JAMES ONEAL AND G. A. WERNER. New York: Dutton, 1947, 416 p. \$5.00.

This revision of Oneal's "American Communism" (published in 1927) was prepared by Professor Werner, authority on Russian history. Oneal's chapters on the early years of American Communism are still the best in the book, for Werner's treatment of the last two decades is far from complete. Even so, the thoroughgoing servitude of the American Communists to Soviet policy is amply documented.

A TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONGRESS. By ESTES KEFAUVER AND JACK LEVIN. New York: Essential, 1947, 236 p. \$3.00.

Suggestions for streamlining the functioning of both Houses of Congress. Mr. Kefauver is a progressive young Congressman from Tennessee.

TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION. By EDWARD S. CORWIN. New York: Knopf, 1947, 182 p. \$2.50.

In these five lectures on the constitutional implications of our wartime experience, a noted authority shows how the power of the President has grown at the expense of the other branches of government.

PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS. BY WILFRED E. BINKLEY. New York: Knopf, 1947, 312 p. \$4.00.

A sound historical treatment of their relations from Washington to Truman.

A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS. BY THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947, 138 p. \$2.00.

This is the "General Report on Mass Communication: Newspapers, Radio, Motion Pictures, Magazines, and Books" issued by the Commission on Freedom of the Press appointed by Chancellor Hutchins of Chicago University and financed largely with a grant from *Time*. It is brief and to the point, and it is critical of the manner in which the owners of the press (broadly defined) are discharging their obligations to the American public. It makes recommendations for remedying these derelictions.

REFUGEES IN AMERICA. BY MAURICE R. DAVIE AND OTHERS. New York: Harper, 1947, 453 p. \$4.50.

A report on the nature of the recent refugee movement into the United States and the part these newcomers play in American life.

JIM CROW AMERICA. BY EARL CONRAD. New York: Duell, 1947, 237 p. \$3.00.

A white journalist pulls no punches in describing the treatment of Negroes in this country or in his recommendations for improving conditions.

THE WALLACES OF IOWA. BY RUSSELL LORD. Boston: Houghton, 1947, 615 p. \$5.00.

Over a century is covered in this friendly yet objective story of three generations.

THIS IS MY STORY. BY LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ. New York: Whittlesey House, 1947, 379 p. \$3.00.

Born and educated as a Catholic, Budenz drifted away from the Church and in 1935 entered the American Communist Party, where for several years he was on the National Committee and managing editor of the *Daily Worker*. In 1945 he foresook Marxism and was readmitted to the Catholic Church. This is his own story of his psychological migration from one faith to another, and return. It throws a lurid light on the intellectual depravity of Soviet-dominated Communist leaders in this country but is largely devoid of startling "inside" revelations.

AMERICAN THOUGHT 1947. New York: Gresham Press, 1947, 502 p. \$3.75.

This is the opening volume in a new venture, which in time the publishers hope to extend to cover other parts of the world. The 49 contributors run a wide gamut of subjects, including several germane to international relations.

ALASKA, LAND OF TOMORROW. BY EDWARD A. HERRON. New York: Whittlesey House, 1947, 232 p. \$2.75.

The advantages and disadvantages of life in the Territory, described primarily for prospective G.I. settlers there.

Western Europe

THE EUROPEAN COCKPIT. BY WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN. New York: Macmillan, 1947, 330 p. \$4.00.

In stating the case for a West European Federation, to be formed with American help and to constitute a fourth Great Power, Mr. Chamberlin reiterates his well-known point of view, mainly favorable to Germany, mainly unfavorable to the Soviets.

DÉFENSE DE LA PAIX: DE WASHINGTON AU QUAI D'ORSAY. BY GEORGES BONNET. Geneva: Éditions du Cheval Ailé, 1946, 390 p. Sw. Fr. 10.

This defense by the man who was French Foreign Minister at the time of Munich repeatedly cites the industrial and military weakness of France vis-à-vis Germany, and the lack of support she received from Britain, Russia and the United States. It seems

probable, however, that he was so obsessed with the dangers inherent in French weakness that he would have been the unhappiest man in Europe if the backing of those Powers had projected France into a war honoring her commitment to Czechoslovakia.

ENTRE DEUX GUERRES: SOUVENIRS SUR LA III^e RÉPUBLIQUE. By J. PAUL-BONCOUR. New York: Brentano, 1945-1946, 3 v. \$7.00.

Volume I of these memoirs of the French statesman deals with the period ending in 1918, Volume II with the years 1919-1934, and the final one with "les chemins de la défaite" (1934-1940). M. Paul-Boncour's pages are filled with facts and judgments on French and European politics in which he was long a prominent figure.

FROM DREYFUS TO PETAIN. By WILHELM HERZOG. New York: Creative Age Press, 1947, 313 p. \$3.50.

In his final chapter of this reconstruction of the Dreyfus case on the basis of new documentation, the author seeks to show that the old division, revealed a half century ago by the famous *affaire*, still cuts through the heart of French politics.

FRENCH LABOR FROM POPULAR FRONT TO LIBERATION. By HENRY W. EHRLMANN. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of World Affairs), 1947, 329 p. \$4.00.

A sound, well-informed monograph on the economic policies and political rôle of the labor movement in France from 1934 to 1944.

MONETARY RECONSTRUCTION IN BELGIUM. By LÉON H. DUPRIEZ. New York: King's Crown Press (for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1947, 88 p. \$2.25.

A somewhat technical account of the economic and legislative means employed to revive Belgium's monetary stability after World War II, by a professor at the University of Louvain.

THE NETHERLANDS IN A CHANGING WORLD. By BART LANDHEER. New York: Roy, 1947, 224 p. \$3.00.

Essays on a variety of postwar problems in Holland, with two concluding chapters on Indonesia. Useful bibliography.

LE RELÈVEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE ET FINANCIER DE LA HOLLANDE. By EDOUARD SILZ. Paris: Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1947, 101 p. Fr. 60.

The Netherlands' recovery presented as a triumph of planned economy.

THE ICE-CAPPED ISLAND: GREENLAND. By KÅRE RODAHL. London: Blackie, 1946, 142 p. 12/6.

An illustrated report on a scientific expedition to East Greenland.

THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY. By HOYT PRICE AND CARL E. SCHORSKE. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1947, 161 p. \$2.00.

Dr. Price explores such questions as how Germany is to feed herself, what foreign raw materials she will require, what kind of industry she needs to become self-sustaining and the implications of a special control of the Ruhr. Professor Schorske traces the conflict of nationalism and democracy in Germany and describes the present social structure, the nature of the political parties and the position of the churches and universities. Allen W. Dulles contributes an introduction.

GERMANY — BRIDGE OR BATTLEGROUND. By JAMES P. WARBURG. New York: Harcourt, 1947, 386 p. \$3.50.

After studying the experience of the occupying Powers, Mr. Warburg decides to eschew both of the extremist schools of thought on what to do with Germany. What he wants is a Germany economically strong enough to stand on her own feet and not become a permanent charge on the rest of the world.

STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY. BY RUSSELL HILL. New York: Harper, 1947, 260 p. \$3.00.

The author's report on conditions and affairs in postwar Germany, and particularly his observations on the behavior of the American occupation forces, are intelligent and critical. Less convincing are his suggestions for arranging Germany's future.

REPORT ON THE GERMANS. BY W. L. WHITE. New York: Harcourt, 1947, 260 p. \$3.00.

In this hastily composed volume Mr. White is as tender with the Germans as he was tough with the Soviets in his "Report on the Russians."

THE SOLUTION OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM. BY WILHELM RÖPKE. New York: Putnam, 1947, 282 p. \$3.00.

Professor Röpke, anti-Nazi exile and distinguished social scientist, warns against missing what may be the last chance to put the Germans back on the track of western civilization. However, his logic sometimes seems typically Teutonic, and in the end he offers no real solution.

GERMANY UNDER OCCUPATION: ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIALS AND DOCUMENTS. BY JAMES K. POLLOCK AND JAMES H. MEISEL. Ann Arbor (Michigan): Wahr, 1947, 306 p. \$3.00.

Mostly official documents, the remainder being authoritative statements in reliable periodicals. Professor Pollock served as a principal American adviser on occupation policies in Germany.

FINAL JUDGMENT: THE STORY OF NUREMBERG. BY VICTOR H. BERNSTEIN. New York: Boni and Gaer, 1947, 289 p. \$3.50.

A journalistic interpretation of the evolution of Nazism as revealed in the documents placed before the court at Nuremberg.

NUREMBERG DIARY. BY G. M. GILBERT. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947, 471 p. \$5.00.

Insight into the inner workings of the leading defendants at Nuremberg, by an American psychologist who studied them.

PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN A CONTROLLED ECONOMY. BY SAMUEL LURIE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1947, 243 p. \$3.00.

Nazi Germany prior to World War II is closely studied as a type case.

IG FARBEN. BY RICHARD SASULY. New York: Boni and Gaer, 1947, 312 p. \$3.00.

After reviewing the world-wide political and economic activities of Farben on behalf of the German Government, both before and during Hitler's régime, Mr. Sasuly asks some very pointed questions about Anglo-American policy toward this monster combine. His association with the Allied Control Council has made him frankly skeptical of our intentions really to destroy this potential agency of German military recovery.

BELSEN UNCOVERED. BY DERRICK SINGTON. London: Duckworth, 1946, 208 p. 8/6.

A report on one of the most notorious of the Nazi death-camps, by a British officer who spent five months there after it had been liberated.

THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA 1918-1934. BY MARY MACDONALD. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1946, 165 p. \$2.50.

In this excellent little monograph the author seeks to explain why the war-born republic did not live up to its early democratic promise. The final chapter concerns the influence of foreign policy, and the 50-page appendix contains relevant documents.

THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF SWITZERLAND. BY GEORGE SAUSER-

HALL. New York: Swiss National Travel Office, 1946, 208 p.

An excellent introduction to the structure and operation of the federal and local governments, with numerous illustrations.

LA SVIZZERA: UN PICCOLO POPOLO, UN GRANDE ESEMPIO. BY EGIDIO REALE. Lugano (Switzerland): Ghilda del Libro, 1946, 199 p. Sw. Fr. 4.

An appreciation of the Swiss people and their free institutions by an anti-Fascist exile who found a haven in their country.

L'ASSEMBLEA COSTITUENTE. BY ROBERTO LUCIFREDI. Milan: Giuffrè, 1946, 128 p. L. 50.

A concise manual on the composition, powers and functions of the Constituent Assembly at Rome.

LA RIVOLUZIONE MERIDIONALE. BY GUIDO DORSO. Rome: Einaudi, 1945, 328 p. L. 280.

The expanded version of a provocative book on the political problems of southern Italy, first published in 1925 and soon suppressed by the Fascist régime.

CON ROMA E CON MOSCA: QUARANT'ANNI DI BATTAGLIE. BY GUIDO MIGLIOLI. Milan: Garzanti, 1945, 325 p. L. 300.

A Christian Socialist deputy before the March on Rome, and later an anti-Fascist exile, writes of his experiences and hopes for the creation of a "Peasant International."

LA QUESTIONE AGRARIA NELLA RINASCITA NAZIONALE ITALIANA. BY EMILIO SERENI. Rome: Einaudi, 1946, 461 p. L. 400.

A comprehensive, authoritative survey of the economic and political problems facing Italy's most important occupation — agriculture.

LA PAPAUTÉ CONTEMPORAINE (1878-1945). BY HENRY MARC-BONNET. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1946, 135 p. Fr. 39.

A summary of papal policy, social and political as well as religious, since Pius IX.

EMBAJADORES SOBRE ESPAÑA. BY JOSÉ MARÍA DE AREILZA. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1947, 272 p. Ptas. 15.

Essays on recent Spanish foreign policy, inspired *inter alia* by the writings of former President Alcalá Zamora, William C. Bullitt, Sir Samuel Hoare and Carlton Hayes. The author prefers the latter to Hoare as a reporter on the Spanish scene.

LINHA GERAL. BY A. LÔBO VILELA. Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1946, 148 p. Escudos 12.50.

Essays on politics and economics, particularly on corporativism in Portugal.

LES VALLS D'ANDORRA. RECULL DOCUMENTAL. BY BONAVENTURA RIBERA-AYGUA ARGELICH. Barcelona: Bosch, 1946, 351 p. Ptas. 60.

A detailed and illustrated treatise on the constitutional history and government of the diminutive republic, by the Secretary of its General Council.

Eastern Europe

UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIANS. EDITED BY BERNHARD J. STERN AND SAMUEL SMITH. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1947, 246 p. \$2.75.

Most of the material in this volume originally appeared in reviews supported by or friendly toward the Soviet Government. It deals with many phases of Russian economic, social and cultural life.

FORCED LABOR IN SOVIET RUSSIA. BY DAVID J. DALLIN AND BORIS I. NICOLAEVSKY. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947, 331 p. \$3.75.

Using such scattered data as are available, the authors have sought to depict one of the more repulsive features of the Soviet system.

PATTERN FOR WORLD REVOLUTION. BY YPSILON. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1947, 479 p. \$3.50.

"Ypsilon" is purportedly a joint-pseudonym concealing two former operatives of the Comintern with wide experience in Central Europe and the Balkans. Unfortunately the book strives for sensationalism and contains no documentation. Its chief value is its intimate picture of the Comintern in the 20's and of some of its greater luminaries.

THE STORY OF THE UKRAINE. BY CLARENCE A. MANNING. New York: Philosophical Library, 1947, 326 p. \$3.75.

The author's pro-Ukrainian and anti-Russian sentiments lead him into certain distortions of the modern period.

RED MIRACLE. BY EDWARD PODOLSKY. New York: Beechhurst Press, 1947, 274 p. \$3.50.

The triumphs of Soviet medical research and education.

ÚVAHY O SLOVANSTVÍ. BY EDVARD BENEŠ. Prague: Čin, 1947, 366 p. Kč. 126.

Scholarly studies on the evolution of Pan-Slavism, by the Czechoslovak President.

AN EXPERIMENT IN FRIENDSHIP. BY DAVID HINSHAW. New York: Putnam 1947, 147 p. \$2.50.

A description of recent Quaker relief work in Finland.

DR. BENEŠ. BY COMPTON MACKENZIE. London: Harrap, 1946, 356 p. 21/.

A satisfying full-length portrait of the Czech statesman — his early life, his political career and his ideas. Many illustrations.

TISÍCILETOU STOPOU. BY MILOŠ V. KRATOCHVÍL. Prague: Sfinx, 1947, 396 p. Kč. 285.

A successful attempt to interpret Czechoslovak history in social terms.

UNDER THE CARPATHIANS. BY J. B. HEISLER AND J. E. MELLON. London: Drummond, 1947, 123 p. 12/6.

A beautifully illustrated description of life in Carpatho-Ukraine.

EUROPEAN CROSSROAD. BY ILYA EHRENBURG. New York: Knopf, 1947, 176 p. \$2.00.

The noted Soviet journalist reports on a quick trip through Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and Czechoslovakia, made shortly after their liberation.

TITO'S IMPERIAL COMMUNISM. BY R. H. MARKHAM. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947, 292 p. \$4.00.

Mr. Markham, for many years an American correspondent in Balkan and Danubian Europe and long in close touch with both peasants and leaders, presents a pretty thoroughly anti-Tito version of events in this important review of recent Yugoslav history.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1945. BY R. B. MCCALLUM AND ALISON READMAN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947, 311 p. \$5.00.

A remarkably cogent analysis of the issues, the campaign and the results.

LABOUR'S FIRST YEAR. BY J. E. D. HALL. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1947, 213 p. 1/.

A journalist's neat summary of the 1945-46 session of Parliament.

SOCIALISM OVER SIXTY YEARS. BY FENNER BROCKWAY. London: Allen and Unwin (for the National Labour Press), 1946, 415 p. 16/.

A first-rate biography of the late Lord Jowett of Bradford, and a history of the Independent Labour Party, of which the author, an M.P., was formerly a member.

THE COLONIAL OFFICE FROM WITHIN, 1909-1945. BY SIR COSMO PARKINSON. London: Faber, 1947, 157 p. 8/6.

The evolution of the Colonial Office, its policies and its leading personalities over the last half century, as viewed by its recently retired head.

COLONY TO NATION: A HISTORY OF CANADA. BY ARTHUR R. M. LOWER. New York: Longmans, 1947, 600 p. \$5.50.

An authoritative, readable summary up through World War II.

THE SOVIET SPIES. BY RICHARD HIRSCH. New York: Duell, 1947, 92 p. \$1.00.

A onetime American intelligence officer retells the story of Soviet espionage as revealed by the Canadian inquiry and trials at the close of World War II.

SOUTH AFRICA, WHAT NOW? BY ALEXANDER CAMPBELL. Capetown: Stewart, 1947, 185 p. 10/6.

Mr. Campbell ranges pretty widely over the economic, social and racial problems of South Africa, and makes forthright suggestions on how to face them more intelligently.

STRUGGLE ON THE VELD. BY RODERICK PEATTIE. New York: Vanguard, 1947, 264 p. \$3.50.

An American geographer, head of the wartime OWI mission in South Africa, writes enthusiastically of the country but has few illusions about the archaic and unstable economic and social relations between white and Bantu.

GENERAL J. B. M. HERTZOG. BY C. M. VAN DEN HEEVER. Johannesburg: A.P.B. Bookstore, 1946, 298 p. 26/6.

An appreciation of the late Afrikaner leader and a defense of his policies, in and out of power. The complete version of this work was published in Afrikaans in 1943.

THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY IN WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION. BY E. RONALD WALKER. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1947, 426 p. \$6.00.

A comprehensive exposition of Australia's contribution to the common war effort and of the changes it brought about in her economic life. The author was Deputy Director General of the Australian Department of War Organization of Industry.

NEW ZEALAND. EDITED BY HORACE BELSHAW. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947, 329 p. \$5.00.

Authoritative, factual chapters, by a dozen hands, on the country, the people, their institutions and their economic and social life.

THE BRITISH IN INDIA. BY P. J. GRIFFITHS. London: Hale, 1946, 222 p. 10/6.

The author is a former member of the Indian Civil Service and a leader of the European Group in the Legislative Assembly. In this quite readable and judicious appraisal, he concludes that on balance British rule performed a useful service for the Indian people but that they must now carry on alone.

DIVIDED INDIA. BY ROBERT AURA SMITH. New York: Whittlesey House, 1947, 259 p. \$3.00.

A wartime official of the OWI in India, writing in 1946, opposes the division of India that has now become an actuality.

BROWN EMPIRE. BY ERSKINE WYSE. London: Background Books, 1946, 125 p. 8/6.

The author weighs India's chances of translating political independence into reality.

INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL IN INDIA (1938-39). BY M. V. DIVATIA AND H. M. TRIVEDI. Bombay: Tripathi, 1947, 91 p. Rs.5 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, \$2.50).

A technical study of investment, production and cognate problems.

LOCATION OF INDUSTRIES IN INDIA. BY TULSI RAM SHARMA. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1946, 257 p. Rs. 7/8.

A careful analysis of geographical and other factors, considered industry by industry.

INDIAN ROUTE MARCH. BY LOUIS HAGEN. New York: Pilot Press, 1946, 192 p. \$2.50.

A German-born journalist on an Anglo-American army newspaper in the CBI and Southeast Asia Theaters gives his impressions of India.

The Near East

OSMANLI IMPARATORLUĞU DEVRİNDE BOĞAZLAR MESELESİ. BY CEMAL TUKİN. Istanbul: Istanbul University, 1947, 387 p. \$1.50.

An important study of the Straits from the Middle Ages to 1920, making use of Turkish archives as well as European sources and secondary material.

PROMISED LAND. BY ELLEN THORBECKE. New York: Harper, 1947, 171 p. \$3.50.

A loose-leaf, illustrated panorama of Palestine and its people.

PALESTINE'S INDUSTRIAL FUTURE. BY E. SCHMORAK. Jerusalem: Mass, 1946, 275 p. £P 1.200.

The author seeks, with an imposing array of factual and statistical data, to prove the future to be bright.

SIYASAT-I INGLIS DAR HALIJ-I FARS: WA DJOGRAPHIYA-I DJAZAIR-I BAHRAIN. BY MANSUR GURGANI. Teheran: Ketab-Khaneh Danesh, 1946, 189 p. 7/6.

A review of British policy in the Persian Gulf and of the historical geography of the oil-rich Bahrein Islands.

IRAN: AN ECONOMIC STUDY. BY RAJ NARAIN GUPTA. New Delhi: Indian Institute of International Affairs, 1947, 169 p. Rs. 5/8.

A compendium of facts and figures, illustrated with charts, tables, maps and photographs, and taking into account war-produced conditions.

IRAN-I KUNUNI WA KHALIJ-I FARS. BY ISMAIL NURZADA BUSHAHRI. Teheran: Ketab-Khaneh Danesh, 1946, 216 p. 10/6.

A survey of contemporary Iran and the Persian Gulf area.

The Far East

ASIA IN THE MODERN WORLD. BY H. VENKATASUBBIAH. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1947, 118 p. Rs. 5.

A summary of political and economic information on most of the Asiatic countries, prepared for the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi early in 1947.

THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION IN CHINA. BY ISRAEL EPSTEIN. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947, 442 p. \$3.50.

The author, who has lived in China over a quarter century, believes the future of that country lies with the Communists, not the Kuomintang and its American backers.

JOURNEY TO RED CHINA. BY ROBERT PAYNE. London: Heinemann, 1947, 198 p. 8/6.

An account of the author's visit to Yenan and some of the hinterland areas held by the Communist forces, who earn the author's favorable regard.

A SHORT HISTORY OF JAPAN. BY A. L. SADLER. London: Angus and Robertson, 1946, 378 p. 21/.

A fast-paced survey, by a professor at Sydney University.

RICHER BY ASIA. BY EDMOND TAYLOR. Boston: Houghton, 1947, 432 p. \$3.75.

A writer who established a reputation with his "Strategy of Terror" turns to India and southeastern Asia, where he was taken by wartime work with the OSS. His reactions to the cultures and the problems of these countries are sensitive and apposite.

THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM IN THE ORIENT. BY RALPH CONISTON. New York: Norton, 1947, 233 p. \$3.00.

Mr. Coniston confines himself largely to reporting, with only a little generalizing. He is mostly concerned with describing political and economic movements he observed in India, southeast Asia and the Far East.

THE PHILIPPINE STORY. BY DAVID BERNSTEIN. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947, 276 p. \$3.75.

A writer conversant at first hand with Philippine affairs reviews the history of the islands and weighs the political and economic problems confronting the young republic. He finds that American responsibility towards it will endure for some time to come.

Africa

AFRICAN CHALLENGE. BY JOSEPHINE KAMM. Edinburgh: Nelson, 1947, 96 p. 6/.
An elementary history of British penetration in Africa.

STUDIES IN AFRICAN NATIVE LAW. BY JULIUS LEWIN. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947, 174 p. \$2.50.

Essays dealing *inter alia* with the interaction of native and European legal concepts, by a professor at Witwatersrand University.

Latin America

EL DESTINO DE AMÉRICA. BY JULIO NAVARRO MONZÓ. Buenos Aires: Losada, 1946, 213 p. Pesos 4.

Essays on historical, political and literary subjects.

DEMOCRACY AND EMPIRE IN THE CARIBBEAN. BY PAUL BLANSHARD. New York: Macmillan, 1947, 379 p. \$5.00.

Out of his wide experience as an American official attached to the Caribbean Commission, Mr. Blanshard has written this informative and critical survey of the none-too-happy political, economic and social conditions in the West Indian islands.

EMPIRE IN GREEN AND GOLD. BY CHARLES MORROW WILSON. New York: Holt, 1947, 303 p. \$3.50.

A popular history of the origins of the American banana trade in the Caribbean.

CONDICIONES DE VIDA DE LAS CLASES JORNALERAS DE PUERTO RICO. BY FÉLIX MEJÍAS. Río Piedras: University of Puerto Rico, 1946, 215 p.

A statistical study of labor conditions, by a trained economist.

UN AÑO DE GOBIERNO 1945-1946. BY ALBERTO LLERAS. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1946, 398 p.

Addresses and other state papers by the then President of Colombia.

THE BRAZILIANS: PEOPLE OF TOMORROW. BY HERNANE TAVARES DE SÁ. New York: Day, 1947, 248 p. \$3.00.

This is a most readable book, full of wit, wisdom and not a little criticism of the recent Vargas dictatorship.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain*: British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, Caribbean Commission*, Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office*: 734 Jackson Place, Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Superintendent of Documents and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office unless otherwise noted.

BALTIC STATES

BALTIC problem and United Nations; facts in review, by Alfred Bilmanis. Washington, Latvian Legation, 1947. 64 p.

LATVIA as an independent state, by Alfred Bilmanis. Washington, Latvian Legation, 1947. 405 p. \$5.00.

BURMA

BURMA Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry, 1947; report. London, 1947. 24 p. (Cmd.7138.) 6d.

COMMERCIAL POLICY AND TRADE

DRAFT charter for the International Trade Organization of the United Nations. Washington, 1947. 87 p. (Dept. of State Publication 2927. Commercial Policy Series 106.) 30¢.

REPORT of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (20 January to 25 February 1947). Lake Success, United Nations, 1947. 82 p. (E/PC/T/34/Rev.1.) 75¢.

RECIPROCAL trade agreements program. Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., on the operation of the Trade Agreements Act and the proposed International Trade Organization. March 26-May 9, 1947. Washington, 1947. 1731 p.

CULTURAL RELATIONS

INTER-AMERICAN Conference of Experts on Copyright. Washington, 1947. 81 p. (Dept. of State Publication 2827. Conference Series 99.) 25¢.

UNITED STATES information and educational exchange act of 1947. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R.3342. July 2-5, 1947. Washington, 1947. 123 p.

FAR EAST

PROVIDING for membership and participation by the United States in the South Pacific Commission. Report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H.J.Res.232. July 16, 1947. Washington, 1947. 6 p. (H.Rept.957.)

— Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate. July 22, 1947. Washington, 1947. 5 p. (S.Rept. 685.)

FASCISM

FASCISM in action; a documented study and analysis of Fascism in Europe. Washington, 1947. 206 p. (80th Cong., 1st Sess., H.Doc.401.) 40¢.

FINANCIAL POLICY AND EXCHANGE

INTERNATIONAL Bank for Reconstruction and Development; second annual report, 1946-1947. Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1947. 40 p.

INTERNATIONAL Monetary Fund. First annual meeting of the Board of Governors. Report of the Executive Directors and summary proceedings. Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1946. 128 p.

GERMANY

L'ÉCONOMIE de la Ruhr, prepared by Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1947. 82 p. 360 fr.

L'ÉCONOMIE de la Sarre, prepared by Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1947. 147 p. 280 fr.

GREAT BRITAIN

THE COLONIAL empire (1939-1947). London, 1947. 124 p. (Cmd.7167.) 2s.6d.

DEVELOPMENT and welfare in the West Indies 1945-46. London, 1947. 162 p. (Colonial No. 212.) 3s.

GREECE

THE UNITED Nations and the problem of Greece. Washington, 1947. 97 p. (Dept. of State Publication 2909. Near Eastern Series 9.) 45¢.

THE CONSPIRACY against Greece (a translation from the Greek text). Athens, Greek Under-Secretariat for Press and Information, 1947. 165 p.

INDIA

INDIAN Policy; statement of 3rd June, 1947. London, 1947. 6 p. (Cmd.7136.) 2d.

JAPAN

THE CONSTITUTION of Japan. Washington, 1947. 13 p. (Dept. of State Publication 2836. Far Eastern Series 22.)

LATIN AMERICA

GUIDE to the law and legal literature of Bolivia. Washington, Library of Congress, 1947. 110 p. (Latin American Series No. 12.) 55¢.

GUIDE to the law and legal literature of the Mexican States. Washington, Library of Congress, 1947. 180 p. (Latin American Series No. 13.) 60¢.

GUIDE to the law and legal literature of Paraguay. Washington, Library of Congress, 1947. 59 p. (Latin American Series No. 14.) 25¢.

GUIDE to the official publications of the other American Republics. Washington, Library of Congress, 1947.

4. Chile. 94 p. 25¢. 16. Paraguay. 61 p. 15¢.

INTER-AMERICAN military coöperation act. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R.3836. June 23-26, July 2, 1947. 149 p.

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— Report, July 16, 1947. Washington, 1947. 15 p. (H.Rept.955.)

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Guatemala. 26 p. Honduras. 24 p. El Salvador. 29 p.

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REPORT to the General Assembly by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. Lake Success, United Nations, 1947. 165 p. (A/364.)

— Annexes 1 to 21 and appendix. Lake Success, United Nations, 1947. 157 p. (A/364/Add.1.)

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